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This study provides an insightful contribution to our understanding of social 
enterprise by investigating the governance of specific organisational types of social 
enterprise within the context of sport provision. It helps us understand how two 
Leisure Trusts, one being a Benefit for Community (BenCom) and the other a 
Company Limited by Guarantee with Charitable Status (CLG-CS) can improve sport 
provision. Specifically, the study examines how each Leisure Trust manages 
tensions associated with the creation of social and financial value and therein avoid 
mission drift. Contemporary discourse on this issue is limited at best. Therefore, this 
study helps further our understanding of social enterprise in the UK. The study was 
conducted within the context of sport and leisure provision in the UK and examined 
two Leisure Trusts via qualitative case studies on each organisation. Interviews with 
senior management and board members/trustees along with direct observations 
produced the evidential trail. 
 
This study presents findings which highlight specific challenges facing different types 
of social enterprise and how they can impact upon the occurrence of mission drift. 
The findings show us that there is no single distinct approach to managing 
competing tensions across the two Leisure Trusts investigated. This study claims 
that mission drift in Leisure Trusts is a fluid process and is influenced by numerous 
factors, particularly the austerity measures imposed on local councils. It is argued 
the role of government policy plays a significant part in the development of both 
organisations. It is argued that austerity is becoming a veneer for privatisation of 
public sport provision delivery for the Leisure Trusts examined. The study suggests 
that one Leisure Trust is at considerable risk of future mission drift because of their 
focus on social objectives and oversight of financial stability. The stakeholder model 
of governance within this Leisure Trust prevents the CEO from performing their role 
adequately to address the challenges they face. The other Leisure Trust was found 
to possess a stewardship governance model which enables the organisation to take 
advantage of commercial opportunities whilst retaining and resourcing the creation of 
social value. The Managing Director of this Leisure Trust is given authority to make 
strategic and operational decisions in the interest of their stakeholders.  
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The social enterprise sector is making an increasingly important and significant 
contribution to UK communities and economies (Teasdale & Buckingham, 2013). 
This has led to heightened interest in academic communities in relation to the 
understanding of social enterprise and its various organisational types (Bull & Ridley-
Duff, 2018). This study aims to contribute to this debate by examining a specific form 
of social enterprise; Leisure Trusts, and from this to determine challenges facing a 
specific type of social enterprise in avoiding mission drift. Despite continuous 
attention from the academic community, several facets of social enterprise, including 
the stability of social enterprise, remain largely under researched (Bull, 2018; 
Doherty et al., 2014; Bull & Ridley-Duff, 2018). By stability, we mean It is commonly 
assumed that social enterprises are able to meet social outcomes and also be 
financially viable; however, little research supports this claim.  Social enterprises 
continue to develop and they play a vital role in the UK economy (Macmillan, 2013; 
Teasdale, 2012, Teasdale & Buckingham, 2013). Given the resurgence of the third 
sector in the UK (Gamble, 2015), an examination of social enterprise, of varying 
types, is therefore required.  
 
1.2. What is a Leisure Trust? 
 
A Leisure Trust is an organisational form of social enterprise (Hodgkinson & Hughes, 
2012; Peattie & Morley, 2008). They are predominantly registered as a Community 
Benefit Society (BenCom) or a Company Limited by Guarantee with Charitable 
Status (CLG-CS) (Findlay-King et al., 2018). Leisure Trusts provide sport and leisure 
facilities to local communities (Hodgkinson & Hughes, 2012). It has become 
apparent that, from 2010 onwards, sport and leisure services in the UK are exposed 
to the turbulent political and economic environment (Osborne and Brown, 2011). The 
coalition government’s Comprehensive Spending Review in 2010 (HM Treasury, 
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2010) and a report from the Association of Professional Service Excellence (APSE) 
(2012) found that over half of local authorities were ill-equipped to deal with the 
severity of a reduction in spending. Taylor-Gooby and Stoker (2011) established that 
there is an unfair and unjustified impact of the spending cuts on service provision 
including sport. However, decisions regarding whether to keep public sport services 
managed in-house or put them out to tender is highly influenced by political and 
ideological tendencies (Houlihan & Lindsey, 2012).  
With the start of the the economic recession in 2008 and the incoming coalition 
government in 2010, there were substantial spending cuts imposed on local 
authorities (Audit Commission, 2011; DCMS, 2013). Unsurprisingly, these austerity 
measures have had an impact on the provision of sport throughout the UK. The 
budget for the Department for Culture, Media and Sport was cut by 20% in 2017 
(Parnell et al., 2017). The Sport England budget has not received an increase for the 
2017-2021 period. A report published by the Institute of Fiscal Studies (2012) 
reported that the austerity measures imposed are greater and explicitly directed at 
poorer regions of the UK, predominantly in constituencies in the north and urban 
parts of London. According to an APSE (2012) report published on the then current 
provision of sport, it evidenced claims to argue that because sport is a non-statutory 
service it is bearing the brunt of the spending cuts. Part of its evidence base was 
pointing out that there has been a decrease in revenue generation, reduced opening 
hours, cuts to the work-force and an increase in the closure of sport facilities. The 
austerity measures put in place by local councils suggest local authorities, where 
possible, are considering and/or actively pursuing a strategy of outsourcing their 
sport facilities to organisations in the third sector and private sector providers. 
Misener and Misener (2017) point out that this has provided opportunities for social 
enterprise to play an active role in sport provision.  
Leisure Trusts can enable local councils to achieve their social welfare and sport 
policy objectives whilst cutting spending concurrently (Hughes & Hodgkinson, 2012). 
There is an increasing tendency for outsourcing sport and leisure services to a 
Leisure Trust business model (SPORTA, 2012). Local authorities seem to have 
created and supported Leisure Trusts mainly for cost saving reasons. In several 
cases, they have naively executed this devoid of any strategy over facility 
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development (Hughes & Hodgkinson, 2012). The decline of grant funding support by 
local authorities has amplified the tangible financial and operational demands. This is 
compounded if any surplus generated is not reinvested into the sport facilities under 
management. As a result, the Audit Commission (2012) argue that a number of 
social enterprises in sport provision are forced to focus on a commercially orientated 
strategy to achieve organisational stability. 
 
In 2012, London hosted the Olympic Games and a key factor in them being awarded 
the rights to host the event was a legacy promise that aimed to improve sport 
provision across the UK (Parnell et al., 2015). Kennedy and Kennedy’s (2015) review 
of the legacy promises in the context of grass-roots sport determined that the extent 
to which the legacy promise has been realised is dubious at best. This, as Misener 
and Misener (2017) argue, is partly due to a lack of clarity in the original proposed 
legacy plan and a subsequent era of austerity after the Olympic Games took place in 
2012. Based on the recent Sport England (2016) strategy, which highlights the 
importance of local authorities encouraging innovative business models like social 
enterprise being more involved in sport provision, accompanied by the UK 
government’s sport strategy ‘Sporting Future: A new strategy for an Active Nation’ 
(Cabinet Office, 2015), it is clear there is an endorsement of the social enterprise 
business model delivering sport and leisure facilities. Both strategies highlight the 
benefits of social enterprises, and therein third sector organisations, tackling societal 
issues through the means of sport. However, this raises questions on how austerity 
has impacted on this policy and most importantly how Leisure Trusts can sustain the 
creation of social value whilst remaining financially stable.  
 
1.3. Background and Rationale of the Research 
 
The sustainability of social enterprise organisations is an area of research that is 
heavily debated (Teasdale & Buckingham, 2013). However, the willingness of social 
enterprises to function as commercial businesses whilst addressing the needs of 
stakeholders such as local community interest groups is an area that has escaped 
critical debate (Alter, 2006; Battilana, 2018; Haugh, 2012; Young & Kim, 2015). 
Consequently, it is essential that social enterprises adopt an effective governance 
model to provide societal value for their stakeholders and achieve their social 
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mission (Vidal, 2014). This tells us the governance model a social enterprise adopts 
determines, to an extent, how they can satisfy the needs of the communities they 
serve. Several studies on social enterprise put forward that determining what 
governance model to adopt is crucial enabling access to the resources needed to 
sustain their existence (Bull, 2018; Bull & Ridley-Duff, 2018; Doherty et al., 2014; 
Haugh, 2012). However, little is known of the factors affecting particular governance 
models and their impact. As a result, by investigating challenges affecting a specific 
type of social enterprise we can contribute to the understanding of social enterprise 
in the UK and its future viability as an effective tool for the provision of public sport 
services. This gap in knowledge provides the motivation for this study of social 
enterprise in the sport provision market in the UK. 
 
1.4. Focus of the Study 
 
Through conducting two in-depth case studies on Leisure Trusts in different regions 
of the UK the findings of this study contribute to developing our understanding of 
social enterprise and examining how Leisure Trusts manage tensions associated 
with striking the balance between financial and social goals. Further to this, it informs 
academic and policy discussions on social enterprise in the UK. It does this by 
identifying key governance challenges and the implications of opting for a specific 
legal form in a time of austerity and how these organisations attempt to avoid 
mission drift. 
 
The study investigates how the political environment impacts upon the development 
of particular types of social enterprise. Additionally, the study seeks to understand 
how the governance processes address contemporary challenges facing Leisure 
Trusts. Finally, the study examines how Leisure Trust manages specific social and 
financial tensions, and how this affects the risk of mission drift occurring. The below 
research aim and research questions are formed with the goal of addressing 
knowledge gaps in extant literature, which will be discussed in Chapter 2; 
 
Aim - To contribute to our understanding of social enterprise by investigating the 
governance of specific organisational types of social enterprise within the context of 
sport provision. 
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RQ 1 - How does a Leisure trust survive and achieve its social mission in an 
unstable, and resource-scarce era of austerity?  
RQ 2 - How does the governance model and processes of different Leisure Trusts 
impact upon their associated tensions? 
 
RQ 3 – How do Leisure Trusts guard against encountering mission drift? 
 
The literature review chapter on the development, definition and governance 
challenges of social enterprise show that the business model itself is still developing 
and is somewhat underexplored from an academic perspective compared to other 
fields of research. The development of the social enterprise business model is now 
challenging the conceptual foundations of social enterprise as it constantly 
influenced and swayed by fluctuating political conditions. Consequently, we are left 
with a distinct requirement for additional studies which will help develop a thorough 
understanding of this phenomenon and how it manages financial and social 
tensions. 
 
1.5. Outline of the Thesis 
 
Chapter 1 discusses the scope and background of the study to form the foundation 
for the findings presented in the study. It delves into the contemporary issues facing 
social enterprise development in the UK and provides a rationale for the exploration 
of social enterprise governance in an organisational context; Leisure Trusts. Further, 
issues surrounding the current political and economic environment are discussed in 
relation to the provision of publish services, specifically, sport provision. The aim and 
research questions of the study are also presented in this chapter.  
 
Chapter 2 consists of the literature review. This chapter discusses the literature on 
social enterprise and critiques the development of social enterprise and its 
development as a business model. It examines the previous, and current, political 
environment social enterprise has developed and operates in. It also contains a 
critique of governance theory and its application to social enterprise organisations. 
Given the tensions associated with social enterprises, the issue of mission drift and 
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its definition, causes and consequences are reviewed. 
 
Chapter 3 comprises of the methodology adopted for this study. This chapter 
discusses the epistemological orientation of the researcher and its application to field 
of social enterprise governance research. Consideration is given to the research 
design and a justification is provided for the adoption of case study methodology. 
The research methods, the sample selection, the research instrument, type of data 
collected, and process of analysis is also discussed and detailed. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 present the findings of each case study. Chapter 4 examines the 
‘LTO-A’ organisation whilst chapter 5 examines ‘LTO-B’. Both chapters focus on 
particular challenges that have had an impact on the governance of the two sampled 
Leisure Trusts. Additional attention is made to the current political environment of 
austerity and the ability to gain access to funding and grants. These chapters also 
discuss the role competition plays in the growth and/or struggles of each Leisure 
Trust. Evidence of how each Leisure Trust manages social and financial tensions is 
presented. Emphasis is placed on the internal governance processes within each 
Leisure Trust.  
 
Chapter 6 is a discussion chapter. It covers what has been learnt and understood 
from the sampled Leisure Trusts in relation to the aim and research questions of the 
study. It presents a critical reflection of both types of Leisure Trust in relation to 
academic literature to help illustrate the study’s findings and how they relate to each 
organisation avoiding mission drift. Specifically, challenges facing both Leisure 
Trusts and how they contribute to the risk of mission drift occurring is reviewed. This 
enables the study to contribute context specific knowledge to a particular type of 
social enterprise in the UK, which advances its understanding. It examines the role 
of the political environment, in particular, austerity, and its varying degree of impact 
upon each type of social enterprise. It also discusses the function of governance in 
each case study, and its ability to address social and financial tensions. It examines 
the two approaches to managing this tension and how the internal dynamics 
between the board and senior management contribute to its effectiveness. 
 
Chapter 7 draws conclusions from the research study against the research aim and 
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questions outlined at the outset of the study. It also presents a number of directions 
for future research derived from the findings of this study. The study’s academic and 
policy contribution to knowledge is discussed and referenced to the conducted 
literature review in chapter 2. Policy considerations and recommendations are also 




































The central focus off this chapter is to review the emergence and our understanding 
of social enterprise, the political environment underpinning social enterprise 
development and the issue of mission drift which is underpinned by their 
governance. It will inform the research of issues and challenges faced by social 
enterprises in their attempts to produce social value whilst remaining financially 
stable. A clear and succinct account of the research problem to be addressed in this 
study will be provided. Additionally, a critique of different governance theories 
employed by social enterprises which will aid understanding of how their composition 
and processes influence the governance of social enterprises. This chapter is 
comprised of three elements. Firstly, we critique definitions of social enterprise and 
establish a working definition for this study. In this section, we also critique literature 
relating to the political background that underpins the use of social enterprise in sport 
provision. Secondly, we critique the governance of social enterprises and determine 
how the specific legal identity of a social enterprise can impact on its governance. 
Thirdly, we review literature on a potential consequence of bad governance within 
social enterprises; mission drift. These three sections underpin the research 
questions of the study.  
2.1.1. Defining Social Enterprise in the UK 
 
There is no unified definition of social enterprise. Prior to understanding the range of 
organisational types that can be construed as social enterprises, a hindrance which 
needs addressing is what is meant by a social enterprise (Dacin et al., 2010). It is 
difficult to explore social enterprise when the concept of study is ambiguous 
(Buckingham et al., 2012; Smallbone et al., 2001). Social enterprise is a concept 
which is variably interpreted according to geographical, political, social and economic 
factors (Diochon & Anderson, 2009; Kerlin, 2009; Bacq & Janssen, 2011; Teasdale, 
2012). At its broadest level, social enterprise involves the use of market-based 
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strategies to achieve social goals (Kerlin, 2009). In the UK, co-operatives in the mid-
1990s were attracted to the social enterprise concept partly as it offered freedom 
from dependency on government money and the associated loss of autonomy (Bull 
& Ridley-Duff, 2011). From this perspective, social enterprises were collectively 
focused organisations which survived through trading and redistributed profits for the 
benefit of the communities they served (Teasdale, 2012). These trading surpluses 
are principally reinvested in line with that mission, rather than being driven by 
maximising profit for distribution to shareholders and owners (DTI, 2002). Social 
enterprises have been seen as key drivers of the ‘social economy’, the part of the 
third sector involved in trading activities (Pearce, 2003). 
 
For the purpose of this study, social enterprise is defined as:  
 
‘A social enterprise is a business with primarily social objectives whose surpluses 
are principally reinvested for that purpose in the business or in the community, rather 
than being driven by the need to maximise profit for shareholders and owners.’ (DTI, 
2002:13) 
However, it is prudent to note that all the definitions of social enterprise are based on 
a few case studies or conceptual understanding of the phenomenon. None of them 
were based on empirical research with adequate samples.  
The concept of the ‘social economy’, which brings together co-operatives, mutual 
societies and associations stresses the specificity of the mission of these 
organisations, namely, their aim to benefit either their members or a larger 
stakeholder group rather than generating profits for investors (Amin, 2009; Dey & 
Steyaert, 2010; Di Domenico et al., 2010; Pearce, 2003). Pestoff and Brandsen 
(2009) argue the social economy now refers to a wide variety of organisational 
forms. A new legal form for social enterprises, the Community Interest Company 
(CIC), was introduced which allowed limited distribution of profits (Teasdale, 2012). 
The first government publication during the term of New Labour referred to social 
enterprises as ‘organisations that are independent of the state and provide services, 
goods and trade for a social purpose and are non-profit distributing’ (HM Treasury, 
1999). Ironically, contrary to what co-operative leaders had expected from social 
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enterprise, government interest in the subject matter, and particularly the 
repositioning of social enterprise as the delivery of public services by social 
enterprises, has actually increased third sector organisations’ dependence on the 
state (Carmel & Harlock, 2008). 
Social enterprises have evident mixed characteristics: they integrate the capital and 
management methods of both commercial and non-profit organisations, and adopt 
the commercial way to obtain financial benefits, resulting in realisation of social 
objectives (Alter, 2006; Jackson et al., 2018). The organisational values are 
measured on basis of commercial and non-profit aspects. In support of this, Wry and 
Zhao (2018) hold that social enterprise is directly related to different social, cultural 
and political backgrounds. They assert that the organisation forms of social 
enterprises in practice, largely differ from each other due to social differences and 
have the different features of varying organisational forms. 
Social enterprise is seen as a vehicle for developing innovative methods of creating 
social value and achieving social objectives (Santos et al., 2015). It has been 
recommended by many as a business model that can provide viable solutions for 
institutional failures, such as government or the economy (Anderson et al., 2019; 
Huybrechts & Nicholls, 2012; Roy & Hackett, 2017). It is considered that the social 
mission of the social enterprise is the core focus of their attention (Roy & Hackett, 
2017). Another characteristic of social enterprise is that any profit, generated from 
trading income, should be reinvested back into the organisation (Bacq & Janssen, 
2011). Farmer et al. (2016) and Macaulay et al. (2017) provide numerous examples 
of social enterprises creating tangible impact in communities in which there has been 
either spending cuts imposed by local authorities or where there are severe levels of 
deprivation. Both studies suggest that the social enterprise business model can 
represent a valid challenge to traditional ways of thinking about how government 
provide public services for their communities.  
2.1.2. Government Policy on Social Enterprise & the Third Sector  
 
Social enterprise has attracted the attention of policy makers in the UK (Wilson & 
Post, 2013). The discourse to the UK third sector has occurred against the backdrop 
of a general atmosphere of anti-welfarism and austerity (Hogg & Baines, 2011; 
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Lowndes & Gardner 2016). To illustrate the point of austerity measures being 
apparent, local authorities are faced with reductions in central grant funding of 56% 
for the cycle between 2015 and 2020 (HM Treasury, 2015; Parnell et al., 2015). 
Labour politicians, and think-tanks originally adopted the concept of social enterprise 
as part of an ideological aim to radically change the ways of organising markets 
(Westall 2001; Grenier 2009; Bull & Ridley-Duff, 2018). To attract further political 
support, New Labour presented social enterprise as an organisational form of the 
third way and as a solution to the policy problem of area-based deprivation (Grenier, 
2009; Teasdale, 2012). The concept was embraced and committed to as a third way 
beyond state socialism and free market capitalism (Wilson & Post, 2013). 
 
In 1999, social enterprise was first presented as a response to area-based 
deprivation (HM Treasury, 1999; Blackburn & Ram, 2006). Between 1999 and 2001, 
social enterprise was seen as a solution to the failure of markets to distribute goods 
and services equitably (Teasdale, 2012). By 2002, social enterprise was portrayed 
as a policy solution for the failure of the state to deliver public services to 
communities (Simmons, 2008). The Office of the Third Sector (OTS) was created in 
2006 following a period of lobbying by strategic alliances of voluntary organisation 
representatives (Alcock, 2010). Alcock (2010) suggests that to support social 
enterprise development the New Labour government invested directly in third sector 
infrastructure and provided public funds to third sector organisations to help them 
deliver public services. Policy emphasis moved towards voluntary organisations 
delivering public services. 
 
The change of government from New Labour to the coalition government signaled 
the end of one policy approach and the beginning of another due to shifting 
ideological, political and economic landscape (Wilson & Post, 2013). In 2009, the 
Conservative party leader David Cameron introduced the concept of Big Society. 
Evans (2011) states that the Big Society, which is underpinned by austerity, aims to 
mend ‘socially broken’ communities by nurturing peoples’ sense of altruism, their 
giving, and their generosity to engage in their community. A key element of the 
agenda was to devolve power from central to local government and encourage local 
communities to take over local state-run services, such as sport and leisure facilities 
(King, 2014). Both Labour and the coalition government committed to promoting 
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provision of public services through social enterprises. They have been encouraged 
because of the expectations that they can secure the engagement and trust of 
socially excluded groups due to their specialist knowledge, flexibility and 
independence from government structures (Carmel & Harlock, 2008; Haugh & 
Kitson, 2007). However, the Audit commission (2013), explained that efficiency 
measures carried out by local authorities during the coalition government’s tenure 
were one-off savings whereby public service operations were scaled back as far as 
possible.  
 
2.1.3. Confronting Austerity in the UK through Social Enterprise 
 
Social enterprise has become particularly popular among academics, practitioners 
and policy makers across the world as a potential solution to a range of social policy 
problems. These include, but are not limited to, a potential solution to area-based 
deprivation (Blackburn & Ram, 2006). The recent UK policy context, through which 
the third sector and state have been increasingly ‘de-coupled’ and marginalised 
regions have suffered disproportionately (Macmillan, 2013). Hastings et al. (2015) 
and Clifford et al. (2013) also argue that the most deprived local authorities in the UK 
have faced the greatest reductions in funding from central government. Clifford et al. 
(2013) argue that third sector organisations based in the most deprived local 
authorities will bear the brunt of government funding cuts, due to the compound 
effect of larger cuts to these local authority budgets and the higher dependence on 
such funding streams within these areas. The impact will likely mean a greater 
likelihood of social enterprise failure in these places because the social action 
needed in those communities is greatest.  
 
Conversely, Amin (2005) contends that regeneration in deprived areas and 
development of prosperous communities through social enterprises is not entirely the 
responsibility of local authorities. Amin’s (2005) claims came before the economic 
recession of 2008 and the subsequent era of austerity. Wilson and Post (2013) 
suggest Amin’s (2005) claims are redundant as they fail to integrate the budgetary 
challenges local councils now face. Blackburn and Ram (2006) and Haugh and 
Kitson (2007) also took Amin’s (2005) view into account but suggest that community 
empowerment through the transfer of public assets to a social enterprise does go a 
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long way to boosting the economy and the production of social value in deprived 
areas of the UK. Wilson and Post (2013) also adopt the view that local responsibility 
must be derived from a broader political infrastructure which facilitates the growth of 
social enterprises. However, this is hindered by austerity measures implemented by 
central government, as Parnell et al. (2015) point out. 
 
Lindsey and Bulloch (2013) in their comparative study of voluntary sector activity in 
one deprived and one affluent area, also show that the central ethos of the austerity 
agenda is to expect civil society to ‘pick up the pieces’ (Lindsey & Bulloch, 2013:113) 
in deprived areas. While affluent areas have a civic core made up of cash and time 
rich volunteers, with an abundance of skills and networks, more deprived areas 
suffer from a civic core which lacks the time, financial resources, skillset, or 
confidence to take up the challenge of austerity (Lindsey & Bulloch, 2013). It must be 
noted that the study by Lindsey and Bulloch (2013) only focused on three social 
enterprises of small-scale, so it is difficult to generalise these findings to all social 
enterprises. According to Smith (2014) and Widdop et al. (2018), although New 
Labour expanded public spending and significantly increased state intervention, the 
Conservatives have used the austerity agenda as a lever for radically reducing state 
spending, reforming welfare and increasing the role of the private sector in deprived 
areas based on the evidence provided in both studies. Smith’s (2014) comparison 
study of Labour and Conservative held councils found that there was a clear trend of 
more Conservative held councils preferring private sector. However, Smith’s (2014) 
study fails to consider various contextual factors affecting the councils’ decision-
making on outsourcing.   
 
What has occurred has been the shrinking of the state but without the simultaneous 
development of the third sector (Dommett, 2015). Rather, as Smith and Jones (2015) 
argue, we have seen the loss of public provision being filled by a growing private 
sector. The study by Smith and Jones (2015) focuses on the provision of social care. 
They found, through a longitudinal study surveying local authorities, that there has 
been an increase in private sector contracts. The main reason given for this is the 
impact of austerity measures on local councils (Smith & Jones, 2015). Dommet’s 
(2015) study on third sector organisations found a similar trend in that the 
Conservative government is a shifting away from public sector commitments of the 
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modernisation strategy to one where the goal is a small state with public services 
being provided by the private sector. Hence, the Conservatives have focused cuts in 
areas that the public see as less of a priority such as housing and sport whilst 
maintaining areas where support is high, such as health and education (Appleby & 
Lee, 2012). Increasingly, local government is outsourcing non-statutory public 
services such as sport and leisure management (Barraket & Archer, 2009; Grant 
Thorton, 2014; Munoz, 2009). Grant Thorton (2014) highlights the range of new 
delivery models that local government are employing in order to cut costs and to 
deliver services. However, local government faced cuts in spending between 2010 
and 2012 on average of 10.4% (Crawford & Phillips, 2012) with some of the most 
deprived areas facing cuts of up to 25% by 2016. In 2014, outsourcing by local 
government increased by 58% with £1.5billion spent on outsourcing (Widdop et al., 
2018) 
 
To conclude, the Conservative modernisation strategy in relation to the state was 
based on a commitment to core welfare provision, but with the debated greater role 
for the third sector through austerity measures the government has been caught 
between a desire to cut spending and to maintain widely used welfare services such 
as health and education. Policy has been based on substantial cuts in public 
spending, and as discussed, these have been concentrated on deprived areas of the 
UK. The current Conservative government differs from New Labour through reducing 
spending. There is also the extent to which the public sector is being privatised 
whereby the private sector is being integrated deeply into public service provision. 
With this being said, there is considerable scope for further marketisation of public 
services. Although social enterprise is being encouraged, the growth of 
organisational types of social enterprise is being hampered by government spending 
cuts, particularly in deprived areas. Consequently, the changing political landscape 
of the public sector environment through the use of privatisation, competition and 
withdrawing of financial support has encouraged the growth of organisational types 
discussed previously. Austerity has been founded on widespread local authority 
spending cuts and this has meant the provision of key public services such as sport 
and leisure have become jeopardized (King, 2014). Its impact on sport services and 
social enterprise will now be discussed.  
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2.1.4. Social Enterprise and the Provision of Sport Services  
The examination and consideration of social enterprise provision of sport services in 
the UK has received little attention from an academic perspective. From what studies 
there are, there is a lack of consideration of crucial contextual challenges specific 
local authorities face in the provision of sport. One study which neglects a contextual 
focus is a study by Gibbon and Affleck (2008) which does not go beyond suggesting 
that there are challenges and barriers social enterprises face when trying to create 
social value through the provision of sport. Gibbon and Affleck (2008) make this bare 
and somewhat rudimentary claim without assessing many different variables within 
many different types of social enterprises. There was a lack of specificity in their 
study, but many other subsequent studies use Gibbon and Affleck’s (2008) findings 
as a basis for their assumptions. For instance, Chew (2010) built on Gibbon and 
Affleck’s (2008) study by examining a specific type of social enterprise, a Community 
Interest Company (CIC), within the general context of the provision of public 
services. It was established by Chew (2010) that the CIC model can be used as a 
model for public service delivery but unfortunately their study focused on the sole 
benefits of the CIC’s business model and fails to incorporate how contextual factors 
may affect the success of the model.  
In a similar vein, there are other studies that provide an insight to how social 
enterprise can be a vehicle for the provision of sport and the creation of social value 
but fall for the assumption that the business models of all social enterprises are 
homogenous. A study by Kiernan and Porter (2014) which examines the use of the 
social enterprise business model in running a professional football club (FC United) 
found that the business model provides stakeholders with a vested interest in the 
football club. However, there was a lack of contemplation of how the business model 
supports the growth of the organisation and it fails to take into account challenges 
posed by the competition in the same market. Similarly, Kennedy and Kennedy 
(2015) argue that the social enterprise model is perfect for the fertile ground of sport 
provision as it offers a new, community focused method, way of tackling social 
issues. However, there was no clarification from Kennedy and Kennedy (2015) as to 
what type of social enterprise this applies to and whether it is appropriate to all public 
services. One study that has gone beyond mere sweeping statements about the 
social enterprise model is Ratten’s (2011) study which delves underneath the 
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surface of social enterprise. Ratten’s (2011) research endeavours to focus on the 
viability of types of social enterprise specifically within sport provision. In addition to 
this, Ratten (2011) attempts to develop a sport social enterprise theory. 
Ratten’s (2011) attempts to develop a theory of social enterprise within the context of 
sport. It was the first of its kind and forms the basis of many studies that followed. 
Through her study, we acquired an in-depth insight into some of the contextual 
factors that either help or hinder sport provision through social enterprise. 
Specifically, Ratten (2011) highlighted the political context of the area the service is 
provided as a main determinant. Ratten (2011) offers a definition for social enterprise 
in sport; 
“The use of social issues to create change in the sports context. Social enterprise 
uses sport as a way to encourage solutions to social issues” (Ratten, 2011:56) 
Although this is a step forward in helping clarify our understanding our social 
enterprise in sport, there is a lack of evidence within the article to come to such a 
generalisation in the definition above. The definition fails to take into account the 
varying issues social enterprises can face in producing solutions to social issues, 
which ultimately is the core focus of the definition. Cohen and Welty-Peachey (2015) 
support this view and suggest the theory provided by Ratten (2011) fails to take into 
account the essential financial benefits the social enterprise business model can 
provide for numerous stakeholders. The omission of financial benefits is 
accompanied by neglect of acknowledging the importance of the leaders within the 
social enterprise the role of taking calculated risks, something of which Dees and 
Anderson (2003) and Bacq and Janssen (2011) argue should be incorporated into 
any definition of social enterprise.  
Although Dees and Anderson (2003) and Bacq and Janssen (2011) raise valid 
concerns about the need to acknowledge the role of leaders within social 
enterprises, there are few studies that concentrate on the role of the leader in sport 
social enterprises and how they facilitate the creation of social value. Of the limited 
amount of studies, two of note were conducted by Cohen and Welty-Peachey (2015) 
and Gilmore et al. (2011). Their studies do focus on the role of the leader but within 
varying contexts. Gilmore et al’s (2011) study examines the role of the CEO in 
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achieving the social objectives of a social enterprise in sport. They found that the 
role of the CEO in social enterprise needs to be professionalised in order for the 
social enterprise to pro-actively plan for contextual challenges they will face. Within 
that, Gilmore et al. (2011) argue the CEO ought to use their expertise and personal 
networks to develop a sustainable business model which can resource the creation 
of social value. They go on to suggest that the CEO should integrate effective 
communication strategies to engage stakeholders in order to increase interest and 
ultimately revenue streams.  
Following on from Gilmore et al’s (2011) study, Griffiths and Armour (2014) carried 
out a similar study in which they claim it is not just the CEO who should take a 
leading role. They claim there is a responsibility for everyone within the social 
enterprise to take a leading role in decision-making. However, this assumption is 
made and applied to all social enterprises and there is little evidence within the study 
to support that claim. Conversely, Cohen and Welty-Peachey (2015) provide 
evidenced claims regarding the variables that can help develop an effective leader 
within social enterprises within the specific context of sport. They focused on the role 
of the CEO in enacting social change regarding women in football. Though 
conducting a collective case study, they were able to offer an insight to what qualities 
a CEO should possess in enacting social change. They were; the person’s expertise 
based on previous experience, holding a social conscious, their social networks and 
personal experiences within the social issue they are addressing.  
One issue which has blurred our understanding of the role of social enterprise 
provision in sport is the trend of private sector organisations setting up non-profit 
subsidiaries to manage sport facilities (Wicker et al., 2013). One study that explored 
this issue of private sector organisations setting up social enterprise subsidiaries was 
done by Chew and Lyon (2012). Chew and Lyon (2012) investigated eight of these 
social enterprises to explore their motives and how they can manage tensions of 
satisfying the creation of social value. In terms of their motives, Chew and Lyon 
(2012) found that these social enterprise subsidiaries provide the private sector 
organisation with diverse sources of income, legal benefits particularly the 
opportunities associated with tax relief associated with certain social enterprise types 
and strategic benefits that focus on the reputation of the organisation. One 
 27 
organisation in Chew and Lyon’s (2012) study made it clear their primary motive was 
purely to improve the public perception of their private sector organisation. An 
additional layer of confusion occurs when privately owned professional sports clubs 
set up charitable foundations and/or develop CSR programmes. Walters and 
Chadwick (2009) is one of few studies that examine this issue. They found that clubs 
which set these foundations or trusts believe they are doing something morally and 
ethically right. They found that these organisations believe they are in a better place 
than traditional social enterprises to enact social change because they have a solid 
financial foundation behind them.  
Early articles, as discussed above, tended to focus on the social value creation 
issues of social enterprises in sport. Since then, there has steadily been a shift 
towards considering the challenges of financial survival for social enterprises in 
sport. One attempt to assess its importance was provided by Gallagher et al. (2012) 
who argue that the board and management of a sport social enterprise should 
actively aim to maximise their revenue streams to ensure financial stability. The 
problem with their study is that there is no clear indication of how that can be done 
via the social enterprise model and what the actual benefits of doing so will be. 
Further, there was no clarification on how or why this commercial approach can be 
facilitated or hampered by the actual identity of the social enterprise e.g. what the 
organisation is legally registered as. The commercial approach defended by 
Gallagher et al. (2012) challenges traditional views of what social enterprises exist to 
achieve. However, there is little evidence within the context of social enterprise sport 
provision to currently wholly eliminate their claims. Although, it is clear that Gallagher 
et al’s (2012) findings on the use of social enterprise in sport is poorly explained and 
lacks a robust evidence base.   
A study conducted by Wicker et al. (2013) provides some support for the views of 
Gallagher et al. (2012). Importantly, there is more substance to the evidence-base 
provided by Wicker et al. (2013). Based on a study of fourteen sport social 
enterprises operating in different regional areas, different sports and contrasting 
service provision, they found that it is in the interest of these social enterprises to 
increase their revenue streams. Wicker et al. (2013) acknowledge that doing this will 
result in some auxiliary problems but point out the only way the examined 
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organisations are able to resource their social value creation is to build a solid 
financial base. They argue that if these social enterprises stick to the traditional 
mind-set of having only a few revenue streams then they will be susceptible to 
failure. Similar findings were presented by Coates et al. (2014). They argue that 
sport social enterprises with a strong business-led model do not suffer from fears 
about their financial stability. Coates et al. (2014) note that although sport social 
enterprises should adopt an approach of diversifying their income, they should not 
lose focus of their core social mission and what they exist to achieve.  
It is clear to see, whilst there have been several attempts to research the topic of 
sport provision through social enterprise, it is still open to misinterpretation and 
unsupported claims. This is mainly due to studies not acknowledging and/or 
integrating contextual factors into their research. Particularly, national and local 
political conditions alongside wider economic issues. This is compounded by little or 
no in-depth studies which examine specific types of sport social enterprises which, in 
essence, are completely different to one another. Given the lack of academic 
consensus on sport provision through social enterprise we will now examine broader 
government policy on social enterprise in the UK to understand the underpinning 
motives behind its adoption as a model for enacting social change.  
The role of government, local and central, in promoting and improving the provision 
of sport services in the UK is declining (King, 2014). King (2014) argues that this is a 
result of austerity measures imposed on local authorities which means sport 
provision is becoming a secondary concern due to the issues related to the NHS, 
schools and local infrastructure. Through consulting with a selection of town 
councils, King (2014) found that all councils examined have or will consider 
outsourcing their sport provision because they are unable to finance their current 
portfolio of sport services. Misener and Misener (2017) explore the underlying 
reasons why councils have adopted this approach. They argue that resource scarcity 
has led local councils to prioritise the services they provide. As sport is a non-
statutory service, Misener and Misener (2017) argue that non-statutory services are 
the first place councils look at in terms of cutting costs.  However, it must be noted 
that Misener and Misener’s (2017) claims were based on an analysis of government 
policy rather than consulting social enterprises and local authorities. Conversely, 
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Lowndes and Squires (2012) provide a more in-depth study in which they surveyed 
thirty-two local authorities to determine the reasons why they are willing to outsource 
their sport provision or remove it entirely. They claim the main reason is that there is 
a concerted effort for local authorities to just survive in an era of austerity. 
As more local authorities start to consider and pursue an approach of outsourcing 
their sport provision due to austerity, Hastings et al. (2015) point out that the social 
enterprise business model is the preferred choice of delivery for many local 
authorities when outsourcing non-statutory services. However, these claims were 
based on commitments made by central government rather than actual views of local 
authorities. For instance, Pape et al. (2016) argue that there are significant concerns 
about how social enterprise can fill the void left by local councils in their sport 
provision. They provide evidence of numerous examples of social enterprises being 
awarded contracts for public sport provision and then failing within twelve months. 
That being said, the National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) (2012) 
stated that there is increased demand for social enterprises to manage public sport 
services due to austerity measures imposed on local councils. Yet, Kelly et al. (2014) 
provide evidence to suggest there is a trend of large social enterprises 
amalgamating in order to dominate public service provision. They argue this is 
hindering the impact smaller, more socially focused social enterprises can have in 
local communities. Pape et al. (2016) support this notion and explain that the main 
reasoning behind large social enterprises joining forces is the opportunity to 
demonstrate to local authorities that they are capable of delivering that public 
service. It also provides them with the ability to compete with private sector 
contractors when bidding for contracts (Pape et al., 2016).  
As social enterprises are becoming more involved in sport provision, research into 
the relationship between social enterprise sport provision within an era of austerity is 
required. Misener and Misener (2017) emphasise the importance on new research 
that examines political challenges and the impacts of austerity upon the different 
social enterprises in different regions of the UK. ‘Research Question One’ is 
presented below. This research question is based on preceding review of literature; 
RQ1 - How does a Leisure trust survive and achieve its social mission in an unstable 
and resource-scarce era of austerity?  
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2.2. Influence of Governance Models & Legal Identity  
 
2.2.1. Introduction 
The governance of social enterprises is multi-faceted and can be conceived and 
explained in many different ways (Dacin et al., 2010; Glaveli & Geormas, 2018; 
Haugh, 2012). This study aims to contribute to our understanding of specific 
organisational types of social enterprise its impact on sport provision. However, this 
is difficult due to social enterprise being an umbrella term for many organisational 
types (Peattie & Morley, 2008). Before examining specific governance processes 
within social enterprise, it is important to discuss the different types of social 
enterprise and the impact it has on their governance. There have been contributions 
from Westall (2001), Pearce (2003) and Alter (2004) surrounding our understanding 
of types of social enterprise. Westall (2001) proposes that there are four types of 
social enterprise; one a hybrid of mainstream business, a second a hybrid of 
voluntary sector types, a third a state funded type and fourthly a hybrid form (figure 
2.1.). Pearce (2003) describes social enterprises as part of the third system (social 
economy) whereby they are neighbouring the first system (private economy yet 
primarily social and secondly a business). 
 
Figure 2.1. Westall (2001) Four sectors of the economy 
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Alter's (2004) model shows the spectrum from traditional for-profit businesses to 
traditional non-profits. This is illustrated through positioning particular business 
models in terms of their level of social value. The rise of responsible business types 
represents a movement in mainstream business towards a more conscious business 
model (Bull, 2018; Bull & Ridley-Duff, 2018). Additionally, social enterprise 
represents a movement in traditional third sector organisations towards more 
commercial activities (Battalina, 2018; Battalina & Lee, 2014). Alter (2004) manages 
to distinguish social enterprises on the basis of motive, accountability and what 
happens with profits. This supports the thoughts of Dees (1998) in that it is 
considered third sector organisations are becoming more enterprising through using 
a business model which reinvests surplus generated. 
 
From the conceptual model presented and discussed below we can see there are 
only a narrow and limited amount of lenses through which we can conceptualise 
social enterprise in the UK. They draw attention to an underlying problem in that they 
do not integrate nor sufficiently acknowledge the large breadth of organisational 
types of social enterprise. Therefore, we are restrained at arriving at a concrete or 
‘one size fits all’ understanding of social enterprise. In addressing this concern, Bull 
(2018) outlines there are three routes to incorporation for a social enterprise; (i) 
Charity Law, regulation of trading charitable types of social enterprise (organisations 
with community and voluntary organisational origins). (ii) Society Law, regulation of 
solidarity types of social enterprise (organisations with cooperative and mutual 
origins) and (iii) Company Law, regulation of private social business types by 
guarantee or by shares (organisations with mainstream business origins). These 
three routes create very different types of enterprise, all with the previously outlined 
shared principles. Bull (2018) built upon Westall's (2001) model and provides a 
concept for three main types of social enterprise in the UK (figure 2.2.). This model is 
applicable to this study as it seeks to bring together both the theory and practice of 
social enterprise in the UK, from which the boundary of this study is focused. 
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Figure 2.2. Bull (2018:18) 3 different types of social enterprise in the UK 
Figure 2.2. outlines the three types of organisations being labelled as ‘Trading 
Charitable’ types, ‘Solidarity’ types and ‘Social Business’ types. Although Bull (2018) 
acknowledges there are organisations (BenCom/CLG-CS) that can span across the 
three core types, there is still limited knowledge of the contributing factors influencing 
this potential crossover. Studying a BenCom and CLG-CS allows us to establish how 
and why these transitions are not static. This potential transition and ambiguity over 
a definition can be attributed to the tensions in the duality of competing logics; 
behaving socially and commercially (Doherty et al., 2014). In this sense, the 
governance of these organisations is integral in distinguishing between different 
types of social enterprise (Mason, 2010; Bull & Ridley-Duff, 2018; Vickers, 2010). 
The competing tensions are apparent in the three core types. As noted by Bull 
(2018), ‘Trading Charitable’ types have tensions in satisfying level of trading income, 
‘Social Business’ types have tensions in satisfying asset lock and profit distribution, 
and ‘Solidarity’ types have tensions in satisfying society social value. 
 
The two Leisure Trusts being studied are two different legal entities. One is a 
Community Benefit Society (BenCom) and the other is a Company Limited by 
Guarantee with Charitable status (CLG-CS). Being registered as a specific legal form 
presents problems when trying to understand social enterprise (Ahmed et al., 2004; 
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Borzaga, 2007; Vidal, 2014). The framework presented by Bull (2018) provides a 
well-defined illustration of how holding a specific legal entity influences the way a 
social enterprise can be characterized and governed.  The legal identities of the 
types covered by Bull (2018) will now be critiqued in order to grasp their operational 
characteristics and governance implications which contributes to our understanding 
of how social enterprise can serve sport provision in the UK. 
 
2.2.2. Social Enterprise Legal Structures in the UK 
 
Social enterprise plays a significant role in the government’s policy of tackling social 
issues within economically deprived areas of the UK (Mason, 2010; Misener & 
Misener, 2017; Spear et al., 2009). However, there is not a particular legal structure 
favoured by all social enterprises in the UK (DTI, 2002; Manning, 2008, Vidal, 2014). 
Social enterprises adopt a range of legal structures to pursue their mission 
throughout the UK (Martin & Thompson, 2010). The structure adopted ensures 
boards of directors/trustees and other individuals associated with the organisation 
carry out their duties and key responsibilities of those involved with social enterprises 
lawfully (Vidal, 2014). Importantly, a social enterprise’s legal structure has a 
significant influence upon the governance approach and types of finance they can 
draw in (Doherty et al., 2014) (see table 2.1.). The legal structures of social 
enterprises in the UK include: Company Limited by Guarantee (CLG), Industrial and 
Provident Society (IPS), Community Interest Company (CIC) and Company Limited 
by Shares (CLS) (DTI, 2002). CLG and IPS (BenCom/cooperatives) are the most 
widespread legal structures for UK social enterprises (Lyon & Humbert, 2010).  
 
Table 2.1. Types of Legal Structure and Governance of Social Enterprise (Adapted 
from Doherty et al. (2014) 







- Company held in 
stewardship by a board of 
 
- Unable to pursue equity 
finance and struggle to 
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Company Limited by 
Guarantee (CLG) 
trustees who are there on 
a voluntary basis. 
- Community Ownership 





- Can attract financial 
support in terms of grants. 
 







- Clear delegation of 
powers between board 
members and senior 
management. 
- One member, one vote. 
 
 
- Facilitates the 
distribution of shares. 
- Grant/loan finance as 







- No individual ownership 
- Can either be a CLG or 
CLS 
- Asset lock to encourage 
investors  
- Has external regulatory 
mechanism 
 
- Can issue shares 
depending on type 
- Attractive to 
philanthropic and venture 
capitalists 




2.2.3. IPS (Community Benefit Society/Cooperatives) 
 
An IPS can either be formed as a cooperative or community benefit societies 
(BenCom). A cooperative is formed for the mutual benefit of members who use the 
services provided by their society (DTI, 2003). They can pay interest on members' 
share capital, and use their surplus to pay dividends to their members. In contrast, 
Brown (2006) states a BenCom is run primarily for the benefit of the community; the 
interests of members and shareholders are second to the interest of the community. 
BenComs have the power to pay interest on members' share capital, but they cannot 
distribute surpluses to members in the form of a dividend. Community ownership, in 
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the form of cooperatives and BenComs, is actively promoted in many countries 
(Spear & Bidet, 2005). According to Brown (2006), the fact that BenComs can install 
an asset lock is a crucial factor to consider when selecting a legal structure. Also, a 
member of a BenCom must possess a share in order to be part of the society (in this 
context, the term ‘member' and ‘shareholder' are interchangeable), and all 
shareholders hold equal weight inside an IPS, with a decision structure based on the 
‘one-member-one-vote scheme', regardless of how many shares a member holds 
(Cabras, 2011). In addition, a BenCom strengthens members’ views within the 
organisation, and increases the level of their involvement and participation within the 
organisation (Brown, 2006). 
 
2.2.4. Company Limited by Guarantee (CLG/CLG-CS) 
 
A CLG is been the most prevalent structure for social enterprises in the UK, being 
straightforward to put in place and adaptable (Leslie, 2002). As a result, a CLG 
status is commonplace within third sector organisations requiring corporate status. A 
social enterprise with this type of legal structure removes the possibility of having 
shareholders and instead has members who are guarantors of the organisation 
(Ahmed et al., 2004). These designated members contribute a small amount of 
money (usually £1) towards the winding up of the organisation if it becomes insolvent 
(Bridge et al., 2009). When a CLG is formed, it is normal to incorporate a non-profit 
distribution clause (DTI, 2003). Instead of dispensing profits amongst its guarantors, 
a CLG promotes the use of voluntary work to help build a sustainable organisation 
(Ahmed et al., 2004). Within the governance of a social enterprise with CLG status, 
there is a separation of powers, as not one person owns the organisation (Bridge et 
al., 2009; Smallbone et al., 2001). A CLG usually has a voluntary board of non-
executive directors whereas a CLG with charitable status (CLG-CS) has trustees 
who are responsible and accountable for generating and effecting a strategic plan 
(Vidal, 2003). 
 
A central feature of a CLG-CS is that it is a registered charity and has a board of 
trustees who volunteer to run the charity (Doherty et al., 2014). An advantage of a 
CLG-CS is that it combines benefits of registered charities and CLGs. They include; 
possible to own property and hold contracts, receive tax exemptions and relief, it is 
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easier to raise funds from trust funds and donations from companies (Bridge et al., 
2009). Additionally, Social Enterprise UK (2012) suggest a CLG-CS status will also 
protect the core mission of the business, as it must have charitable aims within its 
constituted and will be regulated by the Charity Commission. However, a CLG-CS 
legal form also been criticised. The trustees are stewards of the organisation but 
Charitable Law does not allow trustees to be paid for being trustees (Cabras, 2011). 
This raises concerns about how the board of trustees may impact upon the 
commercial aims of the organisation. As Doherty et al. (2009) state, these charitable 
rules and law may result in significant restrictions on trading activities and income 
generation. 
 
2.2.5. Community Interest Company 
 
CLGs and BenComs are not able to draw in finance in terms of equity investments 
because they cannot issue shares for financial return (Cornforth, 1988). 
Consequently, this raises questions about how social enterprise source finance and 
how heavily reliant they are on financial support such as grant funding. Accessing 
suitable financial resources is a key challenge facing social enterprises in the UK as 
current evidence shows that the majority of these organisations are inadequately 
financed (Alter, 2006; Doherty et al., 2009). The inability of the CLG and BenComs 
legal structures to access a wide range of financing options is one of the reasons the 
UK government introduced the CIC, in 2005 (DTI, 2003). This legal structure has 
triple functionality according to the National Archives (2013). A CIC can be structured 
as: (1) CLG (without share capital) (2) CLS or limited by guarantee (with share 
capital). This type of social enterprise pays dividends to asset locked bodies only. (3) 
CLS or limited by guarantee (with a share capital). This type of legal structure will 
allow a CIC to pay dividends to shareholders (National Archives, 2013). Therefore, 
the CIC’s financing options are improved as they present wider sources of finance 
whilst retaining their social objectives (Department for Innovation and Skills, 2011). 
However, BIS (2013) outlines there has been a limited uptake of this version of a 
CIC. 
 
The above discussions reveal two key dimensions. Firstly, social enterprises aim to 
concurrently create social value and the type of legal structure they choose impacts 
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upon what they can realistically achieve (Bridge et al., 2009). This is further 
implicated by its ability to attract suitable investments to reinforce or support its 
social ethos (Doherty et al., 2009). Secondly, the legal identity of a social enterprise 
permits its board to conduct their duties efficiently and legitimately within a system of 
governance. This discussion is integral to this study as the case study organisations 
are either a BenCom (LTO-A) or a CLG-CS (LTO-B). In order to understand different 
types of social enterprise a critique of the contextual environment in which they 
operate must be conducted. The following section presents a critique of governance 
approaches to social enterprise in the UK and the impact of the legal identity upon 
them. 
 
2.2.6. Stewardship Theory Governance Model & Legal Structures 
 
Stewardship theory predicts that the CEO will act in the best interest of the 
organisation (Herzlinger, 1994). Many researchers view stewardship theory as an 
alternative to agency theory (Boon, 2018; Davis et al., 1997; Haugh & Talwar, 2016; 
Iecovich, 2005; Mason, 2010; Nicholls, 2010; Turnbull, 1997) with Turnbull (1997) 
arguing that unless it was accepted that people may act as both opportunistic self-
serving agents and selfless stewards the theory for corporate governance could not 
progress. This would mean rejecting the agency assumptions of CEO acting in their 
own self-interest (Roberts et al., 2005) and consequently avoiding the tension 
associated with solidarity types of social enterprise in being able to satisfy levels of 
society social value. With the steward motivated to attain the objectives of the 
organisation, using stringent control procedures would be potentially 
counterproductive. Such control mechanisms such as separating the roles of CEO 
and the chair of the board of directors potentially lowers motivation and leads to high 
staff turnover (Davis et al., 1997). This approach within a BenCom can enable the 
organisation to find a balance between satisfying the tensions associated with it. 
Empowering the CEO whilst maintaining clear roles and responsibilities of the 
enables the board to ensure the tension of satisfying social value is achieved and 
permits the CEO to address trading income tensions. 
 
The stewardship model places a duty on the board to act in the interests of the 
owners of the organisation and take charge of enabling organisational performance 
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through effective decision-making (Boon, 2018; Iecovich, 2005). Boon (2018) 
assessed the model’s capability of delivering public services. Through examining the 
stewardship model in social enterprises with varying legal identities it was found that 
the individual leader within the social enterprise (normally the CEO) was able to 
proactively react to political and market conditions whilst maintaining their social 
focus. Within a BenCom, this can help address the tension of producing social value. 
This approach can also assist a CLG-CS in addressing the tension of asset lock 
associated with social business types.  
 
In general, the concept of stewardship places importance on the power of the board 
and its ability to act as agents for the organisation’s shareholders (Muth & 
Donaldson, 1998). Furthermore, their primary task is to utilise share capital in ways 
that will result in increased value, primarily financial. In this sense, this model of 
governance can be beneficial in assisting a CLS in attracting equity finance as this 
type of organisation permits the distribution of profits (Doherty et al., 2009). 
However, as discussed, stewardship theory recognises non-financial motives for 
governance behaviour (Muth & Donaldson, 1998) which can aid both BenComs and 
CLG-CSs. Consequently, it should be a main underlying theory in third sector 
organisations. Yet, Puyvelde et al. (2011) note a substantial lack of research in this 
area. From the research we have, where the CEO is acting as the steward, 
empowering rather than controlling governance processes should be used (Davis et 
al., 1997). 
 
In terms of social enterprise, stewardship theory is consistent with the view that it is 
likely to evolve to a much narrower business emphasis (Dart, 2004). Consequently, 
this view of social enterprise will result in board members having a variety and 
particular set of skills and expertise (Cornforth, 2012). As a result, this moves away 
from the stakeholder view of social enterprise governance in which there will be a 
limited representation of stakeholder groups on the board (Spear et al., 2009). This 
implies a stewardship model can help tackle the tension of producing trading income 
which is associated with BenComs and CLG-CSs (Bull, 2018; Doherty et al., 2014). 
This implies that the board will be set up to foster a range of high-quality skilled 
professionals who are capable of operating the organisation more effectively. In 
effect, this can equip a BenCom and CLG-CS with a representative and adequately 
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skilled board which enables them to maximise its social value to its targeted 
communities and stakeholders (Cornforth, 2012; Nicholls, 2010). It is appropriate 
that board members should be sufficiently at liberty and able to deliver increased 
productivity (Nicholls, 2010) However, the CLG-CS legal status may restrict the 
board increasing productivity as it is associated with overlooking commercial 
savviness (Cabras, 2011). Mason (2010) stated that this function of social enterprise 
governance is still emerging and could develop further as the social enterprise sector 
matures. 
 
There is a limited supply of literature on stewardship theory in the social enterprise 
field in relation to its adoption within different types. The majority of studies reviewed 
on stewardship theory focus on general non-profit organisations. Therefore, the 
applicability of their findings must be tempered with caution. Low (2006) suggests 
that political developments may influence social enterprises to move from 
stakeholder to stewardship models of governance which facilitates a commercial 
approach to balance social and financial tensions. Cornforth (1988) affirmed that a 
democratic type of ownership is unappealing to venture capitalists. As social 
enterprises pursue both financial and social objectives, their boards and CEO ought 
to possess the independence necessary to satisfy the creation of social value whilst 
remaining financially stable. Spear et al. (2009) argue that organisations with 
autonomous and voluntary boards can face tensions in controlling their commercial 
operations. This has resulted in a collective interest in the stewardship model of 
governance. Conventional governance models of social enterprise are commonly 
distinguishable by an absence of environmental considerations to inform strategic 
decisions (Harding, 2004). Supplementary to this, the vagueness around the 
separation of roles between the CEO and board of trustees can create a minimalist 
board (McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999). This means the board is predominantly run by an 
individual or dominated by strong founder members, with little or no conflict, 
challenge or dissent amongst themselves (Spear et al., 2007). 
 
However, we must proceed with vigilance and care in this shift to the stewardship 
governance approach. It is clear it has repercussions for the processes involved 
when it comes to setting strategy within either trading charitable types, solidarity 
types and social business types. Spear et al. (2007) contend the growth of a 
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commercial approach unavoidably breeds anxieties about their capability and 
proficiency in balancing commercial social tensions. Further, it is a move away from 
the traditional approach, which Spear et al. (2007) label ‘delegate syndrome’, 
whereby board members become power hungry and concentrate on addressing their 
own interests rather than those of the social enterprise. This can prove particularly 
problematic for a CLG-CS as their board is entirely responsible and accountable to 
the stakeholders they serve (Doherty et al., 2009). On the other hand, as a BenCom 
allows for delegated powers to a director (Doherty et al., 2009) it reduces the risk of 
the board acting in their own interests. Overall, this contemporary move towards a 
stewardship model of governance needs more understanding in its relevance and 
applicability to social enterprises.  
 
2.2.7. Resource Dependence Theory Governance Model & Legal Structures 
 
An alternative viewpoint in understanding the governance of an organisation is 
exploring whether resources are an explanatory factor in determining governance 
structures. Resource dependence theory attempts to explain organisational survival 
as being reliant on its ability to acquire and maintain resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). This theory describes individuals on the board of directors as resources for 
the organisation. The understanding that the board itself and that the knowledge and 
experience of its members is a valuable resource is receiving more recognition in 
relevant literature. 
 
Resource dependency theory is applicable to social enterprise as boards of third 
sector organisations encourage the utilisation of resources. The tension around 
raising capital is a long-lasting and habitual problem in the social enterprise sector 
and this model can address this issue (Callen et al., 2009). However, as discussed 
previously, a CLG-CS is unable to attract equity finance (Doherty et al., 2009) 
therefore the stream of external financial resources can be limited. Nonetheless, 
social enterprises are progressively searching and embracing for creative methods 
to attract within and outside the social economy (Mason et al., 2006). Methods 
include recruiting board members on the basis of their lobbying power and networks 
(Callen et al., 2009). Callen et al. (2009) observed social enterprises identify specific 
individuals based on their ability to acquire access to resources that will help the 
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organisation. This approach can be beneficial for a BenCom because although it has 
a democratic structure (one member one vote) the board directors have delegated 
powers (Doherty et al., 2009). This enables the experts recruited through this 
governance approach to produce impact upon the organisation’s operations. 
Whereas a CLG-CS would potentially restrict this recruitment approach because the 
organisation is held in stewardship by voluntary board members, normally from the 
local community. 
 
2.2.8. Stakeholder Theory Governance Model & Legal Structures 
 
Stakeholder theory has been referred to as balancing the need to keep economically 
viable against the philanthropic notion of ‘doing good’ (Winn, 2001). The non-profit 
sector provides a natural fit for a stakeholder perspective of the organisation 
(Bruneel et al., 2018; Cornforth, 2013; Schillemans & Bovens, 2019). This is 
because non-profit organisations gain strategic advantage from power in the form of 
trust and legitimacy aspects of governance expected from their stakeholders rather 
than being primarily interested in profit (Steane, 2001). This characteristic is in line 
with setup of a CLG-CS in that the board of trustees are primarily elected on the 
prime basis of addressing the needs of the stakeholders they serve (Cabras, 2011; 
Doherty et al., 2014). Third sector organisations are also unique in not being owned 
and controlled by those focused on a return on investment (Pearce, 2003; Peattie & 
Morley, 2008). Instead, they are often founded and controlled primarily by a demand 
for a social return on investment (Dart, 2004; Dees, 1998). The main difference 
between for-profits and non-profits is the issue of ownership (Mason et al., 2006).  
 
Profitable firms had owners who required a profitable return on their investment; 
hence the goals of the organisation were clearly defined and able to be measured 
through share prices and financial measures (Sutton, 1993). Third sector 
organisations have no clear owners and serve large stakeholder groups with a social 
mission, which was, and still is difficult to measure (Mason, 2010). It has been seen 
that a CLG-CS allows for community ownership to ensure the stakeholders are 
central in their governance (Doherty et al., 2009). The stakeholder governance 
approach is also applicable to a BenCom as it is controlled and managed by its 
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members with a democratic one member, one vote structure (Cabras, 2011). 
However, they are still expected to be accountable like their for-profit counterparts. 
 
Researchers have considered the importance of stakeholders being engaged in 
organisational decision-making and their subsequent balance of mission (Burchell & 
Cook, 2008; Foster & Jonker, 2005; Letza et al., 2004; Lozano, 2005; Sutton, 1993; 
Spitzeck, 2009; Spitzeck & Hansen, 2010; Turnbull, 2002; Winn, 2001). Many of 
these studies, however, confirm that most stakeholder governance structures in 
regards to decision-making by the board and CEO can be limited. For example, 
Letza et al. (2004) found that formal dialogue between the organisation and 
stakeholders does not go beyond mere exchanges of different viewpoints. This may 
be a particular problem for a BenCom as satisfying social value creation is an 
associated tension with solidarity types (Bull, 2018). The communication between 
the BenCom and its stakeholders potentially lies at the root of this tension. 
Additionally, Jonker and Nijhof (2006) and Lozano (2005) argue that stakeholder 
dialogue usually consists of a very large number and broad mix of stakeholders, 
which may not develop a constructive working relationship due to the lack of trust or 
the complexity of issues discussed. 
 
The application of the stakeholder approach to organisations has been criticised in 
the past, mainly by advocates of other theories (Burchell & Cook, 2008; Jonker & 
Nijof, 2006; Lozano, 2006; Pederson, 2006). However, the influence of this debate 
upon social enterprise governance is diminished by the absence of one of the key 
factors in the mainstream for-profit governance literature, the stakeholder (Low, 
2006; Mason, 2010). Therefore, it can be assumed that the governance structures of 
a BenCom and CLG-CS should facilitate an adherence to the needs and wants of 
the stakeholder groups they serve. Stakeholder models of governance have further 
implications for the long-term objectives of various types of social enterprise 
(Doherty et al., 2014). Having stakeholder representatives on the board of a CLG-CS 
and BenCom is advantageous because, as Mason et al. (2006) argue, it fosters a 
broader range of viewpoints in strategy and decision-making. Consequently, 
stakeholders can provide a valuable contribution to board decisions that will 
ultimately affect them (Friedman & Miles, 2002). In permitting stakeholders to 
participate in a social enterprise’s operations, the organisation is then able to pursue 
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a social mission which is aligned with the needs of those stakeholder groups (Low, 
2006; Vidal, 2014). 
 
Additionally, even when organisations assert that stakeholder input does in fact lead 
to considered decisions being made, the causal link between stakeholder input and 
decision-making usually remains quite vague and unproven (Letza et al., 2004). This 
vagueness regarding the impact of stakeholder consideration and engagement can 
result in relations with stakeholders turning sour (Turnbull, 2002; Winn, 2001). 
Consequently, this restricts a BenCom in reducing the concern of producing social 
value due to the potential perceived lack of stakeholder input into decision making. A 
CLG-CS does not specifically share this concern as the board is structured in a way 
which makes stakeholder integration and engagement in decision making palpable. 
Additionally, stakeholders may hold back from collaborating with organisations as 
they perceive it to be a waste of time (Burchell & Cook, 2008) or because conflicting 
interests between stakeholders and the organisation may be apparent, but cannot be 
resolved (Pederson, 2006). This is a concern for a CLG-CS due to the wide 
stakeholder base represented in their board of trustees. This facilitates an 
environment in which conflict can surface through safeguarding the interests of the 
specific stakeholder group each trustee represents. 
 
As mentioned previously, stakeholder theory has received criticism. It has been 
suggested that stakeholder theory of governance is not suited with corporate 
governance because it allows accountability to be given to more than one group 
(Mason et al., 2006). One of the main proponents of stakeholder theory criticism was 
Jensen (2001). As a result of his study on organisations adopting stakeholder 
governance processes he argued that the board of directors must be held 
accountable to one group, to whom the risk of failure and benefit of success is 
delivered. He proceeded to point out that when there are multiple stakeholders 
involved, directors are consequently held accountable to a range of groups, some of 
whom may not be directly involved with the social enterprise. This raises the issue of 
identifying and engaging with stakeholder groups. This has an implication for the 
governance of a BenCom and CLG-CS. The structure of a CLG-CS board can be 
accountable to a number of stakeholder groups within one community therefore 
potentially diluting the level of social value created. To this end, Jensen (2001) 
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concluded that it would be more effective to focus on providing a service to one 
group rather than trying to manage a range of groups. This is particularly concerning 
for a BenCom which facilitates a more entrepreneurial approach (Cabras, 2011). In 
effect, as the BenCom becomes more successful, and grows, it will be accountable 
to a larger base of stakeholder groups. Thus, this raises concerns of how they can 
satisfy levels of social value within a growing stakeholder base. 
 
Subsequently, there have been calls for research in this area to focus on providing 
evidence to show a correlation between how stakeholder involvement can add value 
to the development of social enterprises (Cornforth, 2013; Low, 2006). To this end, 
Cornforth (2013) argues that we need to take into account the contextual factors that 
influence or shape board composition and how they work. 
 
2.2.9. Influence of Board Composition 
 
Researchers have emphasised the importance of the board of directors/trustees for 
the effectiveness of the overall organisation (Gazley & Nicholson-Crotty, 2018; Spear 
et al., 2009). Without an excellent board of directors/trustees, the organisation is 
unlikely to attain its full potential (Herman & Renz, 1998). As members of third sector 
boards predominantly work on a voluntary basis, many of these organisations face 
recruitment difficulties. Therefore, they are in many cases, undermanned (Cornforth, 
2003). Due to this understaffing, selection criteria/rationale for voluntary board 
members in many organisations is very low or non-existent (Stone & Ostrower, 
2007). In relation to board composition, much of the governance research is 
descriptive and, as Stone and Ostrower’s (2007) review of the literature pointed out, 
studies have found that voluntary boards are large relative to for-profits and are 
primarily composed of white men from upper-middle-class or upper-class 
backgrounds. Olson (2000) and García-Meca and Palacio (2018) found evidence 
that suggests larger boards, longer average tenure, and more extensive business 
backgrounds of directors strengthen the board’s ability to monitor, be less influenced 
by managerial directives and possess the expertise to make difficult business 
decisions. Recruiting board members with appropriate skills, experiences and 
expertise is important for board decision-making, particularly in non-profit 
organisations (Spear et al., 2009). 
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It is assumed that by having large boards, non-profit organisations will then have 
improved access to a greater amount of resources (Olson, 2000). Olson (2000) 
proposed that there is a positive correlation between board size and organisational 
performance of non-profits. Conversely, studies have shown and argued that board 
size has no correlation or relationship to improved organisational performance 
(Miller-Millsesn, 2003; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The role of the board, working with 
management to improve strategy and add value to top decisions, is primarily 
strategic (Miller-Millsesn, 2003). In this context, board members are thought to be 
recruited based on their professional expertise and skills (Cornforth, 2004; Mason et 
al., 2006). In general, the question of board composition remains a contentious area 
of discussion. Nevertheless, when drawing from the discussions taking place within 
the literature we can state that third sector organisations have larger boards than for-
profit organisations. This is based on the consensus within extant literature that non-
profits have larger boards because their survival and sustainability is highly reliant on 
external resources, such as tax relief, varying skill bases, donations and government 
support functions (Amis & Slack, 1996; Hoye, 2006; Olson, 2000). 
 
In general, few studies have asked how board composition affects governance and 
key decision-making processes. Stone and Ostrower (2007) allude to this by pointing 
out that we cannot at this point, speak with any certainty on the question of whether 
or how the composition of boards makes a difference to third sector organisations or 
the broader communities they serve. From the critique of board composition and 
governance models it is clear the relationship and dynamics between the board and 
CEO/Managing Director is crucial in determining the organisation’s approach for 
achieving their mission. A critique of of these dynamics and contextual variables 
affecting it will now be discussed. 
 
2.2.10. Board Relations with CEO 
 
The relationship between boards and CEOs has been largely neglected in research 
on non-profit governance (Cornforth & Macmillan, 2016). More specifically, decision-
making dynamics within organisations has been under-developed by the 
organisational literature (Contu & Willmott, 2003). Moreover, the processes through 
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which internal dynamics are negotiated in groups is also poorly understood (Lovaglia 
et al., 2005). There has been relatively little empirical research on the relationship 
between the board and CEOs in the non-profit sector (Cornforth & Macmillan, 2016). 
Ostrower and Stone (2006) have suggested that much of the early prescriptive 
literature focused on characterising the relationship between boards and staff as a 
partnership of equals, and that any problems between the board and staff could be 
resolved by clarifying their respective roles. The parties may have unequal power 
and the relationship may involve tensions and conflict, and may change over time 
with changing circumstances (Drucker, 1990; Golensky, 1993). Additionally, 
Mordaunt and Cornforth (2004) and Reid and Turbide (2014) highlighted how 
organisational crises can trigger a loss of trust between boards and CEOs, and a 
shift in dynamics. 
 
CEO and board dynamics may manifest in several forms. Stone and Ostrower 
(2007) indicate that the decision-making dynamics between boards and CEOs 
depends upon a variety of individual, organisational, and environmental factors such 
as CEO seniority, organisational size, and external stability. A key study on power 
dynamics was conducted by Murray and Wolpin (1992) who observed five broad 
patterns of power dynamics in a sample of Canadian non-profits: the CEO-
dominated board, the chair-dominated board, the power-sharing or democratic 
board, which usually rejects any kind of dominant leadership by an individual, the 
fragmented board, where there are strong competing factions; and the powerless 
board where the board is unclear about its role and responsibilities and there is a 
lack of commitment. The CEO-dominated board was the most common, occurring in 
just under half the boards, followed quite closely by the power-sharing board. 
However, this research involved a cross-sectional survey and does not address how 
power dynamics may change over time as circumstances change. Iecovich and Bar-
Mor (2007) examined the relative dominance of board chairs and CEOs in a survey 
of local non-profits in Israel. Similar to Murray and Wolpin (1992), they found that 
CEO dominance was the most common form of power dynamic (41% of 
organisations), but boards were perceived to dominate in 36% of organisations. 
Interestingly, they found that the more established the organisation the more likely 
the CEO was to dominate. 
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The interactional dynamics of the board and CEO relationship is essential to the 
proper functioning of every organisation (Drucker, 1990). Research evidence on the 
relationship between boards and the CEO presents a mixed picture. On the one 
hand, it seems widely accepted in the literature that boards of third sector 
organisations do not actively monitor the CEO (Caers et al., 2006; Miller, 2002). 
However, it is also accepted that the weak control that is observed does not appear 
to be associated with evidence of CEOs pursuing their own objectives at the 
organisation’s expense (Wood, 1992). According to Wood (1992), the board will 
have less involvement with operational roles and more involvement with governance 
roles as the organisation is growing. Drucker (1990) suggests that neither the board 
nor the CEO is the boss per se. Albeit the board ultimately is legally accountable for 
the organisation’s actions. Drucker (1990) sees the board and CEO as colleagues 
working toward the same goal. The CEO is often the stronger partner as he or she 
generally remains longer in office than does the chairman of the board. 
Subsequently, they must adapt to the working style of different board members 
(Drucker, 1990). The roles of the board members and CEO are inter-dependent and 
the boundaries between the two are often necessarily somewhat blurred, particularly 
in smaller organisations (Rochester, 2003). Both boards and CEOs contribute to 
carrying out governance functions. For example, while it may be the responsibility of 
boards to decide strategy or make major financial decisions, it is usually 
management that are in the best position to develop strategic options and proposals 
for the board to consider (Rochester, 2003). 
 
Miller (2002) provides a particularly interesting insight on this through her study of 
board meetings and interviews with individual members of non-profit boards. Miller 
(2002) found no evidence that boards or individual directors did not trust the 
organisation’s CEO and were very comfortable relying on information provided by 
management on which to make decisions. Miller’s (2002) findings suggest that 
boards undertake low levels of monitoring of their CEO because more rigorous 
monitoring is deemed unnecessary. Caers et al. (2006) suggest that the lack of 
CEOs on the board may reduce its monitoring capacity since executive presence 
does bring key inside information needed for optimal decision-making. In other 
words, the increased independence of boards designed to ensure CEOs are better 




2.2.11. Decision-Making Tensions 
 
The decision-making process of non-profit organisations involves political game 
playing in which the players, namely the board of directors and CEO, develop roles 
and coalitions capable of influencing day to day and/or strategic decision-making 
(Auld & Schulz, 2006). Hay (1997) and Morgan (2006) argue that in a political 
framework, the organisation is seen as a group of actors who each have their own 
interests and objectives, controlling diverse resources which are considered relevant 
to the running of the board. Morgan (2006) further elaborated that the day to day 
operations of an organisation consistently display instances of power struggles which 
primarily originate from a difference in opinions, ideas and agendas of the actors 
involved in the decision-making process. Consequently, conflicts and tension surface 
when actors with differing agendas clash concerning key decisions. When examining 
organisations, particularly those which consist of voluntary boards members, there 
are a limited amount of studies which investigate possible decision-making tensions. 
In his study of non-profit organisations and the decision-making processes within, 
Correia et al. (2010) emphasised the importance of the discussion process among 
the board members in order to arrive at an agreed decision. Additionally, Correia et 
al’s. (2010) findings focus on the importance of the CEO having an influence on the 
strategic decisions made by the board. This is emphasised by the findings of Auld 
and Schulz (2006) who argued that the CEO and the board members each hold a 
combination of influences, competences and skills that constitute authentic sources 
of power and they negotiate the decision from within the coalitions formed. 
 
Another factor affecting the decision-making process is based outside the actual 
structure of the organisation, the macro condition (Kikulis, 2000). Since non-profit 
organisations can be dependent on public financing and external partnerships, a 
strategic alliance between two or more organisations can be viewed as a partnership 
that brings benefits to both parties (Geddes, 2005). External power over the 
organisation’s decision-making may vary according to the nature of the alliance, the 
discussion of issues process and the interests of the parties involved (Kikulis, 2000). 
The importance of the external environment in organisational decision-making has 
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been well established over the years. The governance of non-profit organisations will 
be affected by the particular sector or field in which it works as well as its policy field 
(e.g. sport policy and leisure provision) (Stone & Ostrower, 2007). Board members 
operate on the boundaries between the organisation and its environment, providing a 
communication channel and often reflecting important elements of the environment 
such as community power elites and key resource dependencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). 
 
Based upon the above review of literature concerning the governance of social 
enterprises in particular types it is clear that in order to achieve the main aim of this 
study of contributing to our understanding of the role of social enterprise, it is crucial 
we investigate the governance of different types of social enterprise. ‘Research 
Question 2’ below reflects this need; 
 
 
RQ 2 - How does the governance model and processes of different Leisure Trusts 


















2.3. Mission Drift  
 
2.3.1. Introduction 
As discussed previously, social enterprises face a unique governance challenge. 
How do they control the balance between their social activities and their commercial 
ones (Battilana, 2018; Battilana et al., 2017; Battilana & Lee, 2014; Walker, & 
Dorsey, 2012)? How do they generate enough revenue without losing sight of their 
raison d’etre; creating social value? Research which explores the concept of mission 
drift suggests that such drift is a detrimental outcome (Battilana, 2018; Battilana et 
al., 2017), but little is known about what mission drift is, how it occurs, how it impacts 
social enterprises in different contexts and how social enterprises should respond.  
Broadly, Cornforth (2014:3) suggests that “mission drift can be defined as a process 
of organisational change, where an organisation diverges from its main purpose or 
mission”. Grimes et al. (2019) built upon Cornforth’s (2014) definition by attempting 
to theorise mission drift in hybrid organisations. They argue that mission drift is the 
discontinuity between an organisation’s actions and its image. However, this 
definition by Grimes et al. (2019) has been criticised by Varendh-Mansson et al. 
(2020) who argue Grimes et al. (2019) fall into the trap of conceptualising mission 
drift in very simplistic terms and over-generalise their definition of the concept. 
Varendh-Mansson et al. (2020) argue that mission drift may be different in varying 
organisational contexts. They argue that the central feature which underpins a 
definition of mission drift is the organisational mission itself.  
It is regularly presumed that social enterprises are able to achieve social objectives 
whilst, at the same time, be financially viable (Battilana et al., 2017). However, 
limited research supports this claim. Seanor et al. (2013) and Spear et al. (2009) 
argue that in order to address deprivation in local communities, social enterprises 
must provide a sustainable approach for public service delivery. Battilana (2018) 
argues that in terms of organisational governance, social enterprises offer a rich 
subject of study as they combine potentially conflicting social and financial goals. 
Walker and Dorsey (2012) go further and point out that all social enterprises engage 
in social activities but to achieve their social mission commercial activities are 
needed to generate revenue. This study unearths the governance challenges facing 
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two different types of social enterprise in avoiding mission drift. As Battilana et al. 
(2017) and Smith et al. (2012) discovered in their respective studies, a social 
enterprise’s ability to prevent divergence from their social mission is impacted by 
legislative, political and financial issues as well as market pressures.  
It is important to consider the internal and external governance challenges affecting 
mission drift. Maier et al. (2016) argue that it is the organisation’s environment, board 
composition, internal power dynamics, the economy, as well as collective and 
individual actors which are all drivers of the attainment of social and commercial 
goals. Their case study approach of 12 social enterprises was very thorough and 
was conducted over a 5-year period. Kerlin and Pollak (2011) provide more detail by 
arguing that economic factors such as competition with for-profit providers and 
availability of funding affect the commercial/social focus of the social enterprise. 
Harmer et al. (2013) further the debate by contending that social enterprises are 
becoming more commercially orientated due to political pressures of public service 
delivery. This is particularly pertinent to Leisure Trusts in that they are predominantly 
founded as a consequence of political discussions (Hodgkinson & Hughes, 2012). 
Lorimer (2010) provides a correlated view to Harmer et al. (2013) but states that 
ultimately it is the collective and individual actors (board members and CEO) who 
pursue particular interests regarding the focus on commercial or social goals.  
 
To emphasise the application of these challenges to Leisure Trusts, it is the 
organisation’s context and field of operation which proves a determining factor in the 
drift of mission (Garrow & Hasenfeld, 2012; Smith et al., 2010; Varendh-Mansson et 
al., 2020). Other authors have emphasised this point and added that social 
enterprises are not unitary organisations and that they vary across nations and 
communities (Dacin et al., 2010; Kerlin, 2009; Mair, 2010). Yet, there is little 
evidence out there to support the view of these authors as no studies have examined 
this specific issue across types of social enterprise. Underpinned by Cornforth’s 
(2014) definition, we will now critique the meaning of mission drift within the context 
of Leisure Trusts. This will help guide the study by establishing a process by which 
we can determine whether mission drift is occurring in the sampled Leisure Trusts.   
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2.3.2. Relevance of Mission Drift to Leisure Trusts  
 
Leisure Trusts are a widespread and generally accepted model for sport and leisure 
provision in the UK (Findlay-King et al., 2018). These legally independent, non-profit 
organisations are typically set up as Companies Limited by Guarantee (CLG) or 
Industrial and Provident Societies (IPS). The Centre for Public Services (CPS) 
(1998:5) observed that the setting up of a Leisure Trust: 
‘involves the local authority transferring the service to a newly established Leisure Trust (or 
an existing trust). The council retains ownership of the facilities which are leased to the trust 
which also receives an annual grant from the council to make up the difference between its 
income from user charges and the cost of operating the service.’ 
Gillingwater (2016) explained that all Leisure Trusts are charitable social enterprises 
based within communities, many of which operate facilities and services on behalf of 
local councils. Anagnostopoulos and Winand (2019) also argue that Leisure Trusts 
are community assets in a public-facing role. They explain that Leisure Trusts invest 
in local communities within the sphere of sport and leisure provision, and also invest 
in the skills development of their workforce. Pringle (2001) provided insight to the 
reasons why Leisure Trusts come into being. He explained how the restructuring of 
local government in 1995 meant sport and leisure services suffered from vast 
reductions in funding. This created problems in preserving and improving already 
poor quality facilities which were able to compete with fast-growing health and fitness 
industry in the private sector.  
Unlike many private sector sport and leisure organisations, Leisure Trusts are 
governed through their board members who are volunteers. Anagnostopoulos and 
Winard (2019) found that these ‘board trustees’ are normally individuals with 
influential personalities who preferably possess a particular skill-set to help the 
organisation. Shilbury and Ferkins (2011) in their study of non-profit organisations 
found that these volunteer board trustees with professional competencies are critical 
for the governance of Leisure Trusts who are constantly under pressure to 
modernise and compete with their private sector counterparts. Anagnostopoulos and 
Shilbury (2013) agreed with the assertions of Shilbury and Ferkins (2011) and stated 
that this modernisation of Leisure Trusts has resulted in new organisational actors, 
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namely CEOs. Their existence, as Anagostopoulos and Winard (2019) state, helps 
professionalise Leisure Trusts in order to come in line with private sector providers. 
However, this raises questions on how they maintain focus on their social mission.  
To compound this issue, Livsey (2015) in his review of 232 local authorities found 
that just 9 Leisure Trusts managed sport and leisure facilities in 46% of the local 
authorities examined. He also found that 61% of the sport and leisure contracts are 
managed by three Leisure Trusts. This, therefore, is an indication of how the 
provision of sport and leisure facilities is led by only a few Leisure Trusts. This, as 
Findlay-King et al. (2018) argue, is an example of local authorities favouring large 
Leisure Trusts rather than locally-based and purely community focused Leisure 
Trusts. They argue that the continued focus on preferring larger providers can dilute 
the social value created and therefore increase the risk of mission drift occurring. 
However, little is known about the issue of mission drift within the context of Leisure 
Trusts.  
Mission drift is a term commonly applied to non-profit organisations straying from 
their designated mission as a result of external financial pressures (Cornforth, 2014; 
Young & Kim, 2015). Mission drift can be seen as a form of instability that may or 
may not lead to serious social or organisational consequences over the long term 
(Agafonow, 2015; Ebrahim et al., 2014; Young & Kim, 2015). While non-profits 
continue to struggle with this latter manifestation of mission drift, social enterprises 
have emerged which embrace both social and commercial goals, claiming both the 
compatibility of these goals and the advantages in addressing various social 
problems (Billis, 2010). Being commercially focused is seen both as viable sources 
of sustaining surplus generation, and increasingly as new means to address mission 
goals through a commercial orientation (Chell, 2007, Dees, 1998, 2001; Defourny, 
2001; Driver, 2012; Martin & Osberg, 2007; Peredo & McLean, 2006; Young & Kim 
2015). While research in this area is relatively limited, the issue of mission drift 
remains important (Garrow & Hasenfeld, 2012; Smith & Besharov, 2017).  
As highlighted previously, there are difficulties in defining mission drift within social 
enterprises, and therein Leisure Trusts, due to the varying nature of social enterprise 
and how they approach community development and the creation of social value 
(Ebrahim et al., 2014). Leisure Trusts are expected to produce social value in the 
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form of increased participation in sport and facility improvement (Gillingwater, 2016). 
However, the question remains, what is the mission of Leisure Trusts? Gillingwater 
(2016) and Findlay-King et al. (2018) suggest that the mission of Leisure Trusts 
should always focus on community involvement and getting more people 
participating in physical activity.  
Each Leisure Trust has its own priorities and unique challenges which means they 
address them accordingly (Hodgkinson & Hughes, 2012). This issue is complicated 
further by their requirement to be financially stable (Sesnan, 2001). As Wry and York 
(2017) make clear, social and financial objectives can cause potential trade-offs. 
Many Leisure Trusts fail to achieve financial stability whilst others generate 
significant surplus (Gillingwater, 2016). Based on these points, for this study, a ‘one 
mission fits all’ explanation of mission drift is unfit for all Leisure Trusts. Leisure 
Trusts should be judged on their own defined mission provided via their mission 
statement. The claims by Varendh-Mansson et al. (2020) underpin this stance as 
they explain that before we can establish a clear definition of mission drift we must 
first develop a robust and nuanced view of what an organisational mission is, 
particularly in relation to social enterprises.  
The mission statement expresses the purpose of an organisation e.g. its reason for 
existence and mission (David, 1989). A mission statement provides a platform for the 
achievement of organisational outcomes such as strategy and therein, their identity 
and objectives (Pearce & David, 1987). Mission statements help reveal 
organisational characteristics such as their target market, services and 
organisational objectives (Moss et al., 2011). This leads us to a pertinent question; 
what missions do Leisure Trusts pursue and are these missions homogenous across 
different Leisure Trusts? As previously mentioned, although Findlay-King et al. 
(2018) and Gillingwater (2016) point out that missions of Leisure Trusts generally 
focus around community involvement and getting more people more active, there is 
still little critique or exploration of the missions of Leisure Trusts. 
It is clear from the above discussions on what a Leisure Trusts is. We can assert that 
they are organisations which provide sport and leisure facilities to communities 
across the United Kingdom. Due to a Leisure Trust’s reliance on financial support, 
some studies have highlighted the point that Leisure Trusts are at risk of 
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encountering difficulties due to the removal of financial support which is underpinned 
by government spending cuts (Gillingwater, 2016; Findlay-King et al., 2018). 
However, little is known about the issue of mission drift in a Leisure Trust. In contrast 
with the usual assumption that all Leisure Trusts pursue the same mission, as 
discussed above, we argue that the inquiry into mission drift starts with what Leisure 
Trusts themselves promote as their main mission. We opt for this bottom-up 
approach to examine the potential occurrence of Leisure Trust mission drift. 
To tackle this issue, this study will rely on the assumption that, like other 
organisations, Leisure Trusts develop their mission statements to mirror their central 
social mission they wish to pursue, and outline what actions they think are crucial to 
work towards it. Subsequently, this study asserts that if a Leisure Trust drifts away 
from its social mission and/or diverges from its social actions/behaviours affirmed in 
its mission then it is incurring mission drift. If a Leisure Trust stays true to its mission, 
it cannot be accused of mission drift. This working definition is underpinned by 
Cornforth’s (2014) definition of mission drift and addresses the importance of 
mission, highlighted by Varendh-Mansson et al. (2020). Integrating the social 
missions of both Leisure Trusts in this study helps avoid the hazard of criticising a 
Leisure Trust for not doing something they have not proposed to do. 
2.3.3. Causes of Mission Drift in Social Enterprises 
 
As we have now established an approach to assessing potential mission drift within 
the sampled Leisure Trusts in this study, we will now critique the causes of mission 
drift within Leisure Trusts. However, this area is largely unexplored. Subsequently, 
we will broaden the critique to social enterprises in general in order to acquire a 
thorough understanding. The possibility exists in social enterprises for the creation of 
social value to be overly pursued at the expense of commercial viability (Borzaga & 
Becchetti, 2010). It is also contended that although social enterprises are viewed as 
promising vehicles for the creation of both social and commercial value (Sabeti, 
2011), they are at risk of losing sight of their social missions in their efforts to 
generate revenue (Fowler, 2000; Jones, 2007; Weisbrod, 2004). To provide more 
detail, Cornforth and Brown (2014) highlight how the internal power dynamics 
through which the CEO and boards ensure that organisations remain focused on 
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their social goals is a central concern of research. Miller and Wesley (2010) reason 
that this tension between the social and commercial goals of social enterprises lie 
with the extent to which social enterprises focus on social goals. However, Dacin et 
al. (2010) assert that this focus and potential imbalance in goals will vary over time 
due to institutional and external governance challenges. 
 
Whether a social and commercial focus is polar opposite or dependent is an 
important debate in the social enterprise literature. For example, Townsend and Hart 
(2008) suggest that these are difficult to combine because they require a different 
legitimation process, eventually resulting in institutional ambiguity. This argument is 
reflected by Austin et al. (2006:3) who claim that “commercial and social dimensions 
within the enterprise may be a source of tension.” However, Dacin et al. (2010) 
argue that the duality of a social enterprise’s mission may be mirrored in the 
organisation’s values. Moss et al. (2010) concurs with the view of Dacin et al. (2010) 
and furthers it by highlighting the implicit focus on social and commercial goals lies 
within the language of their mission statements. 
 
Although the risk of mission drift is not specific to social enterprises, it is particularly 
relevant for them for two main reasons. First, because they are dependent on 
commercially generated revenue in order to financially sustain their operations, they 
are inherently at risk of giving priority to their commercial activities (Ebrahim et al., 
2014; Renz & Andersson, 2014). Secondly, Sabeti (2011) points out that the 
consequence of mission drift for social enterprises is severe as it threatens their very 
raison d’etre: if social enterprises lose sight of their social mission, they will fail to 
achieve their goals of delivering social value to their beneficiaries. This problem and 
subsequent accountability creates tensions within power dynamics that are likely to 
persist throughout the life of the organisation (Battilana & Lee, 2014; Renz & 
Andersson, 2014).  
 
2.3.4. Contributing Factors to Mission Drift 
 
One contributing factor relates to the behaviour of the board and the CEO. Bromley 
and Powell (2012) contend that if social enterprises separate the commercial and 
social activities, they run the risk of failing to recognise contradictions or potential 
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inconsistencies that could harm the overall social purpose of their organisation. Wry 
and Zhao (2018) further this debate by arguing that CEOs can fall into the trap of 
legitimising their commercial activities on the grounds of financially supporting a 
social mission. However, in practice these actions are detached from those social 
goals or that might prevent the organisation from pursuing social goals. From a 
slightly different perspective, Kreps and Monin (2011) state that CEOs and governing 
boards invoke a moral justification for their commercial activities, but in practice do 
not scrutinise those commercial activities for risks to the social mission. On the other 
hand, Teasdale and Buckingham (2013) argue that social enterprises are able to 
strategically deploy different combinations of resources such as social mission and 
commercial revenue in order to engage in markets while avoiding erosion of their 
social identities. 
 
Social enterprises develop in political, social, and economic contexts that help define 
their purposes and manner of operation (Pearce, 2003). The sustainability of social 
enterprises is especially relevant due to their connection with the local communities 
many of them serve (Dees, 1998). In particular, social enterprise is fundamentally 
concerned with the balancing dichotomous goals; the production of social value and 
financial stability (Triponel & Agapitova, 2017; Young & Kim, 2015). Sustainability is 
a concern where financial success is unable in the long-term to support the intended 
balance or indeed the solvency of the enterprise (Young, 2012). Consequently, 
sustainability is a concern when attention and resources directed at one goal can 
stifle or deter from another, which results in potential ‘mission drift’ as Dart (2004) 
labels it. As Young (2012) suggests, it may be difficult for social enterprises that 
attempt to give equal weight to social and financial objectives to achieve a stable 
balance between both.  
 
This tension lies in the conflict between the instrumental consistency of the market, 
which tends to be oriented to the maximisation and distribution of profit on the one 
hand, and the primary goals of creating social value and democratic governance in 
social enterprises on the other (Defourney & Nyssens, 2012). This is the nature of 
social enterprise. Social enterprise board members are responsible for ensuring that 
the organisation acts according to its social mission and purpose (Pearce, 2003). 
Many social enterprises organisations are registered as Companies Limited by 
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Guarantee (CLG), and charities. Boards and CEOs therefore have legal 
responsibilities under both company and charity law to promote the best interests of 
the organisation and ensure it fulfils its purpose (Harding, 2006). 
 
One of the auxiliary mechanisms in this process is the issue of funding, which 
according to Herranz et al. (2010) lies at the root of mission drift anxieties as it can 
be seen as destabilising the intrinsic nature and character of social enterprises. 
Boards are increasingly becoming more professional and rightly conscious of their 
fiduciary duties (Spear et al., 2009). However, that can carry the risk that trustees 
who focus on business goals such as increased funding may pay adequate attention 
to the organisation’s mission and purpose (Cornforth, 2012). Due to the varying 
organisational forms of social enterprise many can find themselves, on what 
Emerson (2006) labels ‘blurred frontiers’, where they are located on a frontier 
between the non-profit and the for-profit sectors. This can increase the risks of 
mission drift associated with the pursuit of conflicting goals (Defourney & Nyssens, 
2012). 
 
The background of CEOs and board trustees and the degree to which they represent 
social or commercial logics has shown to potentially impact how the organisation 
deals with potential mission drift (Pache & Santos, 2013; Santos et al., 2015). Santos 
et al. (2015) explored the role of the CEO in social enterprises that operate in 
competitive markets. They found, in the organisations investigated, that the CEO’s 
role is paramount in ensuring the dichotomy of opposing goals is balanced out. The 
evidence in their study suggests this is due to the board leaning towards social value 
creation and overlooking financial stability. It was found in other studies that the 
presence of internal coalitions promoting a given logic, or more broadly, the internal 
balance of power between internal coalitions, has shown to influence how 
organisations have considered the possibility of mission drift occurring (Bromley & 
Powell, 2012; Ebrahim, 2010; Glynn, 2000).  
 
More broadly, it has been argued that forming and growing a social enterprise can 
consume scarce management resources, diluting the social enterprise’s focus on its 
social mission (Harding, 2006). This is a pertinent point as even without a direct 
conflict, this pursuit of commercial goals can deter from achieving their social 
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mission. Additionally, Seanor et al. (2014) argue the blurring of the boundaries 
between private, public and third sectors can influence the focus of a social 
enterprise. They contend that a government policy approach of reducing the 
dependence on public grants continually changes the character and institutional 
forms of social enterprise, which in turn may increase dependence on market 
conditions. Conversely, the influence of government policy may harm social 
enterprises and they subsequently hold hostility towards the logic of the market 
(Nicholls, 2010; Seaner et al., 2013). 
 
The above concerns are well put, although, in order to resource the production of 
social value, Agafanow (2015) argues that surplus must be generated. A balance 
must be struck. Surplus generated in Low’s (2006) view is valuable because it 
comes with no strings attached. It can be used for whatever purpose the social 
enterprise leaders deem most important, social causes in many instances. These 
concerns are summed up by Cornforth (2012) who puts mission drift down to an 
absence of realism in evaluating the challenges of being financially stable and being 
able to produce social value concurrently. However, Seanor et al. (2013) found that it 
is possible for social enterprises who engage in commercial activities, the social 
aspect is being overlooked. They found that there is some evidence that shows, for 
the majority of the commercially focused social enterprises, more surplus is spent on 
the operational costs and organisational management and less on their social 
objectives. 
 
This study is an important step in examining the issue of mission drift within specific 
types of social enterprise. Acquiring a better understanding of the distinctive nature 
of this offers one of the most significant opportunities to move the literature forward 
(Bull, 2018; Dacin et al., 2010). The literature shows us that there is a shift towards 
reconsidering how we view mission drift and how social enterprises can avoid it. 
Although research suggests social enterprises are exposed to similar pressures and 
potential mission drift, there is no integration or consideration of whether these 
challenges are apparent in different types of social enterprise. This study focuses on 
this aspect by establishing specific challenges for organisational types of social 
enterprise: A BenCom Leisure Trust and a CLG-CS Leisure Trust. Current research 
has struggled to unwrap these specific challenges and how they are managed due to 
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grouping social enterprises under one umbrella (Peattie & Morley, 2008). This study 
therefore provides empirical research that evaluates the importance of the social and 
financial objectives of social enterprises, providing insight into the distinctive nature 
of the dual mission of social enterprises within sport provision.  
 
2.3.5. Literature Review Summary 
 
This chapter provides the grounding from which the research questions were 
attained. It focuses on the confusion and contributing factors surrounding our 
understanding of social enterprise, internal governance and the issue of mission drift. 
This chapter highlights political factors that have catalysed the development of social 
enterprises in the UK over the last decade, particularly in relation to the possibility of 
mission drift occurring. As discussed, social enterprises are facing increasing 
challenges to remain sustainable organisations. Conceptually, social enterprise 
suffers from a lack of understanding and knowledge of specific types of social 
enterprise and how this influences mission drift. As discussed, there is a limited 
amount of studies that specifically attempt to contribute to the understanding of 
social enterprise governance. ‘Research Question 3’ presented below enables this 
study to contribute to our understanding of how different types of Leisure Trusts 
avoid mission drift. This contextual knowledge contributes to the academic debate as 
no studies reviewed have considered the implications of different types of social 
enterprise and their link to mission drift, particularly within the context of sport 
provision; 
 










Chapter Three  
 




This Chapter provides a thorough account of why the qualitative research approach 
was implemented. The epistemological standpoint of the researcher will be 
explained. Further, the structure of the research will be detailed along with a 
contemplation of the advantages and problems associated with the data collection 
methods and research process as a whole. Building upon that, reflective thoughts of 
the researcher are integrated, consisting of a detailed account of how the research 
process flowed throughout the period of study. The previous chapter discussed the 
relevant literature specifically related to what this study will aim to understand in the 
fieldwork stages of the study. 
 
There is common agreement amongst social scientists that methodology is the study 
of method (Crotty, 1998; Blaikie, 2010). It is important for all researchers to study 
method to find their own way in doing research (Saunders et al., 2009). The purpose 
of method is to address the research questions and achieve the research objectives 
set by the researcher (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003). Method assumes a systematic 
approach to the study of the subject. It is important to distinguish between the 
methods of researching this study’s particular questions and the principles 
underlying why such methods are used and how they are implemented and 
interpreted (Crotty, 1998). Denzin (1978) stated that researchers, if and when chose 
to engage in one line of research methodology, whether that be a qualitative or 
quantitative approach, they are then bound to a certain process of research which is 
unlike those who have chosen another line of research methodology. 
 
3.2. Qualitative Research Design 
 
This study has followed a qualitative methodology. Qualitative methods have 
enjoyed a growing popularity in the past decade throughout the social sciences 
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(Bryman & Bell, 2003; Denzin & Lincoln, 1998). It enabled the researcher to study 
the intricate details of phenomena that are difficult to convey with quantitative 
methods (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Consequently, the researcher decided to base 
this study around a qualitative research design that was consistent with the research 
questions of the study (Blaikie, 2009, Creswell, 2009). Furthermore, the decision 
made to adopt a qualitative research design was based on the notion this method 
could better capture the complex governance dynamics that exist in social 
enterprises. 
 
Alvesson and Skoldberg (2009) and Blaikie (2010) establish that qualitative research 
design is a holistic process rather than a succession of detached choices regarding 
preferred methods of data collection, interpretation and representation. From this 
perspective, this study’s research design originates by firstly acknowledging that 
methodological decision-making is not a technical exercise that takes place. Rather, 
researchers are regarded as members of a plural interpretative research community 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2003), whose practices are entangled in a set of methodological 
and epistemological assumptions known as research paradigms (Blaikie, 2010). The 
researcher assumes that social reality is a human creation, in that they interpret and 
contextualise meanings from people’s beliefs and practices (Denzin & Lincoln, 
2011). 
 
According to Blaikie (2010), it is important to consider different styles of explanation 
and understanding in order to design a consistent research strategy. Alvesson and 
Skoldberg (2009:3) refer to these logics of explanation as ‘explanatory models’. In 
this respect, Blaikie (2007) distinguishes between four main styles of explanation or 
understanding in the social sciences, namely inductive and deductive. Creswell 
(1994) suggests a number of practical criteria in pursuing either a deductive or an 
inductive study. Perhaps the most important of these is the nature of the research 
topic. A topic of which there is a wealth of literature from which you can define a 
theoretical framework and a hypothesis lends itself more readily to the deductive 
approach. Quantitative research is mainly concerned with the testing of hypotheses 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 2008), whereas qualitative research does not usually employ 
statistical procedures or other means of quantification, focusing instead on 
understanding the nature of the research problem rather than on the quantity of 
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observed characteristics (Strauss & Corbin, 2008). With research into a topic that is 
new and encouraging much debate, and on which there is little existing literature, it 
was appropriate for the researcher to generate data and analyse and reflect on what 
theoretical themes the data are suggesting. 
 
3.3. Epistemological Orientation 
 
The researcher ascribes to the epistemology of social constructionism. His view is in 
line with Denscombe (2003) in that as humans we do not just slot into a preordained 
social structure, but we are architects of that social order and knowledge is 
constructed not discovered. Social constructionism is alike to constructivism. 
However, as a social constructionist, the researcher believes what we take to be real 
is a consequence of social relations rather than the construction of reality being 
psychological, as seen by constructivists (Hines & Quinn, 2005). Crotty (1998) 
describes social constructionism as an epistemological approach which perceives 
that knowledge and all meaningful reality is socially constructed and originates from 
the engagement of humans and the world around them. This is in contrast to the 
positivist objectivist view of things existing as meaningful entities outside of the 
human conscious but having truths and meanings residing in them. In other words, 
the truth is out there waiting to be discovered (Crotty, 1998). The researcher does 
not ascribe to this viewpoint, as outlined above. 
 
The researcher ascribes to the belief that society is actively involved in the 
construction of knowledge, taking into consideration the role of culture, values and 
language (Crotty, 1998). The social enterprise sector is shrouded in these 
organisational values and cultures that are naturally relevant to this research, and 
these would not be captured adeptly through an objectivist approach (Hughes & 
Hodgkinson, 2012; Renz, 2006; Stone & Ostrower, 2007; Young, 2012). The 
positivist paradigm does not fit well with understanding mission drift and 
understanding types of social enterprise, which are at the heart of this work. 
Battilana and Lee (2014) and Walker and Dorsey (2012) assert that a positivist 
approach may create problems if the respondents in the study are considered 
autonomous objects, for this ignores their ability to reflect on problem situations e.g. 
mission drift, and act upon this. 
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The nature of the researcher’s knowledge creation is social and experimental, 
meaning that he works in a social group and uses a trial and error format to discover 
knowledge. Also, his view is that knowledge is relative and subjective. It is relative 
because it depends upon the group to justify the knowledge and one group’s 
knowledge can be different from another group’s knowledge, particularly, across the 
two cases being investigated. It is subjective because it depends upon what 
experiences that each respondent has had. Those experiences are brought to the 
social setting of the two case studies. Additionally, the researcher considers 
knowledge to be adaptive and constrained. Social constructionism asserts that there 
is no objective truth waiting for us to discover it. Truth, or meaning, comes into 
existence in and out of our engagement with the realities in our world (Crotty, 1998). 
Meaning is not discovered, but constructed. In this understanding of knowledge, it is 
clear that the different respondents in the study construct meaning in different ways, 
even in relation to the same phenomenon. Lyons and Duxbury (2006) suggest that 
this social constructionist approach is particularly apt for studying organisations in 
the social sector. They argue that public sector organisations can be understood and 
created by language and co-ordination of meaning between actors within that 
environment. 
 
Consequently, in this sense, the CEO and board members/trustees construct their 
own knowledge, and this knowledge may be different to other respondents within the 
same social setting and across the different settings being investigated. This is 
important because the study is aiming to understand how social and financial 
tensions are managed and how they react to the impact of austerity through 
differences and similarities between the respondents interviewed. 
 
Social constructionist epistemology is guided by the philosophic assumptions of the 
present study that the research issue and understanding social enterprise 
governance is subjective and complex. In line with the view of Creswell (2013), the 
researcher’s subjective dimension is guided by social constructionist assumptions, 
where the nature of reality is seeking meaning to understand the world in which the 
subjects live. Social constructionism’s strengths lie in its holistic and contextual 
nature and draws on research participants’ subjective views shaped by their social 
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interactions with others and their personal histories (Creswell, 2013). It reflects the 
context of the researcher’s area of study since it takes into account the differences in 
people (e.g. those responsible for the decision-making within social enterprises) and 
how they make sense of reality (e.g. the nature and existence of social enterprise). 
 
The researcher is concerned with the ways in which people construct knowledge. In 
this regard, the social constructionist approach caters for the investigation of how the 
CEO/Managing Director and board members/trustees affect the overall social and 
financial tensions of their respective organisations. The researcher observed the 
realities of the CEO/Managing Director and board members/trustees to construct 
meaning out of their voices in the field. Organisational actors such as board 
members or the senior management continually constructed or enacted their 
environments, through what they selectively paid attention to and how they 
interpreted the information being received. Therefore, the overall study endeavoured 
to understand multiple realities constructed by participants in their natural setting 
(Creswell, 2013). Social interaction involves direct interaction or conversation, i.e. 
interviews, in making sense of the conversations with the CEO and board trustees 
(Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). The research is designed with an interpretivist approach, 
where the interpretation of data is based on the words of the experts. The researcher 
interpreted the data (e.g. based on the interviews and meeting observations) by 
making sense of the issue. Emergent themes related to the governance of both 
Leisure Trusts were the outcomes that helped address the research questions. 
 
The researcher is not looking to undermine positivist methods of research. Instead, 
social constructionism improves the understanding of the complexities of each type 
of social enterprise which was a main aim of the study. It provided a way to unravel 
complex organisational governance processes by bringing attention to the range of 
different interpretations apparent by the actors across the two cases being 
investigated. The researcher acknowledges that social constructionist epistemology 
is not appropriate for all aspects of social enterprise research. However, as 
mentioned previously, it is valued and extremely useful in providing a foundation for 
interpreting subjective views of actors involved in the governance process in a social 
enterprise in a specific context (Hughes & Hodgkinson, 2012; Renz, 2006; Stone & 
Ostrower, 2007; Young, 2012), in this case sport provision.  
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It becomes clear that a positivistic-quantitative design with an objectivist approach is 
not conducive in answering the research questions proposed for this study. Taking 
up an inside perspective, by establishing a relationship and creating a trustful 
atmosphere in the interviews was necessary to obtain answers to the research 
questions. The researcher does not assume to know more than the respondents, but 
rather that the latter do not know what they know, as their practical knowledge is 
implicit, i.e. they are not aware of it. This knowledge was unlocked through a 
systematic interpretation and comparative analysis of the respondents’ replies. In 
other words, a subjective interpretative approach was the only way to bring out this 
implicit, practical knowledge and make it tangible. 
 
It is important to discuss the role of the researcher in the study. The researcher was 
the fundamental research instrument throughout the entirety of the project. 
Subjective context-dependent knowledge was sought. The researcher acknowledges 
his own subjectivity in the research process. Subjectivity was not seen as a 
shortcoming but as a vital element of understanding (Stake, 2008). Subjectivism 
benefited from high credibility but suffered low reliability (Flyvberg, 2006: Stake, 
2008). The high credibility was achieved because the researcher as the research 
instrument as most sensitive to the valid data being gathered. Low reliability surfaced 
due to the fact that the research relied almost totally on the single researcher and 
what is done can hardly be replicated (Stake, 2008). This was taken into account 
and the measures put in place throughout the research design were done so to 
maximise the reliability of the findings.  
 
3.4. Research Design 
 
3.4.1. Case Study 
 
Before justification of why case study research was suitable for the researcher’s 
study it is crucial to explain what a case study is and why it is important. This 
introductory segment will address one of the most controversial issues in case study 
research, a definition. Before the influential texts of Stake (2008) and Yin (2003) a 
number of authors tackled this matter and presented their conceptual claims. 
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Robson (1993) defines case study as a strategy for doing research which involves 
empirical investigation. Hammersley (1992) considers it an investigation of a single 
instance in the context in which it occurs, whereas Smith (1978) sees it as a 
bounded system, in which behaviour is systematically patterned and certain features 
can be consistently recognised. Stake (2008:11) provides a widely accepted 
conceptualisation of case study research by advocating it as ‘the study of the 
particularity and complexity of a single case, coming to understand its activity within 
important circumstances’. Yin (2003) provides arguably the most intricate and 
developed definition of case study: 
 
“A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident”. (p.13) 
 
Robson (2002) alludes to the point that an academic case study is something which 
comprises of the emergence of a comprehensive account containing exhaustive 
information about a unique case or a number of unique cases. Agreeing with this, 
Bryman (2001) argues that the study of a case is a thorough and rigorous analysis of 
a rationale defended case. Yin (2003) built upon his earlier definition by providing a 
more technical description; 
 
1. A case is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in 
depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. 
 
2. The case study inquiry; 
 
• Copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more 
variables of interest than data points, and as one result. 
 
• Relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a 
triangulating fashion, and as another result. 
 
 • Benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data 
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In the field of qualitative research methodology, case study is discussed as a 
significant qualitative strategy or tradition along with phenomenology, ethnography, 
and grounded theory (Crotty, 1998; Creswell, 2013; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; 
Hammersley, 1992; Patton; 1990; Stake, 2008; Yin, 2003). Case study is 
differentiated from other research strategies because the focus of the research is a 
bounded system of cases. The case study is a well-established research 
methodology in the social sciences (Eisenhardt, 1989; Perren & Ram, 2004; Stake, 
2008; Yin, 2003). Locating the researcher’s study of social enterprise governance 
within a clear and distinct framework supported the overall aim. Given the need to 
understand the internal governance processes within social enterprise a qualitative 
case study approach was the best fit. Further justification for this approach will be 
discussed. 
 
A defining feature of the qualitative case studies conducted was the utilisation of 
numerous sources of evidence (e.g. non-participant observation, interviews, and 
archival or source documents). Eisenhardt (1989) and Stake (2008) confirm this by 
suggesting that case studies are descriptions of past or present phenomena that are 
derived from multiple sources of evidence. This approach helped the researcher 
answer the ‘how’ questions of the study. However, this leads us to an important 
question that ought to be addressed – what is a case? The conception of ‘a case’ is 
defined by Miles and Huberman (1994) as a unit of analysis which is a phenomenon 
of some sort occurring in a certain context where boundaries are drawn. The 
research questions in this study helped determine what the ‘cases’ investigated will 
be. The similarities and differences between actors in organisations, in this case, 
Leisure Trusts, is what was analysed. To achieve this, ‘how’ questions were 
proposed to fully understand the relationships between the actors within the cases 
and the processes being investigated, namely, political challenges, governance 
processes and how they affect associated tensions. As a side, it has been argued by 
Yin (2003) that the posing of ‘why’ questions may create defensiveness on the part 
of the respondents. 
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For the purposes of this study the researcher adopted the typical approach that 
explains it as being the investigation of a small number of cases, which is the major 
characteristic. The study of a small number of cases allowed for the detailed 
examination of many contextual variables which in turn created in-depth and 
meaningful knowledge. 
 
3.4.2. Academic Contributors to Case Study Methodology 
 
In case study methodology, there are several academics who contribute to the 
development of the approach, namely, Stake (2008) and Yin (2003). They both 
propose that there are several various incentives for using a case study research 
approach. Stake (2008) characterises case studies as either being an instrumental, 
intrinsic, or a collective case study. An instrumental case study is used when the 
researcher us aiming to acquire a thorough understanding certain phenomena 
(Stake, 2008). This could be an emerging phenomenon, for instance, social 
enterprise governance. An intrinsic case study is embraced when the researcher is 
intending to obtain specific knowledge about a specific case (Stake, 2008). Stake 
(2008) has advocated that an instrumental case study is utilised to principally provide 
insight into a particular issue or phenomena. When researchers choose a small 
number cases to be investigated, all being instrumental, this implies, according to 
Stake (2008), a collective case study is being employed. This was the case for this 
study on social enterprise and sport provision. Yin (2003) claims that a single case 
study approach is suitable in five different sets of situations, they are appropriate 
when; 
 
1) The only way to test a well-developed theory is through a specific contextual case 
identified by the researcher, 
 
2) Within a particular context, a specific industry for example, there is a unique or 
extreme case completely different to the others 
 
3) The case is similar and emblematic of others 
 
 70 
4) The case is a new phenomenon which can offer insightful knowledge 
 
5) The case is studied for longitudinal purposes. The case can be investigated over 
an extended period of time. 
 
Like Yin (2003), Stake (2008) aims to continually draw lines between single and 
multiple case study investigations. He states that you are advised to employ multiple 
case study approaches in order to attain replication in order to; 
 
(a) Acquire comparable outcomes and build generalisations 
 
(b) Obtain dissimilar outcomes but for pre-researcher predicted reasons, e.g. 
theoretical replication 
 
When assessing the aim and research question of this study it is asserted that 
Stake’s (2008) academic work on developing case study method as a research 
approach was of more value and relevance. Stake (2008) manages to provide a 
succinct and pinpoint explanation of why it is difficult to categorise case studies into 
the types Yin (2003) outlined. Yin’s (2003) detailed categorisations of case studies 
are rigid in terms of type of case. Stake (2008) points out the type of case type we 
chose is always contingent on instrumental interests. With this said, it is apparent 
that trying to position this research study in Yin’s (2003) sortation of case study 
would prove problematic. This is because this study is indisputably a collective case 
study process, and there is no aim by the researcher to pursue any type of 
replication through this approach. Further to this, a criteria and/or rationale for 
choosing single cases within a collective case study are not focused on by Yin 
(2003). The chief criterion Yin (2003) proposes is for mainly for the practice of 
replication or theory replication. Single and collective case study based methods 
have to be assessed and formulated distinctly from each other. Further, the 
procedures for choosing one case to integrate into a collective case study are 
profoundly not the same as deciding a case for a single case study. 
 
3.4.3. Collective Case Study 
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To answer the research questions, a collective case study of two organisations was 
conducted. According to Stake (2008), collective case studies involve the study of a 
number of cases in order to investigate a phenomenon in order to arrive at a greater 
understanding of the area of inquiry. In this case, contextual challenges affecting the 
governance of social enterprise. Because collective case studies typically 
necessitate researchers to choose their cases (Stake, 2008), being able to 
investigate thoroughly and understand the phenomenon of interest depends heavily 
on the considered selection of each case (Patton, 1990; Stake, 2008). The collective 
case study adopted for this research was richly descriptive, because it was grounded 
in deep and varied sources of information. It employed interviews from key 
respondents, observations from the researcher, viewing documental evidence and 
prose composed from interviews, in order to depict the complexity of the variables 
investigated which were inherent in the social enterprise governance settings being 
studied. 
 
To ensure the legitimacy of the adoption of a collective case study it is important to 
justify why it fits with the research aims and objectives presented. First of all, the 
researcher considers the collective case study a variation of the single case study. A 
single case study can be defined as an empirical enquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context (Yin, 2003). It is 
claimed that the use of collective cases yields robust conclusions from the study 
(Stake, 2008). Collective case studies are seen as an attractive research design 
within the developing field of social enterprise research (Cornforth, 2012). This is due 
to the rich detailed data that can be obtained through this method, which in turn will 
create a clearer view of the discipline. This is of benefit to the field of social 
enterprise because the amount of collective case study (Stake, 2008) designs can 
be increased in different contexts in order to reach a more concrete understanding of 
types of social enterprise in the UK. Additionally, the collective case study conducted 
led to more robust outcomes than a single case study approach, particularly when 
looking at cases in a varying context. For the study on different types of social 
enterprise (in terms of legal identity), a collective case study fits well in order to 
achieve the specific aim and questions. The conclusions drawn from each unit of 




When assessing the trustworthiness of their assumptions and conclusions combined 
with the reliability of research designs the researcher established that the studies 
that prove most meaningful have predominantly employed a case study 
methodology. The assumptions made were supported by the rich data that had been 
collected and meticulously analysed through a single or collective case study. This 
further justifies the use of a collective case study for the researcher’s study as case 
study research within the social enterprise discipline is widely accepted and valuable 
for developing it. Kuhn (1962) endorses this contemplation by suggesting that a 
discipline without a large number of thoroughly executed case studies is a discipline 
without organised production of exemplars, and that a discipline without exemplars is 
an ineffective one. In social science, more detailed and thought-provoking case 
studies could help remedy this situation. Indeed, literature espousing, promoting and 
employing this method of research is rapidly increasing within the social enterprise 
field (Peattie & Morley, 2008). This is a shift that is being welcomed as a positive 
step towards a deeper understanding of social enterprise and the governance 
challenges affecting them (Smith et al., 2012). 
 
In the nascent area of social enterprise research there is an emerging trend of 
adopting qualitative the case study methodology in order to provide a better 
understanding of the phenomenon and provide a platform for future research 
(Doherty et al., 2014; Peattie & Morley, 2008). Collective case studies are seen as 
an attractive research design within the developing field of social enterprise research 
(Nicholls, 2010). Further, Cornforth (2012) posits that the case study research 
method may not be the best choice in situations where the phenomenon of interest is 
mature and well understood, where there is little interest regarding how or why a 
phenomenon occurs, and where real-life context is irrelevant. This is not the case in 
this research. As Dart (2004) points out, we must understand what we are 
investigating before we can delve deeper into a specific area. 
 
Prior to the emergence of case study methodology most research in the field was 
concerned with mapping social enterprises and identifying the benefits to the 
associated community and local government. The majority of this research has been 
what Van de Ven (2007) calls variance studies looking at social enterprise 
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characteristics and behaviour. For the most part, this research has been carried out 
with a broadly positivist epistemology. Therefore, when considered, there is a 
necessity for more in-depth qualitative process (Van de Ven, 2007) case study 
research to complement quantitative studies on social enterprise, to examine how 
different actors involved in governance interpret and react to contextual factors and 
challenges. Therefore, this study is a process study (Van de Ven, 2007). We are in 
an exciting period of research in the field of social enterprise because through case 
study methodology we are able to acquire a greater understanding of the underlying 
issues and challenges faced, and the processes by which they are addressed 
(Agafonow, 2015; Ebrahim et al., 2014; Young & Kim, 2015). 
 
Too little attention has been paid to board processes and change and how they are 
influenced by contextual and historical factors (Cornforth, 2012). There has also not 
been a great deal of attention drawn to understanding the internal processes and 
decision-making dynamics of different types of social enterprise (Doherty et al., 
2009, 2014). Subsequently, research has paid insufficient attention to governance 
processes, the varied and sometimes complex nature of the social enterprise sector 
and how social and financial tensions are influenced by contextual factors 
(Agafonow, 2015; Battilana, 2018; Battilana & Lee, 2014). There has been an 
inadequate amount of thought in relation to research design in systematically 
examining the influence of contextual factors on managing tensions, or taking 
account of contextual differences in developing theory, in this study, a BenCom and 
CLG-CS. This study addresses this flaw by conducting a process study that allows 
the researcher to seek narrative explanations in terms of the central actors involved 
in the organisation “that make events happen and to which events occur” (Van de 
Ven, 2007:154) and the sequence of events that led to a change in associated 
tensions. There has been a relative neglect of process studies that can help us 
better understand social enterprise governance as a whole through explaining how 
internal governance structures work and developed and help avoid missteps such as 
mission drift (Agafonow, 2015; Ebrahim et al., 2014; Young & Kim, 2015). 
 
Using the qualitative collective case study enabled the researcher to meticulously 
study the intricacies and the particularity better than other qualitative methods. 
During the past decade in social enterprise literature, authors have been integrating 
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a range of data collection techniques within their case studies to improve the 
credibility and legitimacy of their studies (Peattie & Morley, 2008). This research 
continued this trend, and case study provided the best method for doing this through 
the variety of evidence that can be collected. Providing a study which presents a rich 
description and analysis of the sampled cases helped the researcher identify 
similarities and differences between them, which is a main objective of the study. 
This collective case study method adopted also built on existing studies by 
investigation multiple units of analysis, while previous studies have just focused on 
single cases. The selection of multiple units of analysis (two Leisure Trusts) allowed 
the researcher to investigate them in differing social contexts, in terms of political 
and economic environments. 
 
A detailed explorative investigation focusing on a single Leisure Trust would have 
been enlightening. However, this study aimed at understanding how different social 
and economic environments coalesce to yield social and financial value within a 
BenCom and CLG-CS. Hence, there was a necessity to adopt a collective case 
approach. To sufficiently examine the governance processes and dynamics between 
the actors involved, the data possessed an abundant amount of depth knowledge 
which provided a foundation for detailed analysis on the internal governance of 
Leisure Trusts in the context of sport provision. 
 
Throughout the study, context-dependent knowledge was sought. Those who 
support and encourage of qualitative case study designs agree that the detailed 
context-dependent knowledge acquired through this process is more 
accommodating in providing an explanation for a certain phenomenon being 
examined than that of the ‘fleeting knowledge’ acquired from bigger scale 
quantitative or mixed-method studies (Gerring, 2007:1). The qualitative collective 
case study approach adopted in this study permitted the researcher to construct a 
clear and comprehensive narrative of the governance of both Leisure Trusts through 
engagement with the key actors within the governance process. Stake (2008) points 
out that by spending time in the research site and within the boundaries of the unit of 
analysis we can come to better understand the phenomenon being researched. This 
aided the researcher to thoroughly investigate how they operate and enabled him to 
uphold and bolster the findings. This process was embraced for the study. Whilst a 
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nationwide quantitative study offers data concerning the mapping of Leisure Trusts, 
only an in-depth contextualised qualitative study provided a better explanation of 
how the governance process works and how they manage to produce social and 
financial value. 
 
3.4.4. Case Study Trustworthiness 
 
Justifying the credibility of qualitative case studies can be challenging (Stake, 2008). 
To justify the adoption of the case study method for this study the researcher will 
explain why the collective case study is the preeminent method of adding the most 
credibility to the overall study. This study integrated the trustworthiness criterion and 
the research strategies and operational techniques outlined by Guba and Lincoln 
(1986) to ensure rigour. It equipped the researcher with guidance for handling some 
of the issues and complexities related to maintaining rigour in qualitative research. 
Guba and Lincoln (1986) state that to ensure trustworthiness the research strategy 
should display credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability. For this 
study, a number of operational techniques were conducted prior and during the 
research to ensure the trustworthiness of the study was maintained. They are 
discussed below. 
 
Researcher as the Instrument 
 
The credibility of the research resides in part in the skill and competence of the 
researcher (Angen, 2000). Sandelowski (2002) argues that were interviewing defines 
the qualitative research endeavour, training is required. The researcher developed 
his skill and competence through a thorough review of relevant literature and 
experience; 
 
• A doctoral training programme aimed at developing research skills 
 






Field notes taken by the researcher contributed to credibility and dependability 
because they are analytical in themselves and because they contain immediate and 
later perceptions and thoughts about the research participants. The field notes 
facilitated the constant comparison of the data, which in turn specifically contributed 
to its credibility also. Additionally, the field journal became another data source and 
contributed to credibility and dependability in the context of theme generation. 
Furthermore, the researcher utilised his notes for self-reflection about the research 
process. That is, reflection on the research process, his role and potential influence 
on data collection. 
 
In the context of contributing to trustworthiness, the researcher posed the question 
‘how far did the research itself influence the findings?’ For example, the researcher 
recorded interviews via a Dictaphone and it seemed in a couple of instances this 
made the respondent self-conscious. This potential threat to credibility was tempered 
by providing the respondents with the opportunity to opt out of being audio recorded. 
Only two respondents decided to take this option, through which notes were taken 
instead. 
 
Audio Recording and Thematic Log 
 
The audio recordings aimed to counter criticism of qualitative research as ‘prone to 
systematic bias’ (May, 1991:198). The recording of the interviews facilitated 
credibility and dependability of the data collection procedure. Whilst audio recording 
the interviews removed one aspect of bias, bias during analysis was also eliminated 
through member checking which will be discussed. Furthermore, keeping a thematic 
log during the interviews as part of the researcher’s field notes added to overall 
accuracy or ‘authenticity’ (Caulley, 1999) or ‘truth value’ (Miles & Huberman, 1994: 
278). This thematic log was relied upon to summarise the interviews. Therefore, 
immediate notation into the researcher’s field journal promoted capturing ideas that 
were credible to the respondents. 
 
In addition, when writing interview transcripts, codes were written onto the left-hand 
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side of the transcript page and corresponding remarks were written on the right-hand 
side of the page. Remarks included thoughts and instructions for the researcher if 
clarification from the respondent was required. Further, notations regarding cross 
references to data within the same transcript or references to data in other 
transcripts were made. Making remarks during the transcript reading not only 
created sign posts for later reflection but also reduced the tedium of coding (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). In reducing the tedium of coding, marginal remarks helped 
prevent or lessen errors and distractions related to the researcher’s mood and style 




The purposeful sampling in this study contributed to credibility because participants 
were sought on the grounds that they were likely to have and share their 
understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. Additionally, transferability is 
facilitated because sampling aimed to include ‘the widest possible range of 
information for inclusion in the thick description’ (Lincoln & Guba 1985:316). 
Furthermore, constant comparison of data added to credibility since the research 
strategies employed contributed to data accuracy. 
 
3.4.5. Research Sample Selection 
 
It is important to note that the discussion of the sample selection is confined to a very 
narrow consideration of Yin and Stake’s contribution. This is because they focus 
specifically on selecting samples for case based research. In broader debates, the 
sampling technique for this study can be defined as purposeful, in that information 
rich cases were chosen for study in depth (Patton, 1987). Bryman (2001) notes that 
this method of sampling is endorsed by most qualitative researchers. 
 
One issue crucial in the case study sample selection was when the frequency of 
cases chosen in the research study rises, a correlating weakening in the reliability of 
analysis that can occur if the time permitted for the study stays the same (Stake, 
2008). Therefore, a compromise was needed concerning the frequency of cases and 
the different phenomenon within the cases which can be studied. It was understood 
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that if the frequency of cases investigated was significantly high then the issues or 
certain phenomenon being examined would be severely limited (Ragin, 1994). 
Consequently, studies that examine many cases tend to focus on select aspects of 
cases. However, the researcher asserted that a focus on a small number of cases 
can examine the same features but in more depth. With these points raised, it was 
determined that this collective case study would consist of a comprehensive context 
specific examination of two Leisure Trusts and their internal governance structures 
and processes, one being a BenCom and the other a CLG-CS. Two cases facilitated 
detailed explorative research of each type, and offered data which was organised 
and then analysed together. By choosing to research into similar and contrasting 
cases, the results promoted the precision and credibility of the findings. 
 
Stake (2008) and Yin (2003) both concur that in regard to sample selection the set of 
cases can be selected such that they represent homogeneous cases, or they can be 
selected to yield maximum variation. This study has selected a sample that is 
designed to provide variation in terms of the socio-economic contexts and 
organisational scale of the two cases examined. This was based on strategies for the 
selection of cases proposed by Flyvberg (2001) (see Table 3.1.). Context will vary for 
different cases investigated, and through comparing themes in the different cases 
through in-case and cross-case analysis it will help maximise the understanding of 
the phenomena being studied. In terms of how many cases, cases were chosen for a 
reason, not for quantity. In other words, the use of a collective case study was not to 
calculate tendency or frequency, but rather, to compare and contrast themes across 
cases. 
 
The number of case study organisations for this study was a vital consideration. A 
balance had to be struck between the practicalities of collecting data within an 
allotted time period and the prominence of data saturation occurring. As mentioned 
above, the aim was to provide a thorough insight into managing tensions within a 
small number of cases rather than limited understanding of many cases. The optimal 





Table 3.1. Strategies for the Selection of Cases (Flyvbjerg, 2001) 
Selection Basis Description 
Extreme/deviant Case Extreme of unusual case 
Maximum variation cases Cases which are different on one 
dimension 
Critical case A case with strategic to the general 
problem 
Paradigmatic Case A prototypical case 
 
 
A limitation of existing research is that it is has focused on very specific and 
restricted geographical locations or field of activity for their sample selection. With 
this said, a rationale was formulated for the selection of cases for this study. First of 
all, the two regions of interest were selected. London and the North-West (UK) were 
selected because of the concentration of Leisure Trusts and recent push to improve 
sports provision in these areas (Hodgkinson & Hughes, 2012; Widdop et al., 2018). 
Once selected, to avoid selection bias, deprivation studies were examined to 
ascertain varying socio-economic locations in two regions where it is viable to 
conduct research on Leisure Trusts. The Leisure Trust operating in deprived areas 
was identified as LTO-A (Leisure Trust Organisation A). The Leisure Trust identified 
as operating in an affluent socio-economic was labelled LTO-B (Leisure Trust 
Organisation B). After consulting each Leisure Trust, they both requested that the 
identity of their organisation would remain anonymous due to confidentiality and 
sensitive nature of some of the data. Examining Leisure Trusts in different regions 
allowed the researcher to attain a wide and detailed perspective of the impact of 
austerity on sport provision and the role of Leisure Trusts. They are both firmly 
established Leisure Trusts who have all been operational for at least thirteen years. 
 
The cases selected provided diversity in terms of regional and socio-economic 
contexts, and in particular organisational scale. Where the Leisure Trust is in terms 
of its business life cycle is crucial in answering the research questions. The Trusts 
investigated are in transition from local government support to the requirement of 
becoming self-sustainable. The rationale behind the significant variation of cases is 
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to obtain data about the significance of cases in different circumstances (Flyvbjerb, 
2001; Yin, 2003) in terms of the governance challenges influencing their stability. 
Table 3.2. and Table 3.3. provide a description of each case. This sample section 
strategy provided the researcher with ample opportunities to learn about the 
complexities of the governance processes each type engage in. This purposeful 
selection was tailored to the research questions of the study. 
 














LTO-A (Case A 
– London) 
- Their social mission is “to make local sport services 
and facilities accessible for everyone in the 
community. Focus on providing affordable access to 
high-class community sport and leisure facilities 
which is inclusive” (LTO-A, 2019b:1). 
 
- LTO-A is a public sector leisure provider in the UK (LTO-
A Sport Foundation, 2019). 
 
- LTO-A was first established in 2003. 
 
- They currently directly manage numerous leisure centres 
and sport facilities in Southern regions of the UK. (LTO-
A, 2019). 
 
- Have approximately 18million visits to their centres per 
annum (LTO-A, 2019). 
 
- Turnover up to £108m in 2015. Has risen to £121m in 
2018-2019 (LTO-A, 2019). 
 




- Cash used on investment activities in the year 2018 
(LTO-A, 2019b). 
 
- Social Value has increased in the period 2014-2018 
(LTO-A, 2019). 
 
- Registered as an Industrial Provident Society (BenCom). 
 
- The board has representation from a number of 
stakeholders of which all are skilled professionals (LTO-
A, 2019). 
 
- Hold a Social Enterprise Mark and a number of 
associated awards (LTO-A, 2019). 
 
- LTO-A are owned by our staff and stakeholders. (LTO-A, 
2019b) 
 
- Now has a workforce of over 1,000 and has a senior 
management team of 11 (LTO-A, 2019). 
 
- Have a membership base of 100,000 and have directly 
invested in to sport, leisure, health and wellbeing over 
the last 10 years (LTO-A, 2019). 
 
- They are a key partner in the delivery of the 2012 DCMS 
Sport Plan (Sport England, 2015). 
 
- New partnership with Local Authorities covering 18 
facilities, including the national performance centres for a 


















LTO-B (Case B 
– North-West) 
- Their social mission is "Improve the community 
through the provision of high class sport and leisure 
facilities and increasing participation across a 
number of sports and physical activity" (LTO-B, 
2019:1). 
 
- The Trust manages sport and leisure facilities across the 
North-West and surrounding areas. LTO-B was 
established in the early 2000s for public benefit with the 
key aim of providing facilities and organising activities for 
recreation and improving the health and well-being 
through community participation in healthy recreation. 
(LTO-B, 2019) 
 
- Registered as a Company Limited by Guarantee with 
Charitable Status (CLG-CS). 
 
- Turnover of £5.2m in 2015 which includes an annual 
council grant of £1m. Turnover has decreased to £4.6m 
in 2018-2019 (LTO-B, 2019b). 
 
- A Board of 10 Trustees, made up of local people, are 
responsible for the strategic management of the Trust 
(LTO-B, 2019). 
 
- The Trust is a registered charity with every penny surplus 
generated being re-invested back into improving the 
leisure offer to the people of the borough. 
 
- Annual attendances at the Trust's facilities and activities 
currently exceeded 1 million. They manage 5 leisure 
centres and golf courses predominantly in the affluent 
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areas of the North-West. They also manage football 
pitches and venue hire on behalf of the local council (14 
venues and 22 football pitches) (LTO-B, 2019). 
 
- They have over 300 members of staff. 
 




The below tables give an indication of the backgrounds of board members and 
trustees for each Leisure Trust organisation. They are redacted for anonymity 
purposes.  
 
Table 3.4. LTO-A Board Member Backgrounds 
Managing 
Director 
Aaaa aaaaaaaaa aa aaaaaa aaaaaaaaaaa aaaaa aaaaaa 
aaa aaaa aaaaa aa a aaaaaa aaaaa aa aaaaa aaaaaaaaaaa 
aaa aaaa aa aaa aaa  aaaaaaaaa aaaaaa.  
 
Board Member A Aaaaaa aaaaaaaa aa aaaaaaaaaa aaaaaaaa aaaaa 
 
Board Member B Aaaaaaa aa a aaaaaa aaaaa aaaaaaaaaa aaaaaaa 
 
Board Member C Aaaaaaaa aaaaaaaa aa a aaaaaaaaaaa aaaaaaaaaa 
 
Board Member D Aaa aaaaa a a aaaaaaa aaa aaaaaaa aaaa aaaaaaa aa 
aaaaaaa aaaaaaa 
 
Board Member E Aaaaaa aaaaaaaaa aaaaaaaaaa 
 
Board Member F Aaaaaa aaaaa aaaaaaaaa aa a aaaaaaaa aaaaaa 
 
Board Member G Aa aaaaa aa aaaaaa aaaaaa aaaaaaa aaaaaaaaa 
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Table 3.5. LTO-B Board Trustee Backgrounds 
Board Chairman Bbbbbb bbbbbbb bb bbbbbb bbbbbbbbb  
 
Board Trustee A Bbbbbb bb bbbbbbbbbb bbbbbbbbb bbbb bb bbbb bbbbbbb 
Board Trustee B Bbbbbb bbbbbbbb, bbbbbbbb bbbb bbbbbbbb, bbbbbbb 
bbbbbb/bbbbbb bbb bbb bbbbbbbbb 
 
Board Trustee B bbbbbb bbbbbbbb bbbbbbbbb. bb bbbbbb bbbbbbbbbb 
bbbbbb bbb bbbb bbbbbbbb, bbbb bbbbb bbbbb bb bbbbb 
bbbbbbbb bb b bbbbb bbbbbb bbbb  
 
Board Trustee C Bbbbb bb bbbbb bbbbbbbbb bbbbbbb  
 
Board Trustee D Bbbbb bbbbbbb bbbbbbb  
 
Board Trustee E Bbb, Bbbbbb bbbbbbb bbb bbbbbbb bbbbbbbbb 
 
Board Trustee F bbbbbbbb bbbbbbb bb bbbbb bbbbbbbbb bbbbbbbb 
 
Board Trustee G bbbb, bbbbbbb bbb bbbbbbbb bbbb bbbbbb bb bbbb bbbb 
bbbbb 
 
Board Trustee H bbbbbbbb bbbbbbbbb  
 
 
 Negotiating Sample Access 
 
An important consideration was access to the sample and key respondents. Through 
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contacting the key gatekeepers, both Leisure Trusts granted full access. An 
information sheet regarding the purpose and value of the research was provided for 
both organisations at the outset of securing access. Gaining access to the case 
study organisations was arguably the most challenging step in the entire process. 
Before full access was granted the researcher met and discussed the research with 
the respective CEO and Managing Director. This provided an opportunity to build a 
rapport with the key respondents prior to the data collection. Further, it enabled the 
researcher to gain a thorough understanding of both LTO-A and LTO-B. For 
example, a tour of their facilities was provided, their mission and vision were clarified 
and the value of the research to them was established. As mentioned previously, 
due to reasons of confidentiality, both Leisure Trusts wished to remain anonymous in 
the presentation of the research.  
 
In all, negotiating full access was achieved by clear communication with the Leisure 
Trusts in terms of what the research covers, the issues facing them and what the 
benefits of the research are to them as an organisation. They agreed with the 
research proposed and since that point they displayed real interest and a willingness 
to participate in the research. In the exceptional circumstance whereby one or more 
Trust withdrew from participating there was a contingency plan. Discussions 
commenced with Leisure Trusts in similar regions to ensure that if one of the initial 
Leisure Trusts withdraw from the research project there are other avenues to pursue. 
Fortunately, this was not required. 
 
Unit of Analysis 
 
It is vital a clear unit of analysis was established in order to establish consistency in 
the findings and avoid speculation and deliberation over irrelevant data. As 
discussed previously the focus of this study is on how social and financial tensions 
are managed. So, in that sense, the units of analysis were the organisations. This 
was reinforced by using meeting observations and the interactions within as well as 
interviews for data collection. These methods will be discussed in following sections. 
This distinct boundary of investigation was partly due to the vast operational nature 
of both Leisure Trusts. The research questions are explicitly linked to how 
governance challenges affect the occurrence of social and financial tensions in both 
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Trusts. The boundaries set allowed the researcher to produce rich in-depth data on 
the area of focus (Stake, 2008). It was vital this unit of analysis was set as it was 
fundamental to understanding the phenomenon being examined. 
 
3.4.6. Data Collection Methods 
 
For the data collection process, two collection methods were employed. The data 
collection stage involved following the case study protocol which included a line of 
questioning elicited from the literature review, using multiple sources of evidence, 
creating a case study database, and maintaining a chain of evidence throughout. 
The first involved carrying out semi-structured interviews with the key personnel 
identified within each Leisure Trust. Secondly, observations of board and 
CEO/Managing Director meetings were conducted. To Stake (2008), case study 
findings are likely to be more convincing and accurate if they are based on different 
sources of information, because multiple sources of evidence allow for the 
development of converging lines of inquiry. With this said, it can be posed that 
examining evidence across different types of data sources was a method of 
verification. Firstly, it is important to discuss how the researcher prepared for the 
main data collection stage. 
 
Timeline of Data Collection 
 
For the data collection and data analysis phase of this study, the researcher carried 
out these tasks over one and a half years, from February 2014 to July 2015. The 
timeline of the study is displayed in table 3.6.. The data collection methods adopted 






Table 3.6. Data Collection Timeline 

































The preparation stage focused on developing skills as a case study researcher, 
training for the specific case study, developing a case study protocol, conducting a 
pilot study, and gaining access to the Leisure Trusts. According to Yin (2003), the 
researcher should be sufficiently familiar with the study domain as to understand the 
main concepts and methodological issues relevant to the study. Preparations for 
data collection activities included reviewing the original case study research 
proposal, findings from the pilot case study and Social Return on Investment (SROI) 
reports. The pilot case study helped reinforce the purpose and value of the research 
and as Yin (2003:92) alludes to, used to refine the ‘data collection plans with respect 




This section will describe and discuss each of the methods employed for this study. 
Initially, a discussion on the interview approach in the study will be presented and 
then a subsequent discussion on the observation procedures for the board meetings 
will be offered. The principle data collection method was interviews. They are 
deemed to be broadly accepted as a qualitative research method in the social 
sciences (Fielding & Thomas, 2001). Stake (2008) alludes to the point that because 
 88 
a qualitative research approach is dependent upon subjective data, the use of 
interviews is usually the employed method. The interview method is generally 
accepted because of its adaptability (Bryman, 2001). Additionally, Bryman (2001) 
states that they enable the researcher to obtain vast amounts of data in a relatively 
short space of time. Interviews are guided conversations that are one of the most 
important sources of case study evidence (Stake, 2008). The researcher adopted 
semi-structured interviews accompanied by a number of probing questions and 
issues he they wished to cover, which were elicited from the literature review. The 




This study employed a semi-structured interview technique so that the data reflected 
precisely the responses of the interviewees. This empowered the researcher to 
formulate a valued understanding of Leisure Trusts’ internal governance processes. 
The semi-structured approach allowed a certain degree of leeway in the sequence of 
questions, which presented a bigger scope of responses. Fielding & Thomas (2001) 
make a crucial point in asserting that a semi-structured interview technique provides 
the platform for the researchers to probe for further depth or clarity in the responses. 
When considering the inexperience of the researcher in this study, Robson (2002) 
stresses that pursuing an unstructured interview technique would be a hazardous 
strategy, as they are not always an advisable choice for the novice researcher. The 
intention was to carry out 15-17 in-depth semi-structured interviews with, the CEO, 
board trustees and senior management for each Leisure Trust over a nine-month 
period. By doing this, it permitted the growth of a narrative on the governance of the 
Leisure Trusts. In total, 31 interviews were conducted, 16 at LTO-A and 15 at LTO-B. 
 
Hammersley (2008) states that the replies from interviewees are motivated by a 
fixation with defending their own role and beliefs, and with the aim of influencing 
others. The idea of the respondent wanting to convey the facts of the matter is a 
secondary concern (Hammersley, 2008). With this said, the informal bond and 
understanding between the researcher and respondent was crucial if and when it 
occurred during the research process. In most interviews there was a time when the 
researcher exerted hegemony over the topic route and flow on the interview. This is 
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what Fielding and Thomas (2001) describe as the interviewer influence. This tended 
to be apparent on most occasions, due to the researcher’s desire to cover a range of 
different issues and themes. The implicit and explicit bias associated with the 
researcher can also cause problems, particularly when an unstructured interview 
technique is being employed. This is due to its absence of adaptability. Fielding and 
Thomas (2001) argue that when the interviewee is probed excessively about a 
particular topic, they begin to recognise what the interviewer’s specific concerns and 
thoughts are. Consequently, this may result in the interviewer imparting their 
personal standpoint on the interviewee and affecting the quality of the data acquired. 
This could lead to the interviewee responding in a way that falls in line with what they 
think the interviewer’s standpoint is. Fortunately, this did not occur. 
 
When research commenced, at the onset of all the interviews the respondent was 
again informed thoroughly about the overall aim of the research project and specific 
aim of the interview to be conducted with them. With this said, the researcher 
endeavoured to be concise and provide a coherent explanation to the respondent on 
the intended outcomes of the interview. Hammersley (2008) bolsters this view by 
asserting this the respondent’s interpretation of the rationale behind the interview will 
be implicitly displayed in the data obtained. If the researcher told the respondent that 
he wants to acquire information regarding the historical background to the 
governance of their Leisure Trust, then the respondent’s attitude and frame of 
thought would be poles apart from a frame of thought relating to being told the 
researcher wants to achieve an understanding into all of the current governance 
challenges, processes and outputs. 
 
At the outset of the interviews it was imperative to choose probing areas of 
discussion that applied to the specific field of knowledge the researcher was 
investigating (Stake, 2005). Yet, in order to build up an initial general understanding 
of the interview topics and rapport with one another, there were informal 
conversations prior to the interview. Recordings of the interviews were made with a 
Dictaphone after consent was given by the respondent. It is important to note that for 
six interviews consent was not given to be recorded although the duration was 
noted. This meant note taking was a crucial aspect of these interviews. Thankfully, 
prior research experience equipped the researcher with the necessary skills to avert 
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any problems during this process. 
 
There was no intention to outsource transcription of the interviews. To do this would 
be seen as detrimental to the research analysis process. It would prevent the 
researcher from familiarising himself with the obtained interview data. Additionally, it 
would not be congruent with thematic network analysis (Attride-Stirling, 2001) the 
researcher would later conduct. Once every interview was conducted, the researcher 
ensured that the transcription of the interview was done soon after. As a result, 
nascent themes and patterns were able to develop informally during the transcription 
phases. This provided a foundation from which the thematic network analysis was 
conducted. 31 interviews were carried out and on average the duration of all the 
interviews was approximately 40 minutes. Tables 3.7. and 3.8. provide more detail 
concerning the frequency and duration of the interviews. This meant the researcher 
was then tasked with mining the extensive amount of raw data collected. In order to 
achieve and develop an understanding it was crucial to commence with the coding 
process as soon as possible. It is a critical stage of the research process as it is a 
technique which results in the collected data becoming organised and controllable 
(Attride-Stirling, 2001). 
 
As mentioned above, once the interviews at a Leisure Trust were conducted the 
transcribing process began thereafter. To familiarise himself with the data and to 
guarantee the coding process was based on the data collected and reviewed 
literature, the interviews were transcribed by the researcher. Once transcription was 
completed, the data was moved to the data management software programme 
NVivo in order for it to be organised. The coded interview transcripts were explored, 
analysed and discussed in a thematic network format. This presentation style 
provided more appropriate depictions of the governance apparent in both types of 
social enterprise. This is exemplified in the two findings chapters on LTO-A and LTO-
B. 
 
Both Leisure Trusts gave permission to speak with senior management, the 
CEO/Managing Director and board members/trustees for approximately thirty 
minutes each. The respective CEO and Managing Director were interviewed for over 
one hour. On some occasions, in terms of logistics of travelling to and from 
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interviews, it was unfeasible. The arrangement of the interviews and observations 
was alike for both Leisure Trusts. For example, a meeting was set with the CEO, 
designated as the gatekeeper, who then organised for senior management staff and 
a number of board trustees to take part in the interviews. In general, the researcher 
visited the Leisure Trusts at the start of the week, and would conduct the interview 
sessions with the key actors normally one after the other. Interviews were staged in 
staff member offices or board rooms. On some occasions, the obvious practicalities 
of interviewing respondents sequentially became a problem. If a respondent was to 
be delayed by work commitments, this would result in a subsequent cutback in time 
to conduct the interview. To illustrate, early on in the data collection process, Board 
Member F of LTO-A arrived fifteen minutes late due to a meeting which overran. 
Consequently, the amount of time spent interviewing this respondent was halved. 
The researcher ensured that the interview was concluded at the agreed time in order 
to avoid a ripple effect in terms of timing issues with the following respondents on 
that day. 
 
In order to efficiently manage and organise the data collected, NVivo was valuable 
during the data collection process. It is important to note the degree in which the 
thematic networks were founded from the interview responses. Preceding the data 
collection stage a substantial amount of critical reading was carried out in the 
specific academic field on interest. If this had not been done, forming probing areas 
for discussion in the interviews would have been problematic. Therefore, it can be 
asserted that the information acquired through the interviews relies heavily on the 
prior reading conducted. This being said, the topic areas were probed in an impartial, 
non-leading style to avoid conveying any unintended bias to the respondent. When 
fresh patterns in the data emerged, themes were formed. The codes emerged from 
the analysis of the first Leisure Trust and were utilised for the following Leisure Trust. 
 
Table 3.7. Interview Respondents and Duration for LTO-A 
Respondent Duration 
Managing Director 1hr 48mins 
Finance Manager 32mins 
Deputy Managing Director 24mins 
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Marketing Manager 28mins 
Community Liaison Manager 20mins 
Sport Development Manager 26mins 
Asset Manager 55mins 
Board Member A 18mins 
Board Member B 27mins 
Board Member C 30mins 
Board Member D 42mins 
Board Member E 12mins 
Board Member F 12mins 
Board Trustees G&H (Interviewed 
together) 
53mins 
Total 8hr 37mins 
 
Table 3.8. Interview Respondents and Duration for LTO-B 
Respondent Duration 
CEO 1hr 55mins 
Board Chairman 1hr 31mins 
Finance Director 46mins 
Community Development Manager 26mins 
Chief Operating Officer 52mins 
Business Support Manager 28mins 
Head of Development 43mins 
Head of Marketing and Sales 32mins 
Centre Manager A 50mins 
Centre Manager B 27mins 
Board Trustee A 46mins 
Board Trustee B 33mins 
Board Trustee C 54mins 
Board Trustee D 28mins 






Across the two case studies, five meetings were observed. To acquire necessary 
knowledge, it was not essential to spend prolonged periods of time within the 
boundaries of the unit of analysis. Albeit, arguably, one could claim that by spending 
longer observing the data acquired will possess more credibility. However, for 
practical and logistical reasons this was not possible. The data collection method of 
observation was not the central method. It supplemented the data collected from the 
semi-structured interviews. Robson (2002) claims that a drawback associated with 
the observation technique is that the observed can sometimes implicitly influence the 
social interactions being observed. For example, when observing a meeting between 
members of senior management and the representatives from the board of trustees 
it was sometimes apparent that the participants altered their behaviour to convey a 
changed persona. Further, on occasion, it seemed that the participants of the 
meetings had gone to extra lengths to ensure there were heightened levels of 
punctuality in the lead up to the meeting and for the duration of it. 
 
Five senior management/board trustee meetings were observed. Table 3.9. outlines 
the duration and issues discussed in these meetings. Both sampled Leisure Trusts 
permitted observation of meetings. However, both didn’t wish for these meetings to 
be audio-recorded. Note-taking by the researcher was permitted. Using Waring et 
al.’s (2007) observation note-taking timetable, notes were aimed to be recorded 
every forty-five seconds. Though, once in the observation setting, this frequency of 
note taking was practically challenging. Therefore, the researcher commenced with 
taking notes every five minutes. The theme of the note taking consisted of the topic 
of discussion, signs of conflict between the key actors, thoughts on the decision-
making dynamics of the meeting, and the CEO’s/Managing Director’s engagement 
throughout. Overall, the observation of a number of meetings proved to be a 
worthwhile glimpse of the dynamics and governance processes within both Leisure 
Trusts. 
 
Table 3.9. Observed Meetings and Areas of Discussion 








• Strategic Direction 
• Staff away day team 
bonding 
• Training new staff in 
new facilities 











• Making cutbacks due to 
reduced council support 
• Update on finances 
• Targeting affluent areas 







3. Board of Trustee 
Meeting (LTO-B) 
 
• Measuring their social 
impact 
• Getting the message out 
about who they are 
• Asset consolidation 










• Further areas of revenue 
generation 









• How to address 
reduction in financial 
support 








Data Collection Summary 
 
Table 3.10. below encapsulates the data collection techniques for this study. The 
Table 3.8. demonstrates that this study employed an in-depth qualitative approach to 
collect the evidence needed to answer the research questions. The intricacies of 
researching both a CLG-CS and BenCom are revealed through the data collection 
methods used. 
 
Table 3.10. Data Collection Methods for this Study 
Research Question Data Required Data Collection Method 
 
1. How does a 
Leisure trust 
survive and 
achieve its social 
mission in an 
unstable, and 
resource-scarce 




• Financial support 






• Affluent areas 





• Company reports 
• In-depth case 
studies 
• Qualitative 
interviews with key 
informants 






2. How does the 
governance model 
and processes of 
 
 
• Conflicts of Interest 
 



















• Social tensions  
• Financial tensions 
• Asset lock tensions 
 
• Qualitative 
interviews with key 
informants 
• Direct observations 












• Mission drift 
occurrence 
• Balancing social 
and financial 
objections 






• Annual reports 
• Qualitative 
interviews with key 
informants 
• Direct observations 




3.5. Data Analysis 
 
Although the employment of case study methodology has been justified throughout 
this chapter it is valuable that we consider what the researcher sees as the vaguest 
element of case study research. Yin (2003) states that one of the practical difficulties 
of analysis of case study evidence is dealing with the amount and variety of data 
collected, especially as strategies and techniques for analysis of case data are 
 97 
generally not well defined. Further, qualitative data analysis has been described as 
both the most difficult and the least codified part of the case study process 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). With this said, it is crucial that in order to answer the research 
questions the researcher develops a general data analysis strategy as part of the 
case study design. 
 
In the context of case studies, ‘data analysis consists of examining, categorising, 
tabulating, testing, or otherwise recombining evidence to draw empirically based 
conclusions’ (Yin, 2003:126). Coalescing a collective case study design with an 
interpretivist approach allowed the researcher to fully demonstrate the stream of 
evidence which the analysis has followed so that the source of the conclusions 
brought forward from data collected is unequivocally presented. As the researcher 
adopted an interpretivist approach, thematic network analysis (Attride-Stirling, 2001) 
was used to interpret and present the main themes found through the data collection 
stage. 
 
Thematic Network Analysis 
 
Generating and applying thematic networks was a clear-cut way of organising the 
thematic analysis of the data collected from the BenCon and CLG-CS. The thematic 
networks generated aimed to facilitate the structuring and discussion of the thematic 
analysis. The researcher followed the process provided by Attride-Stirling (2001) in 
the production of thematic networks. Thematic networks systematise the extraction 
of: (i) lowest-order premises evident in the text (Basic Themes); (ii) categories of 
basic themes grouped together to summarise more abstract principles (Organizing 
Themes); and (iii) super-ordinate themes encapsulating the principal metaphors in 
the text as a whole (Global Themes). These are then represented as web-like maps 
depicting the salient themes at each of the three levels, and illustrating the 





figure 3.1. Example of Thematic Network (Attride-Stirling, 2001)  
 
The researcher followed the step-by-step guide from Attride-Striling (2001) for 
generating and organising the themes extracted from the data. The below section 
discusses this. 
 
Step 1: coded the material 
 
The first step in a thematic networks analysis is to reduce the data. This was done by 
dissecting the text into manageable and meaningful text segments, with the use of a 
coding framework: 
 
Devised a coding framework 
 
There were several ways of doing this, but as a summary, it was done on the basis 
of the theoretical interests guiding the research questions, on the basis of salient 
issues that arise in the interviews/observations, or on the basis of both. The coding 
framework was based on pre-established criteria. These were the issues/words 
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associated with governance challenges, non-profit governance and mission drift 
elicited from the literature review. Table 3.11. illustrates the coding framework used 
for this study. 
 
30 codes were derived on the review of relevant literature in the area of governance, 
political environment and mission drift. These were then fused with discussions with 
the interview transcripts to form a set of codes. These codes were then combined 
and applied to the interview transcripts to develop a finite set of codes (see Table 
3.11.). The interview transcripts were then scrutinised and classified according to 
these codes. For instance, the codes ‘Commercial Goals’ and ‘Competition’ included 
text segments such as, “The plan is on developing our commercial focus to keep up 
with other Leisure Trusts,” The code ‘Organisational Mission’ included text segments 
such as “You only have to look and read our four pillars to get an idea of our mission 
and what we stand for.” It is important to note that in a number of circumstances a 
given quotation was classified under more than one code. 
In this step the codes were applied to the textual data to dissect it into text segments: 
meaningful and manageable chunks of text such as passages, quotations, single 
words, or other criteria judged necessary for the particular analysis. This is a 
commonly used procedure and parallels are easily found in the literature (Corbin & 
Strauss, 1990; Miles & Huberman, 1994). Both these steps were completed with the 
upmost attention to detail and care. The codes in the coding framework had explicit 
boundaries so that they were not interchangeable or redundant; and they were also 
limited in scope and focus explicitly on the unit of analysis. This was an important 
interpretative step. 
 
Step 2: identified the themes 
 
Once all the text has been coded, themes are abstracted from the coded text 
segments: 
 
(a) Refined themes from coded text segments 
 
For this step, salient, common and significant themes in the coded text segments 
were identified. This was done by rereading the text segments within the context of 
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the codes under which they were classified. This procedure allowed the researcher 
to reframe the reading of the text, which enabled the identification of underlying 
patterns and structures. Next, the selected themes were refined into themes that 
were (i) specific enough to be discrete (non-repetitive), and (ii) broad enough to 
encapsulate a set of ideas contained in numerous text segments. This reduced the 
data into a more manageable set of significant basic themes that succinctly 
summarised the text. The Identification of the basic themes required a great deal of 
interpretative work. As they emerged, they were worked to accommodate new text 
segments, as well as old ones. Each basic theme had to be specific enough to 
pertain to one idea, but broad enough to find incarnations in various text segments. 
 
For this, the 30 codes were grouped into 4 clusters and each code’s text segment 
was re-read. Whilst this was conducted, a record was made of (i) the areas of 
discussion from which the codes were sourced; (ii) the basic themes that were 
emerging; (iii) a reference of the specific text segments the basic themes were 
contained in; (iv) the amount of text segments that contained a basic theme. The 30 
codes were applied to the text transcripts which resulted in the emergence of 23 
basic themes. Table 3.11. highlights this analytical process. To clarify, the analysis 
focused on discursive themes disseminated from the interviews and meeting 
observations. The aim was to produce themes that were common through both 
Leisure Trusts. Consequently, these common themes were given priority. Although 
the themes identified were common the data pertaining the theme from each Leisure 
Trusts were significantly differently. This will be discussed in the findings chapters. 
The rationale for theme selection was simply to focus the researcher’s attention on 
the common popular themes that were of specific interest to the research questions 
of the study. 
 












1. Board comprises 
various expertise. This 








Legal structure of board 
 
- Age, occupation, 
education, experience 
and gender 
- meeting frequency 
- presence of committees 
- Incentives for the board 
- board dependence on 
the CEO to avoid mission 
drift 
-  how the board directors 
engage with and work 
with each other in 
avoiding mission drift 
 
varying degrees in LTO-A 
and LTO-B.  
2. Infrequent meetings 
results in a breakdown of 
communication between 
board/CEO in LTO-B 
3. Board trustees 
unaware of the dangers 
associated with mission 
drift within LTO-B. 
4. There is little 
collaboration and 
engagement from the 
board in addressing 
governance challenges in 
LTO-B 
5. LTO-A’s legal structure 


















- types of issues that 
capture boards attention 
and the degree of 
attention they devote to 
particular issues in 
relation to mission drift 
-  CEO evaluation 
-  task-oriented 
differences in judgment 
among board trustees 
-  affective dimension of 
trustees’ inclusion on the 
 
 
6. Restricting the ability of 
the CEO to make 
decisions facilitates 
mission drift  
7. A multi-stakeholder 
board presents conflicting 
agendas  
8. A democratic 
stakeholder model of 
governance aids the 
development of mission 
drift. 
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 board and the ability of 
the board to continue 
working 
- Impact of austerity 
measures 
-  Board effectiveness 
-  Board involvement in 
addressing the avoidance 
of mission drift  
-  Trustee conflicts 
 
9. A stewardship model of 
governance provides a 
prudent approach to 
ensuring mission alliance. 
10. Board involvement 
should be limited to the 




Board/CEO Relationship   
 
CEO Involvement in 
decision making 
CEO Power 
Trust and Transparency 
CEO experience/expertise 








- presence of alliances  
- CEO ability to exert their 
will 
- Sources of unequal 
power, tensions and 
conflict, and how this 
changes over time with 
changing circumstances 
- individual, organisational 
and environmental factors 
- correlation between 
commercial/social 
success and CEO/board 
power relations 
- Distribution of decision 
making power in relation 
to mission drift. 
 
11. A CEO dominated 
board facilitates the 
avoidance of mission 
drift. 
12. Governance model 
impacts upon power 
dynamics between the 
board and CEO 
13. Voluntary board 
trustee power can result 
in mission drift 
14. The expertise of the 
CEO plays a pivotal role 
in power dynamics 
15. Trust and 
transparency is 
developed through 
constant and clear 
communication 
16. Commercial focus is 
provided by the CEO in 
 103 





















- Managing the balance 
between social activities 
and commercial ones 
- How do power relations 
affect the possibility of 
mission drift 
-  How do they generate 
revenues without losing 
sight of creating social 
value 
- Effects of 
commercial/market 
pressures 
- sourcing of 
finance/revenue streams 
-  why are commercial 
and social goals a source 
of tension 
- Impact of austerity 
 
17. The Leisure Trusts do 
not primarily focus on 
social goals 
18. Focus on commercial 
goals to resource creation 
of social value, 
particularly in affluent 
areas 
19. Local council relations 
& financial support play a 
significant role in potential 
mission drift 
20. Being unable to 
sufficiently convey what 
they do is a source of 
concern – compounded 
by level of competition 
21. Leisure Trust 
amalgamation is 
becoming a method of 
managing tensions 
22. CEO power 
dominance rather than 
board dominance 
facilitates mission alliance 
23. Austerity has become 





Step 3: constructed the networks 
 
As Attride-Stirling (2001) states, the basic themes identified provide the foundation 
for the thematic networks to be developed. The 23 basic themes were arranged into 
10 clear basic themes and then 3 main groupings (organising themes) (see figure 
4.1.), on the basis of related conceptual content. These organising themes were then 
deduced further to arrive at a global theme (figure 4.1.). This global theme 
summarised the main issues of the 3 organising themes and 10 basic themes. Once 
this was done the thematic network was established. The thematic network for each 
case study organisation is matching but the causes and details of why are different. 
These issues and interrelated content shared between all themes is presented and 
discussed for each case study in the findings and discussion chapters. 
 
Step 4: Described, explored and discussed the thematic network 
 
At this stage, the researcher delved deeper into the meaning of the texts, the themes 
that emerged were explored in relation to the patterns that underlined them. Once 
the networks were constructed, the researcher returned to the data and interpreted it 
with the aid of the networks. The researcher presented the network in each of the 
findings chapters and discussed the themes with supporting text segments. The 
researcher returned to the original text, but rather than reading it in a linear manner, 
the text is now read through the global themes, organising themes and sub-themes. 
As such, the thematic network became not only a tool for the researcher, but also for 
the reader, who is able to anchor the researcher’s interpretation on the summary 
provided by the network. The networks were read in a sequential order to facilitate 
the presentation and understanding of the material. In the description and 
exploration of the text it was useful to present text segments from the original 
transcripts/data to support the analysis. In all, step 4 helped the researcher bring 
together the data and the interpretation. 
 
Step 5: Interpreted Patterns 
 
For this, the researcher brought together the deductions in the summaries of all the 
networks and these deductions and the relevant theory, to explore the significant 
themes, concepts, patterns and structures that arose in the text. The aim in this last 
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step was to return to the original research questions, and address these with 
arguments grounded on the patterns that emerged in the exploration of the texts. 





Throughout the study, the researcher, being the research instrument, has influenced 
the study. Thinking reflectively, a central limitation to the study was the absence of 
substantial fieldwork experience by the researcher. The researcher was short of 
conviction in the initial meetings and interviews with each Leisure Trust. With this 
being said, reflecting upon the first couple of interviews, it could be assumed that the 
data acquired was not vastly enlightening. In order to practice and harness 
interviewing skills a pilot study was conducted prior to the data collection stage. 
Cross-referencing interview transcripts was one skill that was developed which 
significantly improved the research process moving forward. 
 
The researcher must assure himself and the intended audience that the findings and 
conclusions proposed are based on critical investigation and do not rely solely on a 
couple of carefully selected examples (Silverman, 2005). It was imperative that the 
researcher identified and rectified any shortcomings in the findings. This helped 
improve the credibility of the findings and therefore reduced any worries. It is merely 
not enough to accentuate that the findings and discussion are a truthful reflection of 
the data transcripts. The probing areas covered in the interviews were to a large 
extent manifested and informed from themes originating from the literature review. 
Consequently, themes were naturally prioritised over others, thus, the findings were 
steered in a certain direction. The probing areas covered in the interviews were seen 
to be imperative and essential in determining how Leisure Trusts operate and govern 
in different social and economic environments. A different investigator with an 
alternative cache of expertise and knowledge may have arguably followed different 
themes whilst overlooking others. 
 
For the study and self-reflection purposes, it was valuable to contemplate the 
rawness of the researcher and the constrictions on time for negotiating access, data 
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collection, analysis and writing. Further, worthy of note, concerns regarding 
appearance may have an intangible influence over the findings. The researcher had 
an impalpable impression that because he is still a fledgling researcher, a number of 
interviewees implicitly assumed that the researcher and the research were mutually 
inconsequential. Due to this, it took longer than anticipated to draw in and build a 




As this study aimed to delve into only a small number of case studies, a focal 
consideration before the research commenced was to deliberate upon the expected, 
and sought after, generalisability of the findings. Resulting from this thought process, 
it is asserted that the findings are not generalisable to the whole population of 
Leisure Trusts, and therein, the wide array of social enterprise organisational forms. 
Reason being, there are over one hundred Leisure Trusts in operation presently, 
with almost infinite social, economic and operational variables (Hughes & 
Hodgkinson, 2012). Although, a significant proportion of the findings and discussion 
reveal governance characteristics and processes of the wider Leisure Trust 
population (Flyvbjerg, 2001). The fundamental aim of the findings was to accurately 
represent the governance process attained from specifically a BenCom and CLG-
CS, thus, context-dependent knowledge was sought. 
 
Regarding social enterprise governance, boards defy easy generalisations (Stone & 
Ostrower, 2006). Consequently, future comparative research designs that not only 
focus on board/management characteristics but explicitly examine how governance 
structures change over time and are influenced by external and internal factors will 
benefit the field. A certain amount of generalisability was developed when the the 
thematic network of the two Leisure Trusts was analysed. This contributes to wider 
academic debates and dialogue around the understanding of social enterprise in the 
UK. Yet, the reporting of generaliseable findings was not a central aim from the 
outset of this study. Consequently, whilst aiming to acquire a deep understand the 
governance in each type, the data collected arguably reveal the governance 
processes and challenges that are uncovered within a number of social enterprises 
of the same type. Although, to reiterate, it was determined that this was not a 
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necessity of the study. 
 
Stake (2008) points out that when there is a pertinent urge to present generalisations 
in case study research, concentration and consideration is drawn away from the 
unique facets and processes specific to each case. Hammersley (2008) reaffirms 
this argument by asserting that findings can frequently become de-contextualised 
due to the researcher attempting to generalise and expound a similar phenomenon. 
The main cause of this common occurrence is that too many case study 
researchers, to begin with, declare that their research is not concerned with 
generating such generalisations, yet then go on to do the above when conducting 
analysis on their findings (Hammersley, 2008). When discussing the findings and 
outcomes of case study research, Flyvbjerg (2001) claims there are five 
misunderstandings associated with this; 
 







independent) knowledge is more 







One cannot generalise on the basis of 
an individual case; therefore, the case 








The case study is most useful for 
generating hypotheses; that is, in the 
first stage of a total research process, 
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while other methods are more suitable 






The case study contains a bias toward 
verification, that is, a tendency to 







It is often difficult to develop general 
propositions  





The table above covers Flyvbjerg’s (2001) five misunderstandings of case study 
research. The misunderstandings encompass a number of frequently flawed 
practices of case study research. Concerning Flyvbjerg’s (2001) misunderstanding, 
for building an understanding of a specific phenomenon, context-dependent 
knowledge is crucial. The analysis conducted of highly contextual knowledge is 
significant when acquiring extensive and comprehensive knowledge of a case. If the 
data were to be collected in detached or isolated context, then the findings can 
become incapable of helping achieve the overall aim of the research. Using the 
discussion on the governance processes of one Leisure Trust in a particular context 
to provide an explanation of the governance processes of a Leisure Trust in a 
different contextual setting is improbable, even more so to detail how all Leisure 
Trusts are able to avoid mission drift in different types of social enterprise. To 
provide generalisations to develop a wide-ranging concrete social enterprise 
governance theory is not a fundamental aim of the research. To add clarity, the 
research is concerned producing claims founded from the analysis which help 
contribute to and develop our understanding of social enterprise types in the context 
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This chapter covered the research methods adopted for the study and delivers a 
thorough justification and reasoning for doing so. The principle data collection 
method was semi-structured interviews with key respondents of the Leisure Trusts 
which covered areas elicited from the literature review. Observation of management 
and board meetings was integrated into the findings and subsequent discussion. It is 
intended that this research process, accompanied by a consideration and reflection 
of potential limitations, will result in a thorough analysis on the management of social 
and financial tensions within two Leisure Trusts. 
 
The process was challenging yet accompanied with a consistent sense of a 
communal effort to produce positive outcomes. Some problems emerged during the 
process due to the lack of fieldwork experience. Nevertheless, most arising issues 
and unanticipated problems were out of the researcher’s control, as mentioned 
previously. The process of conducting qualitative case study research in Leisure 
Trusts is intricately coupled with the support and adherence of the participants 
involved, particularly the gatekeepers. The researcher formed a research plan prior 
to the fieldwork. However, when issues emerged that had the potential to affect 
Leisure Trust’s operations at a particular time, the research inevitably became an 
ancillary interest to them. 
 
The findings chapters and subsequent discussion chapter to be presented enables 
the reader to evaluate the credibility and value of the arguments and claims made. 
The presentation of the findings will be founded predominantly on the interview data, 
therefore, utilising the responses of the interviewees to narrate their own account. A 
significant degree of preparation and planning was undertaken to guarantee that the 
arguments presented are not only presented in their individual contextual 
environment, but also that inconsequential and unrelated responses to the study are 
given little consideration. The data collected has been compared with responses 
from respondents and strengthened by supplementary responses from same 
interviewee in order to increase the legitimacy of the claims to be made. Due to this, 
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it is anticipated, the reader will be certain that the discussion of the findings is 
entirely founded on the pursuit of a critical investigation of social enterprise 
governance and not purely on ‘well-chosen’ examples (Silverman, 2005). 
 
To conclude, this chapter presents a thorough rationale and details of the research 
methods employed for the study. Initially, the chapter developed the current debates 
and academic conversations of case study research in order to illustrate its 
application to the study on social enterprise governance. This discussion covered 
details such as negotiating access, what research methods will be used, selection of 
a sample, and the type of analysis. These deliberations helped provide details of the 
numbers key judgements made preceding the commencement of the fieldwork. Built 
upon this, an evaluation of the researcher’s self-reflection of the research process 
was provided. This included discussing some of the problems which arose and the 
essential modifications made to the initial research proposal. Taken as a whole, it is 
anticipated that the methodology chapter clearly justifies the research process and 



















The next two chapters provide a detailed insight into the governance challenges and 
processes of LTO-A and LTO-B. Findings from both Leisure Trusts will be presented 
and analysed in order to address the research questions. Chapters 4 and 5 are both 
findings chapters but they have been split into separate discussions on each Trust. 
There will then be a subsequent discussion chapter. Chapter 4 details the thematic 
network analysis of LTO-A. Chapter 5 concerns the same for LTO-B. Structuring the 
findings chapters this way ensures consistency when reporting the findings. Main 
themes prominent from the primary research undertaken are used to draw out the 
key themes for consideration. 
 
Figure 4.1. below illustrates the main themes derived from the thematic network 
analysis which will be discussed in both chapters 4 and 5. The basic themes derived 
from the data collected is illustrated and grouped into organising themes and a 
global theme. The thematic network analysis illustrates the main themes established 
for both types of social enterprise investigated. The global theme for LTO-A and 
LTO-B was ‘Mission Drift’. This was then supported by organising themes labelled as 
‘Political Environment’, ‘Competition’ and ‘Governance’. Within each organising 
theme there are sub-themes. These themes will be discussed in detail and 
evidenced through the supporting data collected. Links between the themes and the 




Figure 4.1. Thematic Network Map for LTO-A 
 
LTO-A’s mission is “to make community services and spaces better for everyone. 
That means providing access to quality community leisure and fitness facilities - and 




The discussion of competition will highlight some fundamental tensions revolving 
around the possibility of mission drift occurring and how it affects the identity of LTO-
A. The thematic network map (figure 4.2.) illustrates the key organising theme and 
foundational basic themes on which ‘competition’ is anchored. 
 
Figure 4.2. Thematic Network Map for Competition 
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4.2.1. Identity Ambiguity 
 
The respondents from LTO-A believe that one of the main challenges they and all 
Leisure Trusts face is competition from each other and from organisations in the 
private sector. From their perspective, LTO-A subscribe to the notion that the Leisure 
Trust (social enterprise) model has suffered from poorly communicating the added 
value they bring to services they provide, in comparison to private sector 
counterparts. This problem, according to respondents, surfaces from the implicit 
vagueness of identifying where LTO-A sit in relation to the spectrum of social 
enterprise and shouting about what is unique about their business model per se. A 
key issue for LTO-A surrounds the struggles they have in conveying to people what 
type of organisation they are. The Managing Director stressed that they fear the 
majority of their user-group are not aware of the organisation that is managing the 
facility: 
 
We have taken steps through getting the Social Enterprise Mark which solidifies our 
identity as a social enterprise. But if you ask someone on the street what they think 
we are, a lot would probably say we’re in the private sector. There’s no onus upon 
the people who use the facilities to know where we are positioned but it would be 
great if we could tell them exactly the values we stand for which will hopefully attract 
more users across our centres. 
 
The above response implies that due to a lack of consumer intelligence users may 
presume the facilities are being managed by private sector organisations. A variety 
of the responses reinforce the notion that society’s understanding of what LTO-A is, 
is of no interest or is still developing. The responses suggest that LTO-A are still 
struggling to promote themselves as a viable delivery vehicle for public sport 
services. This leads us to pose a significant question – is this problem due to a lack 
of expertise in marketing their identity or a lack of interest in LTO-A being a social 
enterprise? This challenge is compounded by the fact it is still occurring fifteen years 
later than when this challenge was identified. However, the findings from LTO-A 
contradict the proposition that this lack of marketing expertise is a consequence of 
social enterprises being too reliant on third sector funding mechanisms. From their 
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viewpoint, the issue is that their marketing is inadequate for enhancing consumer 
understanding of LTO-A. It seems that their lack of distinctiveness is in part an 
outcome of their own actions. LTO-A are continually aiming to take the good things 
about the public sector and the good things about the private sector and incorporate 
them into their business model. However, as suggested, convincing the consumer of 
this vision is another matter. Board Member A noted this difficulty LTO-A face in 
communicating their identify to consumers: 
 
Our ability to market the organisation effectively is a problem. We haven’t focused on 
the marketing side of things in the past because there wasn’t a need to do so. As 
we’ve grown the need to engage in more marketing activities is becoming crucial, 
particularly in helping local authorities see who we are and what we can do. To be 
fair, we do a better job than most other social enterprises working in sport but there’s 
always room to improve. The business model we have is great but we sometimes 
ask ourselves if we should be investing a lot in marketing and clarifying our identity. 
A lot of the time, you could argue that the consumer isn’t particularly bothered about 
our values or that we’re a social enterprise. They are arguably more concerned with 
the pricing and quality of the facilities they can use.  
 
To further illustrate the frustration of LTO-A in conveying a social enterprise focus to 
their user-group, Board Member B described the assumption users tend to make 
about the organisation; 
 
People will think the facility is totally focused on profit so they are not going to be as 
keen on prioritising community needs and dealing with the inactivity in local residents 
and getting them more active. 
 
From an observed board meeting, board members discussed ways in which they can 
clarify and communicate their social enterprise identity to consumers. The 
researcher presents notes from the meeting below; 
 
Board Member E leads an agenda item on how they can improve their organisational 
image to the public. Board Member B explains that they are falling behind other 
Leisure Trusts and private organisations in their use of social media to engage with 
the public. The Managing Director admits the management team can do more on 
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their social media platforms to get the message out. He will direct the Marketing 
Manager to develop a social media campaign focused on telling the public about 
their social enterprise background and that they have the Social Enterprise Mark 
awarded to them. The board seem pleased this will now take place.  
 
The evidence suggests LTO-A have certain reservations about embracing a 
complete emphasis on marketing activities. There appears to be suggestions and 
apprehensions that taking a more marketing driven approach would cause LTO-A to 
lose sight of their core values. However, is this inhibiting LTO-A’s ability to establish 
their identity as a social enterprise? Respondents stressed that the council was not 
willing to support the development of social enterprise which would enable them to 
compete against the private sector and have to meet continuously upward-shifting 
public expectations in terms of service quality. Yet, according to respondents, the 
council were initially apprehensive in transferring their sport services to a Leisure 
Trust. Board Member B outlines this viewpoint of the local authorities they work with 
in tendering for sport provision contracts; 
 
Originally, the council saw us a secondary option for managing sport facilities and 
viewed the private sector as preferred providers. It seemed they did not fully grasp 
the benefits the social enterprise business model can bring to the local community in 
that it does not just benefit sporting objectives but can achieve wider societal benefits 
which is massively beneficial. They tend to make short-term decisions which tend to 
prefer private sector provision.  
 
The Asset Management Director also pointed out that there were underpinning 
reasons why the local council(s) were either unwilling or unaware of what a social 
enterprise can offer; 
 
I can guarantee if you speak to these council commissioners they haven’t got a clue 
what we’re about. They see a spreadsheet with monetary value – measuring what 
we achieve is largely intangible. 
 
The Managing Director of LTO-A supplemented the above viewpoints by suggesting 
the wider political context of the UK has had a direct impact on the focus local 
authorities place on their preference of public service providers, particularly in sport; 
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The evidence is there for them to see; I don’t know what the reservation is [using a 
social enterprise]. Since the coalition (government) came in it is more difficult to bid 
for and win contracts. Under the previous Labour government and Labour controlled 
councils there was a clear understanding of what the advantages of social enterprise 
provision in sport are. This changed in certain local authorities and some were 
resistant to listen to the what we could provide and the benefits our model would 
bring to sport provision.  
 
The evidence from the LTO-A case study infers that arguably the commitment to 
developing the use of a social enterprise model for sport provision is bound by 
managing the red tape of the public sector and the profit focus of the private sector. 
These challenges are potentially partially a result of political ideology from central 
and local government. As seen, these tensions have caused LTO-A difficulties in 
informing consumers who they are and what they can provide. 
 
4.2.2. Tendering for Public Service Contracts 
 
LTO-A are becoming increasingly competitive with other providers of sport and 
leisure. The continued expansion of LTO-A and their asset base has resulted in them 
taking over management of facilities in other regions of the UK e.g. North-West. With 
privatisation of sport provision in the North-West, and throughout the UK, LTO-A see 
moving into the North-West as a growth opportunity. Additionally, they see the 
BenCom model as an important tool in combating the increase of Leisure 
Management Contractors (LMCs) from the private sector. Respondents from LTO-A 
believe that they must tender like any private sector organisation in order to have a 
good chance of winning contracts. This is due to the common occurrence of council 
commissioners placing increased emphasis on financial savings in the tendering 
process and not understanding an emphasis on social value or implementing the 
Social Value Act (2012) (which due to their social mission would in theory prioritise 
social enterprise providers). The Managing Director explained how this emphasis on 
tangible financial savings is affecting their success in tendering for public service 
contracts in sport; 
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It comes down to a question of tradition and culture within government. If they want 
to get rid of a service, there’s normally an agenda behind it. The coalition 
government is using social enterprise as a tool for privatisation and when it comes 
down to the bidding process we’re at the back of the line unless we can demonstrate 
the financial savings we will make them. But when you think about it, that is not the 
core focus of our organisation. We focus on social objectives – getting more people 
playing sport and providing an upgrade in service provision. A lot of our impact is 
intangible. The tenders generally don’t take that into account, or more precisely, they 
don’t have any tools to help monetize the impact we as a social enterprise can 
generate. It’s the easy option every time to flog the tender to a private provider.  
 
There was a genuine disappointment displayed from the respondents when it came 
to discussions on the tendering process of sport facilities. There was a belief that 
they are bidding for contracts with one hand tied behind their back because of 
councils’ preference of private sector providers. From their perspective, LTO-A has 
achieved sustained financial stability but their identity proves to be a burden when 
entering a tendering process. The Deputy Managing Director alluded to this problem; 
 
When you’re managing over fifty sites successfully, you have a good turnover. That’s 
a commercial organisation. The problem is that there is a lack of communication 
between us and (local) government. That is the fault of theirs. They seem to think 
tendering a facility to a private contractor will make it easier for them to monetize the 
savings they are making on getting rid of the sport facility. The impression we get is 
that due to the difficulties in declaring a tangible monetary impact of the social value 
we create the councils take the easy option too often. With the lack of communication 
there is an assumption social enterprises will always need financial support in 
running the facility through grants and other things. We don’t need any financial 
support. Look at our track record.  
 
This evidence helps us pinpoint a difficulty LTO-A face in becoming an integral 
provider of public service delivery. This is also underpinned to issues over consumer 
knowledge, as previously discussed, and of an approach within government 
commissioning of not promoting or enacting Social Value Act (2012) and the role of 
social enterprise in public service delivery which is argued by respondents. The 
findings show that, from their perspective, cultural factors within local government 
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were a significant inhibitor to advancing social procurement through social enterprise 
for LTO-A. The findings suggest that procurement opportunities for LTO-A are 
restricted by limited local government knowledge of what social enterprise is and the 
way it operates. This lack of knowledge has is compounded by difficulty local 
government and, to an extent, social enterprises have in measuring and monetizing 
social impact. Respondents argue that the reasoning behind this lack of government 
knowledge can be attributed to the lack of communication between LTO-A and local 
government. This is compounded by the different types of social enterprise. Some 
respondents argue that commissioners may be aware and understand the charitable 
model of social enterprise but fail to see LTO-A as a co-operative, thus not 
understanding the differences between them. This was explained by Board Member 
G, C and F respectively; 
 
I can guarantee if you speak to these council commissioners they haven’t got a clue 
what we’re about. They see a spreadsheet with monetary value – measuring what 
we achieve is largely intangible. We’re registered as a BenCom therefore there is 
little or no reliance on hand-outs from the council to get the contract up and running. 
If you look at social enterprises who are registered as a CLG for example, they are 
heavily reliant on support from the council. This doesn’t help the overall cause of the 
social enterprise movement in sport provision as a negative stereotype amongst 
council commissioners starts to develop.  
 
Councils are struggling as it is. The reason they put something up for the tender in 
the first place is to get it off their books. I have spoken to (council) commissioners on 
numerous occasions and understanding I get from them is that they are 
apprehensive of giving the contract to a social enterprise because they normally 
have to help finance it and there are loads of examples of the contract failing due to 
the social enterprise’s inability to balance the books. Commissioners put us in the 
same bracket of these failing (social) enterprises which are normally CLGs. In reality 
we’re completely different to a CLG. We’re a BenCom which enables to not rely on 
council grants and build a robust business model which produces social impact but 
also profit. There needs to be more clarity in local government about the different 
identities of social enterprises because we consider ourselves almost a polar 
opposite to a CLG.   
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I mean, what’s the point of this Social Value Act (2012) if local government still don’t 
understand you can’t group all different social enterprises in the same pigeon hole. 
We’ve raised these concerns lots of times but it’s like talking to a brick wall 
sometimes. I don’t really blame the local councils because surely it’s the 
responsibility of the (central) government to explain and provide some direction to 
local government about the variations and different forms of social enterprise and 
therein the benefits each type can provide. It’s so frustrating. 
 
From LTO-A’s perspective, it is clear, this lack of understanding is a consequence of 
a lack of direction and promotion of social enterprise provided by central 
government. Their contention is that social enterprise procurement is not entirely the 
responsibility of local government. They adopt the view that local responsibility must 
be derived from a broader political infrastructure which facilitates the growth of social 
enterprises. However, although most respondents agree this is a problem, there 
were little or no explanations as to how this issue can be realistically solved. They 
argue there needs to be more education/informing on social enterprise particularly 
on the understanding of the different types of organisations under the umbrella of 
social enterprise, which have very different ideological commitments. Yet, it seems 
LTO-A are demanding other stakeholders in the third sector to take up this burden. 
Given the positive financial performance of LTO-A it can be argued that they 
possess the resources to take up this burden and move the sector forward as a 
whole.  
 
LTO-A see their overall business model approach as an advantage over private 
sector providers due to them being able to address social value tensions, which is 
associated with the BenCom model. From LTO-A’s perspective, as highlighted, there 
is going to be additional competition moving forward due to the increased levels of 
sport and leisure facilities coming into the marketplace. As austerity spending cuts 
increase, this can be a natural consequence for public services. LTO-A see 
themselves going from strength to strength when it comes to bidding and winning 
contracts. Some respondents do not see this development as a concerted effort to 
acquire other Trusts but as a reaction to the market challenges currently facing 
Leisure Trusts, and to reduce private sector provision. To compete, and ultimately 
reduce the privatisation of sport provision, LTO-A comment that their growth is the 
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best approach to achieve this. The Finance Manager alludes to this by pointing out; 
 
Down here we’ve been bidding against each other for years. Leisure Trusts have all 
been bidding commercially against each other and private companies for the last 
twenty years. Our commercial growth allows us to build a competitive advantage 
against other (Leisure) Trusts bidding for the same contract. Since the austerity cuts 
came in there’s been a boost in the number of social enterprises bidding for these 
contracts because sport is normally the first thing to go when spending cuts are 
announced. This is good and bad for the social enterprise movement. Although it’s 
positive that there are more social enterprises bidding, a lot of them are in their start-
up phase and lack any real infrastructure to make a success of the contract.  
 
Board Member G further explained how this development has impacted the strategic 
approach of LTO-A and their aim of being the leading provider of sport and leisure 
providers in the UK; 
 
Often the backwards thinking North-West of this world haven’t got it yet up there. You 
need to communicate a solid track record to win these contracts. We thought about 
this a lot and ended up pursuing an angle of ‘if you want to be successful then come 
and join the [LTO-A] family. If those fairly established Trusts would work with us by 
pooling resources, we would have a better chance of furthering the social enterprise 
movement in the provision of sport in the UK. We’ve recently welcomed a Trust from 
up North to join us in order to get some mutual access to resources. We’re helping 
each other and hopefully helping councils get a clearer picture of what we’re all 
about. 
 
The competitiveness of LTO-A was illustrated in an observed board meeting in which 
the board critiqued the strengths and weaknesses of rival social enterprises. The 
researcher noted; 
 
An agenda item is covering the latest developments in sport provision across the 
country. Board Member F explains that in terms of resources, there is no other 
Leisure Trust nationwide that can compete with them. Board Member A presents a 
case for bidding on two new sport facilities in the North-West. The board are 
discussing the pros and cons of putting a bid in on the contract. They decide to 
consult the Managing Director on his views on the proposal. Board Member C sums 
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up by saying other Leisure Trusts have little or no chance of competing with them 
given the fact the others cannot demonstrate a similar track record to them.  
 
The evidence from LTO-A shows us that a lack of a track record can reduce their 
competitiveness, of which is integral criteria for awarding contracts. This tells us that 
LTO-A do not have to actively pursue acquiring smaller Leisure Trusts due to market 
pressures. Instead, with facilities contracted out to social enterprises failing in some 
regions, LTO-A, from their standpoint, is seen as a safe pair of hands. They are 
securing other contracts rather than Trusts being sold off to the private sector. They 
argue this is a strong and sustainable model which is underpinned by integrating 
smaller Trusts into the organisation. LTO-A’s rationale for expansion is based on the 
finite contracts for sport provision in London and the appeal of growth opportunities 
in different regions. LTO-A’s main competitor in the London boroughs is also 
registered as a Charitable Leisure Trust. They are around half the size of LTO-A and 
manage facilities in six boroughs. LTO-A manage sport facilities in twelve boroughs. 
Oddly, their competitor was originally set up and founded by LTO-A but now operate 
independently. In the main, LTO-A want to be supportive but it was clear from 
observed board meetings that if an opportunity arose in a borough largely controlled 
by their competitor(s) then they would take advantage.  
 
LTO-A’s competitive nature remains and they believe this is essential in order to 
create and sustain a vibrant marketplace for social enterprises in sport. For LTO-A, 
this substantial landmark in the sector is going unnoticed. LTO-A assert that they 
and local and national government understand the success of Leisure Trusts. Yet, 
the claims made by LTO-A in these findings suggest that commissioners who assess 
the bids for the facility contracts miss the point on many occasions of what they can 
add value to. Board Member B pinpoints the problem LTO-A face; 
 
It’s the market we’re in, we have to build our asset base up to ensure we can get the 
message across in bidding that we’re capable to delivering value. The 
commissioners have to answer to their superiors and they want to see financial value 
from the outsourcing of these contracts. The commissioners are pushed into a corner 
because of the issues they have with trying to monetize the social value we can 




The lack of understanding by commissioners on the benefits of social enterprise is 
hindering the growth of LTO-A’s business model. Overall, the findings tell us 
commissioner knowledge of the benefits of the social enterprise business model is 
lacking. This is underpinned by the problems local government have on measuring 
the tangible benefits of the social value created through social enterprise.  
 
4.2.3. Leisure Trust Amalgamation 
 
One developing and fundamental issue facing LTO-A is the future size and scale of 
the business model and what other organisations are delivering sport services. 
Particularly, this concerns the capacity of a number of Leisure Trusts to manage and 
improve sport facilities. This has caused a trend of amalgamation within the social 
enterprise sport provision movement. A main catalyst for this development has been 
LTO-A. LTO-A are supportive of the development of supporting other Leisure Trusts. 
More specifically, bringing them under the organisational umbrella of LTO-A. If such 
an amalgamation occurs, then LTO-A are in a good place to be at the forefront of 
this movement. This is mainly due to the substantial financial and human resources 
available to LTO-A. The Managing Director explains some of the reasoning behind 
this approach; 
 
It’s increasingly difficult for small Trusts to survive in this competitive market place. 
The private sector has always struggled in leisure management because it is not a 
high profit generating model. So every one of the private sector companies that 
started in 1992 have all gone bust or have been bought out. Every single one. That 
being said, the difficulty smaller (Leisure) Trusts face is they are too risky a choice to 
operate big sports facilities. They are often relying on financial grants to keep them 
going which, for me, defeats the object of the social enterprise business model. We 
have started to work in other regions particularly up in the North-West. We haven’t 
gone in directly, we’re working with Trusts within that area to offer support and 
access to resources. The Trust from up North that recently joined the LTO-A group is 
seeing the benefits of that – they’re now starting to win contracts. I like the idea of 
forming one super trust, if you want to call it that, which can incorporate a whole raft 
of Leisure Trusts under the LTO-A flag. This will give us the best opportunity of the 
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social enterprise business model becoming the preferred choice for sport provision 
throughout the country.  
 
Board Member C also alludes to this and highlights some of the negative 
consequences if they did not pursue this approach; 
 
The size of us brings a lot of benefits [supporting other Leisure Trusts], crucially 
sustainability because if we didn’t try and get bigger we’d lose talent to private sector 
operators. This is not just for LTO-A but also for other Trusts with talented and 
socially driven individuals.  
 
LTO-A acknowledge the potential downsides of the emergence of ‘Super Trusts’ but 
insist this development will be beneficial for sport provision in the UK overall – if it is 
legitimate and undertaken by social enterprises. This viewpoint is pointed out by 
Board Member A; 
 
If you go to a lot of Leisure Trusts now the capacity and resources just aren’t there to 
effectively control and deliver the service to the required standard, we’d be stronger 
together. I understand there may be an impression from others that we’re trying to 
monopolise social enterprise in sport but that couldn’t be further from the truth. We’re 
doing it for the greater good and offering our services to help other (Leisure) Trusts 
get better. If we didn’t help, then you would get other people saying ‘well why aren’t 
they doing more to help other social enterprises?’ This is surely at the center of what 
a socially responsible social enterprise should be doing.  
 
LTO-A believe we will see the number of Trusts decreasing and a few Trusts 
becoming bigger. Consequently, to survive, according to LTO-A, private operators 
are using a sham trust model. Sham trusts is a term that refers to organisations 
labelling specific aspects of their organisation as ‘non-profit’ or ‘charitable’ in order to 
covey a distorted picture of who they are and what they seek to achieve. The 
occurrence of sham trusts is becoming commonplace within the UK according to 
LTO-A. They stress the ever-increasing problem of private sector operators of public 
sport services possessing a non-profit arms-length organisational model. The 
Finance Manager cuts through the issue and starkly remarks; 
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It ends up in a trust in one shape or another, more often than not it’s a sham trust. It’s 
just what the private contractors do, it makes financial sense and there’s little or 
nothing anyone can do to stop it.  
 
The Managing Director helped explain how this actually occurs and the underlying 
reasons why private organisations adopt this tactic; 
 
A lot of the private sector companies like SLN, DC Leisure and Real Action have all 
got non-profit organisations [sham trusts]. SLN when it was set up and what they did 
was if you managed a facility then you can get the tax savings. Why wouldn’t they do 
it if they know they can get away with it. It’s all about the tax relief they can get from 
doing it. What they do is legal but the main point is that on the face of it they’re a 
(Leisure) Trust but in reality they are anything but. They don’t hold the same values a 
social enterprise does. They don’t focus on social impact within local communities. 
They don’t reinvest their profits to improve the service they’re providing. All this sham 
trust model does is line the pockets of the owners and their shareholders.  
 
Although LTO-A acknowledge there is little that can be done to stop the trend and 
development of sham trusts entering the sport provision market, discussions within 
an observed board meeting suggest LTO-A are actively pursuing change by 
identifying and engaging with relevant regulatory bodies. The researcher noted 
during the meeting; 
 
The Managing Director suggests something needs to be done to raise awareness of 
‘sham trusts’ (as they phrase it) playing a significant role in sport provision. Board 
Member C suggests that they contact the Department for Media, Culture and Sport 
(DCMS) to make sure they are aware that these organisations are passing 
themselves off as social enterprises. Board Member C explains to the board that if 
they can persuade the DCMS that these sham trusts are damaging the social 
enterprise movement in the UK then something may be done about them. There was 
agreement on this course of action from all board members including the Managing 
Director.  
 
Moving on, LTO-A believe most local authorities want to put sport and leisure 
facilities out to tender, and their choice more often than not is to put them out to their 
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own Leisure Trust, or to a conglomerate Leisure Trust like LTO-A or to the sham 
trust operated by a private company. If sham trusts continue to appear then it raises 
more difficulties surrounding types of social enterprise. It can further blur the view of 
social enterprise being an umbrella term which encompasses a variety of 
organisational types. Further, these findings tell us the sham trust model raises 
concern and can ultimately hamper attempts to understand social enterprise 
organisational types. This is particularly important when considering the existing 
difficulties consumers and local government have in understanding what the social 
enterprise business model is and the specific benefits it can bring. However, it must 
be noted that these assertions made by respondents about the sham trust model 
must be counterbalanced. There is a possibility that some of the above claims made 
are motivated by the threat this new model poses for LTO-A. Therefore, there must 
be caution when assessing the overall warranty of LTO-A’s criticisms.  
  
4.3. Political Environment 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Thematic Network Map for Political Environment  
 
4.3.1. Local Council Relations are Crucial  
 
In 1993, the borough council proposed a reduction in the funding of its leisure 
centres. These significant funding cuts would have led to the closure of local leisure 
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centres, including LTO-A. Strategically, LTO-A have extended their geographical 
reach through a number of contracts with local councils based outside their core 
Southern base (notably in the South of England and South Wales). Although there 
are still huge opportunities to build their London business, they continue to look for 
opportunities to scale and share knowledge with local councils and sport service 
providers across the UK. Discussing, conferring and tendering for contracts with 
local councils, who in many cases have wavering political ideologies with often 
provides LTO-A with challenges. LTO-A’s relationship with its core business area 
Labour controlled council continues to be productive. LTO-A’s Sport Development 
Manager explains this; 
 
The Labour councils get it. They know through working with social enterprise we can 
achieve mutual objectives in encouraging social inclusion through sport. They are lot 
more engaging when it comes to discussion what we can do for them. From my 
experience, it is always worthwhile targeting Labour controlled areas when bidding 
for contracts. The process seems a lot more fluid and straightforward. I don’t know 
whether this is to do with ideologies or more simply a pragmatic approach of 
combating the austerity we find ourselves in at the moment.  
 
Board Member E provides more clarity on why Labour controlled councils are more 
engaged in the social enterprise movement than Conservative held areas; 
 
Labour local authorities would say get on with it. We trust you and will invite you to 
the top table and engage with you very heavily. We are always kept at arms-length 
by tory councils when it comes to communication and involvement in contributing to 
policies on sport provision moving forward. There are the odd exceptions to that 
trend but more often than not we get the impression Labour councils actively see our 
business model as a beneficial vehicle for addressing social issues whilst still fighting 
back against the austerity cuts put upon them.  
 
These findings from LTO-A suggest that the Labour controlled local authorities they 
work with are continually promoting the use of social enterprise in tackling social 
exclusion. Further, these comments support the notion that Labour councils have 
continued to build upon the significant injection of resources New Labour provided 
for the establishment and growth of social enterprise in the UK. Local government’s 
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role, for LTO-A, is to act as a facilitator for social inclusion and use examples of that 
from the experiences of LTO-A. Although LTO-A have a strong relationship with its 
host council, they also encounter a number of challenges with local councils in 
different regions where they manage a facility. LTO-A have forty-five local authorities 
who they refer to as partners. With LTO-A’s strategic pursuit of continuous growth in 
terms of their facility management portfolio the main problem they confront is that 
local authorities own the majority of the assets that they need to work from. This 
suggests that the local authority holds a certain degree of power over LTO-A, 
particularly concerning local authority requirements for contracting a facility to LTO-
A. Board Member A provides an explanation of this issue; 
 
Some councils don’t see it as a mutual agreement. Some are very frosty and 
explicitly ask us ‘what can you do for our bottom line?’ The pressure put on them by 
the austerity agenda of government has meant they are less likely to priorities social 
impact over financial savings. Often, we get an ultimatum from councils, particularly 
Conservative held ones, which outlines that unless we can spell out the financial 
savings we can provide them with then we will not be considered for winning the 
contract on the service. It’s a bit of a joke really. You’d think austerity would create 
more opportunities for us but in some instances it’s to the contrary.  
 
The findings provide an insight to how local authorities perceive and engage with 
potential public service providers such as LTO-A. Overall, the relationship between 
LTO-A and the Labour controlled authorities they work with is crucial to overall sport 
policy aim of improving sport provision in the UK. LTO-A have had a mainly positive 
experience and have built a strong mutually beneficial partnership with their Labour 
controlled host council. LTO-A assert that the local authorities should use sport to 
address social issues rather than a vehicle to save money. LTO-A’s relationship with 
their host council signifies sport provision is not being disregarded. So, for LTO-A, 
the issue is not necessarily about the growth of Leisure Trusts, it is actually about the 
reduction of the number of facilities available to manage. This reasoning has 
provided LTO-A with the motivation to pursue growth opportunities in other regions 
of the UK. The Managing Director offers an example to help build a picture of how 
this translates into practice; 
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We were granted and contracted to manage and operate the theatre. This is an 
addition to our portfolio which meant there is an argumentation from our core 
business area of sport provision. This helps bolster our relationship with the council 
and demonstrates our flexibility and willingness to be a ‘go-to’ public service provider 
in the borough. Although some of these are not sport focused, our success and 
availability of resources enables us to provide social change in different areas of 
provision. The development of this is partly because of that but also due to the 
limited amount of sport services available to manage. We want to grow as an 
organisation so that is why we are diversifying into other areas and entering the sport 
provision market in different regions of the UK. It’s all positive at the moment.  
 
As the raison d’etre of LTO-A is to produce social value, they are confronted with the 
issue of being able to monetize the social value they produce. Being able to do so 
clearly illustrates their benefits to local councils in a language they understand. One 
tool being used to measure the impact of the LTO-A is Social Return on Investment 
(SROI). The SROI report is intended to measure extensive socio-economic 
outcomes by analysing and monetizing views of various stakeholders. LTO-A deem 
the impact of SROI upon the local authority’s decision to externalise to a Leisure 
Trust to be minimal at best. They acknowledge the councils’ frustrations at the 
inability to monetize social value and lay the blame at the vagueness of SROI itself. 
The Managing Director and Asset Manager make reference to this problem 
respectively; 
 
There's the SROI. For instance, it said that they (Council) were saving the economy 
£500k by running a Friday night basketball club. This was based on the fact that if 
kids were playing basketball they weren't smashing up the town. There is a link there 
but quite how you can monetize that is really difficult, if impossible. The value most 
councils place one SROI isn’t great. The way the report is formatted and presented 
to the reader, normally this commissioner is sometimes confusing and it doesn’t take 
into account the specific requirements of the contract being bid on. Hopefully, as time 
goes on, there will be some refinement to the reports generated and we, and 
councils, can make better use of them.  
 
There needs to be better scrutiny and evaluation of the evidence within the SROI 
report. This will improve the trustworthiness of the SROI results and will encourage 
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Leisure Trusts to collect and store valuable evidence. It can be a really useful tool in 
providing concrete evidence to commissioners. With the austerity cuts, it’s more 
important than ever to use whatever tools are available to us to compete with private 
sector providers when bidding for these contracts. One of the issues we, and I guess 
other (Leisure) Trusts face, is that it’s a cost the Trust has to bear to conduct the 
SROI. We’re growing and bidding for numerous contracts so if we’re going to do a 
SROI on every one, that cost is going to add up. If we have to consider that burden, 
then I bet most of Trusts are struggling with that as well.  
 
Board Member A reaffirmed the viewpoints raised above but also argued there is a 
more pragmatic approach they and councils need to take when considering the 
SROI report; 
 
Why not work with the stakeholders and cross-examine the results? This will help us 
recognise evidence which corroborates with the findings. It the findings from the 
report can be presented in a way that is clear and understandable then surely it 
makes sense to put it to the people who are actually affected by the service in 
question. This hasn’t happened in the past but if there was clear support from the 
stakeholder base then that would help our cause more-so than just presenting a 
cluttered report to the local council authorities.  
 
In one board meeting, the board members worked together to develop a plan of 
action regarding an engagement strategy with stakeholders to try and explain the 
tangible impact they create. The researcher noted; 
 
The Managing Director has asked board members to contact representatives from 
the council to organise a meeting to discuss the SROI reporting mechanism. The 
Board seem reluctant but the Managing Director explains the reasoning behind it. He 
says that if they can explain how the SROI works and they can show council 
commissioners what to look for when reading the report then that will stand them in 
good stead in the tendering of future contracts. The Board now seem completely on-
board with the idea and Board Member E volunteers to organise the meetings with 
the council.  
 
The difficulties LTO-A encounter with SROI means that they are unlikely to spend 
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valuable time and money on trying to monetize its impact unless councils understand 
its significance. Opposed to providing tangible value for commissioners, the SROI, 
for LTO-A, was perceived as being underdeveloped and largely disregarded by 
councils. Additionally, the findings on Local Council Relations reaffirm the view that 
there is no uniform way of measuring social value and that various sources of 
evidence are needed to define impact in a consequential way. The broad idea of 
‘Return on Investment’ could have multiple numerators combining monetary, 
qualitative and narrative measures that may reflect more specific and direct returns 
to different stakeholders. These findings from LTO-A also infer that practical and 
ideological factors often act as a barrier to the uptake of measurement tools by social 
enterprises. 
 
4.3.2. Focus is placed on affluent geographical areas 
 
When it comes to LTO-A expanding and managing more facilities in different 
regions, a key consideration when assessing this decision is whether it will dilute the 
social value LTO-A creates, for such reasons as resource constraints, staff and 
financial. For LTO-A, it is about creating value where they can and then subsidising 
things where they have to subsidise it. This means diversifying and getting involved 
with things other than running leisure centres. To that end, LTO-A have begun 
thinking strategically about what regions, and therein towns, they would aim to 
operate services in. Somewhat surprisingly, the main consideration on their 
decisions is financially motivated. Board Member A made this clear in an unwavering 
response; 
 
If you haven't got a good business you haven't got anything. We try and do a Robin 
Hood business, a four-star business at a two-star price. Having a presence in decent 
areas provides a good opportunity to build a solid business. It’s common sense 
really. The levels of disposable income in certain affluent areas makes sense for us 
in terms of revenue generation. We can’t do one without the other. If we’re to 
generate social value particularly in areas of need then we need to resource that. We 
can’t rely on all our provision being positioned in deprived areas – there needs to be 
a balance.  
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The Finance Manager provides a detailed example of some of the difficulties they 
face when operating in deprived areas. It is predominantly focused on the issue of 
revenue generation; 
 
In this borough, it has massive social housing areas but it has really nice areas. We 
have a leisure centre where 90% of people pay full price and 10% are on 
concessions. The Waterfront Village in a similar area was nearly the opposite 10 
years ago where 60/70% of people were on concessions and only 30% paying full 
price. That has a significant impact on the amount of surplus we generate and 
reinvest back into achieving our social objectives. There needs to be a trade-off 
between what we can do. I doubt there’s another social enterprise out there similar to 
us that can do what we do but only operate in difficult socio-economic areas. 
Ultimately, we’re not a charity and the public needs to understand that. Everything 
we do is for the benefit of the communities we work in. That is why we’re a BenCom 
and not a CLG. The CLG for me, is too idealistic. It means well, but many of them are 
far too naïve.  
 
LTO-A try to ensure staff are well equipped to develop and produce social value in 
different regional areas. Assessing affluent or deprived areas is crucial for LTO-A 
when determining the potential success of any tendering for new sport facilities. 
LTO-A consider entering affluent areas as more beneficial, as the facilities produce 
more revenue. However, currently, the major proportion of LTO-A’s operations is in 
significantly deprived areas, predominantly in the South. A number of areas LTO-A 
operate in are socially and economically diverse.  
 
However, the findings contradict the view that social enterprise is predominantly only 
a tool for economic growth within deprived communities, increasing social cohesion, 
tackling unemployment and social deprivation. LTO-A highlights the fluency in the 
rate of change in social and economic environments where Leisure Trusts operate. 
These considerations are constantly integrated and deliberated over when assessing 
their effectiveness of what social value they want to create and how they will 
implement it. As pointed out, for LTO-A, it is crucial their staff, whether operating in 




The staff are trained in it (LTO-A values), they have it through them like Blackpool 
rock. This is the way we think, act and behave. It’s crucial they understand this, 
particularly in the well-off areas we work in. There’s no point going into these areas 
and trying to act like someone we’re not. It helps persuade people, and importantly, 
the council that we are able to provide sport and leisure services in various areas. 
This has helped us a lot recently. Consistency is key when it comes to our values as 
we continue to grow. If we can’t maintain and uphold our values then the impact we 
can create, no matter the location, will be limited. This could harm us in the long-run 
and that’s why we have put so much thought and effort into it.  
 
Working with partners such as National Governing Bodies and Organising 
Committees LTO-A have been able to acquire operational management of facilities 
across the region. The provision of such facilities is a major factor in LTO-A having a 
mechanism, or delivery system, by which they can produce social value for the local 
socially deprived communities. LTO-A make judgements around how they can cross-
subsidise across the growing number of sport facilities they manage. Ideally, every 
facility they manage would generate revenue constantly, but their facilities are at 
different development stages. The Deputy Managing Director highlights this point; 
 
With the facilities we're managing, we wanted to be involved in big events before, 
during and after. That was not about money. It was about saying we want a social 
enterprise to be on the sporting scene because that is a statement in itself. It is 
saying that social enterprises have come of age in a sense. Although managing 
these facilities didn’t make much financial sense at the time, we’re able to resource it 
because we know it is worthwhile investment in the long-term.  
 
This suggests LTO-A are making initial strides to supplement gaps left by the 
withdrawal of government control, through which social enterprises can thrive. LTO-
A argue that they are not only looking to improve their own position within the market 
but also that of social enterprise provision of public services in general. This is a bold 
viewpoint as there is the possibility of ulterior motives. From the findings, we can see 
this expansion approach is evidently improving the financial performance of LTO-A 
yet there is little evidence to suggest it is improving the overall impact of the social 
enterprise business model across the UK. Their assumption is that their successful 
local approach is easily transferable irrespective of contextual challenges. However, 
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they are adamant this approach will produce an environment whereby gaps left by 
withdrawal of government control will be filled by social enterprise provision. 
 
4.3.3. Austerity is a veneer for Privatisation 
 
LTO-A assert that the main reason for private organisations being awarded contracts 
for sport facilities is the issue surrounding Best Value. Best Value refers to a 
council’s desired outcomes from the externalisation of a service. LTO-A concede 
that, in the main, a council will either assess Best Value in terms of financial savings 
or the potential to produce social value. Best Value has recently been influenced by 
the Social Value Act (2012) from central government but LTO-A contend the impact 
of the Act upon the issue of Best Value is negligible. The findings from LTO-A 
suggest it has had little impact on the ground. The central concern for LTO-A is 
outlined by the Sport Development Manager; 
 
It is literally their choice. Under the new Social Value Act 2012 they're supposed to 
take social value into account but they could argue that saving money on running 
leisure centres enables us to spend more on the old folks homes so that's social 
value. So they can still make it financial but typically there will be a percentage in the 
tender process. The problem with the Social Value Act is that it coincided with the 
beginning of austerity. You kind of had a perfect storm with severe public service 
spending cuts, councils being required to sell off sporting assets which meant, in 
terms of Best Value, the financial element of it would always be up-front and center 
when it comes to deciding who gets the contract.  
 
The findings emphasise the ambiguity of the Social Value Act (2012) and its current 
lack of influence over local councils. A proponent of the Social Value Act (2012) was 
the Big Society concept promoted by the coalition government as a way of 
increasing community ownership of public services. However, the comments made 
by LTO-A concur with the argument that the Big Society is a façade and has little 
impact and that it was ultimately a hollow solution for an era of austerity. For LTO-A, 
the austerity agenda, and therein the Big Society approach, from central government 
has had little impact in deprived communities. Board Member B alludes to this issue 
and argues that austerity has actually resulted in more private contractors being 
preferred in managing sport facilities than was the case before the austerity cuts.  
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It was us versus a number of private contractors on the sports events we work on 
and it was still just a commercial rationale behind the externalisation. The 
government might say they would like the Big Society to work and give us facilities to 
manage as a social enterprise. In reality, they are not going to stop commissioners 
going for the cheapest option when we’re in a time of austerity. For them, every 
penny counts and they feel like going with the private sector provider is less risky 
than a social enterprise. Logically, it’s counter-productive but the trend is there to 
see. They want sport completely off their books and it seems they think giving it to a 
social enterprise will always come with strings attached.  
 
When discussing their acquisition of sporting facilities for big sporting events, LTO-A 
point out that the local council, although aware of the Big Society concept and its 
aims are barely swayed by the concept, mainly due to austerity imposed on them. 
However, LTO-A were still able to acquire management of a number of new sports 
facilities due to the local council and National Governing Bodies recognising the 
impact social enterprises can have on the local community and their plans for the 
regeneration of the region. The Managing Director highlights this; 
 
Interestingly, the commissioner on the sport facilities did have a high social value 
scoring for the tender process which was a surprise. This isn’t always the case, but 
we put a lot of work in to the proposal and they seemed to acknowledge this and 
recognise the potential value we could create. This is the exception rather than the 
norm.  
 
To this end, the findings suggest that the Big Society combined with austerity has 
promoted ignorance towards LTO-A. However, the contracts for sport and leisure 
facilities is an exception to this trend. Respondents affirm council commissioners use 
the excuse of ‘Best Value’ to encourage private sector provision. This has arguably 
resulted from a shrinking of the state but without the simultaneous development of 
the third sector. However, the findings suggest LTO-A has tried to take advantage of 
an era of austerity by focusing on their bid proposals and the social impact they can 
create. This gives LTO-A the best possible chance to be take advantage of the 
perceived significance the Social Value Act (2012) places on added value. This 
raises questions around how they can maintain focus on their social mission and 
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therein avoid mission drift. 
 
4.3.4. Financial support is pivotal in avoiding mission drift 
 
One challenge facing LTO-A is access to funding and grants, of which are pertinent 
to the concerns raised by a number of the respondents. They argue social 
enterprises fall into difficulty when financial support is absent. However, they point 
out their legal structure enables them to pursue external sources of funding, some 
being from the private sector but more recently through the initiation of social bond 
investments. Added to this, their host council currently give LTO-A an optional 
annual grant which supports a number contracts they hold. This is designed to 
enable the cost of leisure facilities in the regional area to be kept at a level 
accessible by lower-income members of the community. The BenCom model, 
according to the Managing Director enables LTO-A to access a range of financial 
support; 
 
Since the beginning of LTO-A, the purpose was all about keeping the sport services 
running and saving them from the forecasted spending cuts. Over the years, we and 
councils are beginning to learn that the BenCom model is a beneficial way of gaining 
investment which will result in sustainable sport and leisure provision through a wide 
range of funding avenues and processes only a leisure trust can pursue. It is not as 
limiting as a CLG and gives us a lot of flexibility in our financial planning.  
 
The Finance Manager explains why they have initiated social bond investments in 
order to raise capital to invest in their services; 
 
We’re happy the social bonds have been embraced. This capital will enable us to 
produce value where it’s needed. It’s a win-win for all. We’ve raised significant 
amounts of capital to improve our managed facilities and the people who take up the 
bonds become an active participant in the success we will have as an organisation 
moving forward. It’s an innovative way of us competing with our private sector 
counterparts whilst remaining completely attached to our socially driven mission.  
 
These social bonds offer members, including members of the public, an opportunity 
to help contribute to their social mission, as well as achieving a financial return on 
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their investment. This auxiliary mechanism for funding addresses the concern in that 
the issue with funding lies at the root of mission drift anxieties and can be seen as 
destabilising the intrinsic nature and character of LTO-A. The issuing of social bonds 
is one of various forms of crowdfunding: member shares, community shares or 
crowd (investment) funding. LTO-A claims that the social bonds help to further 
develop their sport and social legacy strategy. Board Member G summarises the 
importance of the issuing of social bonds for the organisation and for other Leisure 
Trusts and social enterprises registered as a BenCom; 
 
The social bond issuing is becoming a crucial component of the funding of social 
enterprises. We’re ready to support a social investment market and our success 
shows this type of finance can help the growth of social enterprise in sport and other 
areas of provision. This was one of the main reasons we’re a BenCom. It provides us 
with the ability to utilise different sources of funding streams rather than being overly 
reliant on councils for support in the form of grants. In today’s environment of 
austerity cuts, the last thing councils want to be doing is giving grants to social 
enterprise to help them run a service the council can do themselves. A charitable 
social enterprise, like a CLG doesn’t have what we have in terms of financing our 
service. 
 
Another income route LTO-A have engaged with is Single Regeneration Budget 
bids, which was introduced to combat and address worn-out public services. The 
main benefit of this income was that it was completely separate to council income. 
Therefore, there was no loss in funding from the council due to this second income 
stream. This enables LTO-A to meet the needs of the sport services proposed by the 
council whilst not being a strain on the council by matching their funding with 
external funding. Company documentation highlights that they have acquired 
something approaching £1.8m in external funding, of which a significant amount is 
from the Single Regeneration Budget. Funding from the National Lottery Sports Fund 
has also contributed to their income. The need and enhanced requirements in the 
future for external funding investment is clear.  
 
The investment through the social bond enables LTO-A to provide facilities that are 
available to both elite sport performers and also people within the local communities 
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and resident groups. Thus, this helps address DCMS sport policies of improving elite 
performance and getting more people participating in sport. The social bonds appear 
to also contribute to the ongoing development, refurbishment and expansion of LTO-
A’s asset base. However, this overt focus on the generation of income implies that 
LTO-A are giving priority to their commercial activities. This results from LTO-A being 





Figure 4.4. Thematic Network Map for Governance 
 
4.4.1. Neglect of Commercial Focus can cause Mission Drift 
 
LTO-A’s social mission is crucial because it enables them to build a certain identify 
and communicate it to the stakeholders they serve. LTO-A’s mission encompasses 
tacking issues such as increasing participation in sport and improving the provision 
of sport by means of developing the sport and leisure facilities they manage and 
deliver. Like many other social enterprises, LTO-A face challenges in trying to 
manage the tensions associated with satisfying social and financial value. LTO-A 
demonstrate a strong desire to achieve financial objectives. The respondents 
suggest attainment of financial stability is important for LTO-A in generating surplus 
to re-invest in the organisation and its sport development plans. Arguably, this 
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commercial orientation takes precedence over the social objectives and implies LTO-
A has a strong ambition to be a sustainable organisation. The Managing Director 
clarifies this focus but explains it is for the greater good of the social mission; 
 
This commercial orientation and revenue generation is facilitated by our unremitting 
expansion strategy of procuring the management of more and more sport and leisure 
facilities nationwide. Social objective achievement is seen as a by-product of 
successful commercial operations. My outlook is clear, too many social enterprises 
are doing things back-to-front and are suffering as a consequence. There are no 
magic money trees knocking about. If you want to achieve social change in 
communities, you have got to resource it. We’re not reliant on financial support and 
we stand on our own two feet – turn over the revenue to fund the sport programme 
and facility improvement. Some purists on social enterprise may turn their eye at that 
but we’re in a time of austerity and we need to be pragmatic about how we operate. 
But to be clear, we will never lose focus of our overall mission. Financial stability and 
achieving social change go hand-in-hand for us.  
 
In a similar vein, Board Member A explains how other Leisure Trusts overlook this 
crucial point and become naïve about how they can enact some social value in their 
community; 
 
It (commercial focus) allows us to possess a strong financial foundation from which 
to build and produce social value from. A number of social enterprises struggle to 
pursue or even consider this approach. Don’t get me wrong, the intent of these social 
enterprises are always positive but there are too many examples of a lack of being 
business savvy and a lack of professionalism. We want professionals working in the 
different functions of the organisation. Having a strong foundation in place from a 
revenue perspective enables us to attract talent to come and work for us. It’s a 
lesson some other social enterprises, especially those in sport, could take some 
lessons from.  
 
Similarly, the Marketing Manager explains the importance of attracting professionals 
to work at LTO-A and therein the third sector;  
 
We need to employ people at the top of their game in marketing, in health and fitness 
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and personnel etc. They don't come naturally fitted out or equipped as social 
entrepreneurs. So you then have to educate them in social and so them are quite 
resistant of it. If we can get more experts working for us, then hopefully it will not just 
benefit us but the third sector as a whole. This development of professionalisation is 
crucial if we are to be seen as a prudent and trusted provider of sport services across 
the country.  
 
However, LTO-A face some difficulties when it comes to ensuring people who take 
up a management level position within the organisation is aware and engaged with 
their values. This difficultly possibly arises from a number of professionals being 
recruited from the private sector whereby values and motives can be averse to that 
of the third sector. Board Member B highlights this; 
 
We try to retrofit the mission to people but it doesn't always work because 
psychologically people are brought up differently and they see the world in a certain 
way, particularly if they have been working in the private sector previously which 
have set values. We don’t expect them to grasp our values right away but there is an 
expectation that, in time, everything they do is in line with our social mission.  
 
Likewise, this pragmatic approach to recruitment is highlighted by the Managing 
Director succinctly; 
 
People aren't born as social entrepreneurs. You don’t need to be a social 
entrepreneur. But what you do need to do is to apply yourself to the mission and 
vision - our values of the organisation. 
 
From their viewpoint, the skillset of senior management and board members for 
LTO-A is not overlooked in their pursuit of social objectives. They also concur that it 
is possible to fall into the trap of being overly focused on financial objectives to the 
detriment of achieving the social objectives if there are not a range of skilled 
employees. Since we have established that LTO-A focus predominantly on financial 
objectives it is important to ascertain how they manage to remain balanced in their 
approach. Possessing a highly skilled workforce whilst maintaining their social ethos 
is one motivation which LTO-A feel is crucial in avoiding mission drift. However, 
LTO-A seem to be in a cyclical battle in that it is difficult to convey LTO-A’s message 
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and develop a socially driven employee. The Marketing Manager explains this 
challenge they consistently face; 
 
You try telling a brands person what a social enterprise is, they don’t understand it. 
But we need to get the brand on the high street because otherwise we can't make 
the business work. There's no perfection in that. We know we are not going to recruit 
pure social entrepreneurs. We would rather recruit the right expertise and mold them 
into a socially conscious individual if they’re not already one. Professionalising our 
management gives us the best chance of maximizing our revenue streams in order 
to reinvest as much as we can. I don’t know what others focus on, there are a lot of 
poor trusts that have no sales skills, and they have no financial skills, no marketing 
skills. We have them. 
 
The findings indicate there is a significant burden placed upon LTO-A to not just 
secure expertise in certain areas but also to yield social value from their operations. 
As LTO-A pursue a strategy of sustained expansion they find it difficult to ensure all 
employees of merging Trusts and/or leisure providers’ employees possess the social 
conscience core LTO-A services have. The concern is that organisational growth can 
dilute their social focus of. A number of respondents convey that developing this 
social mission within new employees is challenging as it does not come naturally to 
everybody. This problem suggests that when the size of LTO-A increases, the social 
value it can create decreases in a linear fashion. In this sense, arguably, LTO-A has 
fell into the trap of legitimising their commercial activities on the grounds of 
financially supporting a social mission. Consequently, the potential for mission drift 
increases as the organisation grows. This ultimately threatens their very raison 
d’etre. If LTO-A lose sight of their social mission, they will fail to achieve their goals 
of delivering social value to their beneficiaries. The potential consequences of not 
adopting this approach is outlined by Board Members D and B respectively; 
 
We have an extensive amount of staff whose jobs will be in jeopardy if we couldn't 
run the business properly. So there's a social responsibility there alone about the 
employees which shouldn’t be underestimated. We’re doing things the right way and 




You are always looking over your shoulder to make sure you trade successfully, 
because if you don’t then you’ve got no business and then you have failed.  
 
LTO-A argue that social enterprises should be more commercially driven and 
endeavour to become financially stable. Satisfying levels of social value is a tension 
associated with BenComs and LTO-A are addressing this concern by pursuing a 
commercial approach in order to resource social value creation. Nevertheless, LTO-
A are aware they are at risk of losing sight of their social mission in their efforts to 
generate revenue. LTO-A acknowledge that the commercial and social dimension 
within the organisation creates a source of tension indefinitely. Despite a surplus 
producing orientation there is also an understanding that they need to achieve social 
objectives. A debate on this was observed in a board meeting by the researcher, 
notes taken are presented below; 
 
Board Member F makes a point of asking all board members to reflect on the 
organisation’s core focus. They suggest a number of the preceding discussions in 
the meeting have purely been focused on reviewing their trading income and 
identifying opportunities to increase it. Board Member B agrees and acknowledges 
that they need to be speaking about trading income concurrently with how that will 
benefit their social objectives. Board Member D points out that doing well from a 
revenue perspective is only all well and good if they know exactly what they are 
going to re-invest it back into.  
 
The responses indicate LTO-A is attempting to balance its financial objectives with 
their social mission. They believe surplus must be generated but a balance must be 
struck. LTO-A aim to balance the duality of mission by focusing on their 
organisational values. This emphasis on values possibly helps LTO-A balance the 
potential tension between financial and social goals. They admit it is an extremely 
diverse environment they operate in and how a social enterprise may pursue their 
social objectives will vary significantly. Responses imply that LTO-A strategically 
deploy different combinations of resources to achieve social objectives and 
commercial revenue in order to engage in markets while avoiding erosion of their 
social identity and achieve their social mission. LTO-A’s orientation of pursuing 
surplus generation implies that they see the social value they create resourced by 
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the revenue streams they have in place. From their perspective, LTO-A’s pro-market 
approach helps to clarify their strategic focus on their social mission. Board Member 
D admits that public perception, whilst being important, is not their primary concern 
when it comes to their focus on building a solid financial foundation; 
 
When people say oh you’re not a social enterprise, we say well we don’t care what 
you say. We are ticking all the boxes we need to tick in terms of creating social 
impact. We’re providing a blueprint for other social enterprises to follow when it 
comes to creating that impact. We’ll do whatever is necessary in order to sustain the 
organisation and maximise the social value we can create. If people have a negative 
view of that, then so be it.  
 
The Managing Director added to this and stated summarised their approach fairly 
bluntly; 
 
This commercial orientation and revenue generation is facilitation by our unremitting 
expansion strategy of procuring the management of more and more sport and leisure 
facilities nationwide. Social objective achievement is seen as a by-product of 
successful commercial operations 
 
However, these comments are contrary to the concerns respondents had 
surrounding their wish to communicate their social identity to consumers more 
effectively. LTO-A believe that they have to be realistic in their approach and not set 
themselves up to be predominantly focused on social value because they need to 
have financial resources in place in order to fund their sport development 
programmes and improve facilities. This is a pragmatic approach and has been 
evidenced by their growth in recent years. However, as the findings suggest, their 
focus on commercial goals to resource social goals is heavily dependent on the 
background of their senior management team’s expertise. This commercial approach 
to avoiding mission drift can potentially fail to recognise environmental challenges 
that could harm the overall social purpose of an organisation. The responses 
suggest LTO-A combat this problem through the use of relevant expertise. The 
findings also suggest that management and board members are arguably becoming 
more professional and more conscious of their duties. However, this can carry the 
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risk that boards and managers who focus on commercial goals may not pay 
adequate attention to the organisation’s social mission and purpose. This will now be 
discussed in greater depth. 
 
4.4.2. Traditional Stakeholder Models of Governance can facilitate Mission Drift  
 
There is a consensus amongst respondents that the board is critical in shaping and 
achieving LTO-A’s social mission. Boards of social enterprises are normally 
associated with voluntary members, but this is not entirely the case for LTO-A. 
Analysis of the LTO-A board leaves us with an interesting insight to contrasting 
approaches within types of social enterprise. It is clear LTO-A value recruiting board 
members with appropriate skills, experiences and expertise. Additionally, the findings 
show and contradict the argument that there is no correlation between improved 
organisational performance and board expertise. Instead, the findings indicate there 
is a positive correlation between both. The evidence suggests that more extensive 
expertise strengthens the board of LTO-A’s ability to be more informed to make 
difficult business decisions. Board Member E provides an insight to the purpose and 
key characteristics of LTO-A’s board; 
 
Because of the experts we have in the decision making process the stakeholders we 
are trying to please, such as the actual user-group, can trust us to make the right 
decisions. We have a professional board that, without exception, always act in the 
best interests of our stakeholders. The social ethos of the organisation is always at 
the forefront of our thinking, especially when we are discussing future scenario 
planning and updating our strategic plan with the Managing Director.  
 
LTO-A believe that having a variety of areas of expertise within the board is crucial. 
The same goes for having a mix of commercial skills within the senior management 
team. Having this blend of skills and backgrounds amongst the board members 
encourages a healthy environment of debates and people looking at things 
differently. This was evident from observed board meetings. It allows the board to be 
sufficiently at liberty and able to deliver increased productivity. They deem that all 
decisions made are underpinned by a social mission everyone is bound to. The need 
to maximise social value alongside having an adequately skilled board is crucial for 
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LTO-A, as pointed out by Board Member G; 
 
Having particular expertise on the board encourages healthy and informed 
discussions about the direction of the organisation. We looked at the different 
functions of what we do and what areas we were lacking expertise in. We were 
lacking any real expertise in relation to effectively marketing the organisation. So we 
pro-actively went out and aimed to recruit an expert in marketing to sit on the board.  
 
LTO-A believe the traditional models of non-profit governance for Leisure Trusts is 
redundant in today’s environment. It is question of what fits best for a BenCom to 
achieve their aims according to LTO-A. They have a robust composition of their 
board. Their rationale behind this is that with some members of senior management 
being on the board there is enhanced cohesion between the board members and 
senior management. LTO-A deem that there is no best fit for all Leisure Trusts. For 
them, it depends purely on the political and economic environment they are 
operating in. This is one reason why LTO-A have endeavored to become 
independent to its host council in order to lessen their influence over agenda driven 
decision-making. Firstly, Board Member B makes reference to the impact of the 
political environment and its influence over LTO-A’s governance model; 
 
Local politics plays a massive part in the way we govern. If it was set up by the 
council, they will want more representatives on the board. Whereas, our view is that 
we want professionals on the board that will act in the best interest of everyone. 
Generally, if it is a Labour controlled council we have more confidence in allocating 
resources to a potential awarding of a contract. We are always more reserved in 
conservative held territories.  
 
The Managing Director pays reference to how the composition of the board enables 
him and his team to get on with the day-to-day operations of the organisation; 
 
We’ve got an effective board; they allow us to get on with the job. Myself and the 
team just get on with it because we are trusted. I have confidence in the board 
because I sit on it. I would feel uncomfortable with a board which is all made up of 
people who don’t actively work in the business. It’s very pragmatic and task 
orientated. I come to them with problems or issues and we come up with solutions as 
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a board using all the experts on it. I then implement them. We don’t generally feel as 
if we need to govern a specific way, we just get things done.  
 
This insinuates that LTO-A take a general pragmatic approach to their governance. 
They believe it is an approach which is required in order to integrate and cater for 
fluid political and economic developments. This approach together with increasing 
the prominence of senior management on the board moves LTO-A away from 
democratic system of governance. This move away from the stakeholder view of 
social enterprise governance means there will be a limited representation of 
stakeholder groups on the board. The significance of this shift away is that LTO-A 
can avoid ‘delegate syndrome’ whereby board members become power hungry and 
concentrate on addressing their own interests rather than those of the social 
enterprise. Although, it naturally reduces the involvement of stakeholder groups they 
provide their service for. The board ostensibly empower the Managing Director to 
make decisions for the common interests of the BenCom. This is consistent with the 
stewardship theory approach to governance. This is because of increased 
stakeholder expectations caused by their large asset base. It seems, from the 
comments, the Managing Director’s role is integral to the future of LTO-A. He is 
mandated, along with the senior management team to make operational decisions 
by calling upon their expertise. This means the board act as a sounding board for 
key decisions. Board Member C asserts this approach is facilitated by their flexible 
governance model; 
 
It's all about can we do to me and why not? People love to find rules, regulations and 
things like that. But why bother? We want to be community based, we act like the 
private sector when we need to and we act like the public sector when we need to. 
That’s our governance model. We want to empower the Managing Director because 
their skill-set demands it.  
 
The Managing Director emphasises this viewpoint and confirms that it enables him to 
act in the best interests of their stakeholder base rather than just that of the board; 
 
There are lots of people who say oh 'you need this governance model etc. I'd say 
you just say that because you read it in a book, it's got nothing to do with the real 
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world. Giving me and the (management) team the authority to lead is crucial in 
today’s austerity. We can go to the board with issues we’re currently facing or 
predictions about what might happen further down the line. We sometimes meet 
every other week or monthly with little or no absenteeism. Everyone is completely 
invested in the journey and they confidence in me to guide us down the right path.  
 
The findings tell us LTO-A has shifted towards a stewardship model of governance. 
This is where the Managing Director is empowered with decision-making rather than 
being controlled by the board. The board transfer control to the Managing Director 
and believe having stringent control measures would be counterproductive. This 
motivates the Managing Director (steward) to attain the objectives of the 
organisation. This separation of roles between the board and Managing Director has 
helped avoid a ‘minimalist board’ whereby decisions are dominated by strong 
founder board members, and where there is little dissent or healthy discussions. The 
evidence shows that discussions and debate between the board and senior 
management takes place on a constant basis. The findings also show how the 
nature of board roles can influence the LTO-A’s capacity to attract resources from to 
help achieve its social mission. This is facilitated by the BenCom legal structure 
which enables external funding sources. This comes in the form of members buying 
social bonds in LTO-A, which is innovative and developing within a BenCom. The 
view that LTO-A adopt a stewardship model is reinforced by LTO-A’s focus on 
commercial goals. This is similar to private enterprises but they see social value is a 
by-product of this approach, which helps them avoid drifting away from the central 
social mission. 
 
4.4.3. Internal Power Dynamics Determine the Focus on Social and Financial 
Objectives 
 
Observations in board meetings gave an impression that LTO-A’s governance 
processes promote trust and transparency between the board and the Managing 
Director. These practices enable clear accountability and organisational stability 
which, as a separate point, is crucial if the social enterprise sector is to continue to 
provide value to the economy. This is a key feature of BenComs in that the 
cooperative model is founded on solidarity, honesty and openness. With the unique 
composition of the board and their roles alongside senior management, the issue of 
 147 
trust and transparency between both parties plays a significant part in the power 
dynamics within LTO-A. Power dynamics is a key driver of the attainment of social 
and commercial goals within LTO-A. They consider the most crucial way to shape 
and form effective governance teams and help achieve their social objectives is to 
develop trust.  
 
Respondents continuously emphasised that once trust runs through LTO-A’s senior 
management and the board it helps facilitate an open and honest environment of 
discussion around decision-making or organisational issues. Through developing 
trust and transparency with one another the board and Managing Director make 
tough decisions without being worried about conflicts arising. They recognise that 
these conversations are occurring in a constructive manner and that there is no 
hidden agenda and that any decisions made should not be taken personally. This is 
facilitated by the BenCom structure in which the members of LTO-A are beneficiaries 
of the organisation. Board Member D outlines how this trust is developed; 
 
We get members of the senior management team to present reports to the board on 
a regular basis. As a result, a rapport is built not just with the Managing Director but 
all the senior management team. This helps develop that trust. If we’re all on the 
same page, then there less chance of there being negative conflict between 
everyone. I’m not saying we should avoid conflict, because some conflict helps us 
make effective decisions. We’re copied into daily email trials on important 
developments from the management team to make sure we’re aware of what is 
going. This gives us a lot of context which feeds into our discussions during board 
meetings.  
 
Building upon this, Board Member C supports this view but also pinpoints the clarity 
in regards to the role of the board when compared to the Managing Director; 
 
We accept that we are volunteers and therefore they should do all the legwork 
considering they’re paid staff; we should be a sounding board for them. We offer our 
informed views but we don’t try to trample over the decisions made by the Managing 
Director. The Managing Director is in control of the direction but we like to think our 
input is clearly valued and built into operational decisions made on a daily basis.  
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The Managing Director explains this relationship and the reasoning behind it; 
 
Even if I had a board of the great and the good I’d make sure I hold the power 
because I wouldn’t be able to work with a board who tried to run the business, 
because that's not their job. They are there to ratify decisions and offer their advice 
when needed. Allowing me to control operational decisions provides clear lines of 
accountability. I am responsible for the success of the business. This motivates me 
to perform better and ensure our social objectives are met.  
 
As seen above, the Managing Director of LTO-A upholds and fosters trust with the 
board continuously persuading them of the benefits of empowering management to 
control the strategic direction of the Trust without much interference. This level of 
influence gives the Managing Director access to an authentic source of power. The 
power of the Managing Director in LTO-A gives credence to the view that boards do 
not actively monitor and control the CEO. In LTO-A, this is due to the trust built up 
over time between the board and Managing Director. This has also helped avoid the 
concerns whereby the boundaries of power in decision making are often 
unnecessarily blurred. However, although the evidence does not suggest the 
Managing Director pursues his own objectives, LTO-A have not yet encountered an 
organisational crisis. This situation can possibly cause a loss of trust between the 
board and Managing Director, and a shift in power dynamics. Due to LTO-A’s co-
operative approach to governance this will be an important consideration moving 
forward, considering the extremely volatile political and economic environment in 
sport which is compounded by the austerity measures put in place by central 
government.  
 
Although management understand that the board will have the final say over 
important strategic planning, all the operational decision-making is done by 
management. The board acknowledge that they are there more often than not to 
ratify decisions within LTO-A. They believe mutual trust is built through constant 
communication via different methods. The findings indicate that the members are 
taking a step back from actively participating in strategic decision-making. This is 
surprising given it is the members who are the beneficiaries of the organisation. 
LTO-A’s reason for developing trust and transparency is for the simple motive of 
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avoiding conflict. The Deputy Managing Director provided an example to illustrate 
this approach; 
 
If people are not happy on either side, then we will just park it until both parties are 
happy with it. There are numerous disagreements between us about operational 
stuff. We want my decisions to be questioned and critiqued. Although, it must be said 
there have been a few instances when this hasn’t been the case. For example, with 
the budgets, it ended up with me going to the board with one piece of paper with the 
detail on it and they are happy to agree because they know the way we operate. 
We’ve always delivered on budget. They have always been realistic which is helped 
by the explanations we provide them with.  
 
This internal coalition conceivably positively influences the avoidance of mission drift 
occurring. The internal balance of power in regard to decision-making is promoting a 
commercial orientation and the LTO-A, this helps avoid mission drift as the outcomes 
is always focused on their social mission. The robust process of information sharing 
and discussions is constructed in a way which aims to persuade the board on the 
future direction of LTO-A. To develop more trust, the management team point out 
that they will not implement any strategic decision or take up any proposal unless the 
board have agreed with it. However, it appears that the board’s mind-set is to make it 
easy for the management team and allow them to manage. This illustrates the 
unique paradox in the BenCom type in that the senior management hold control of 
the organisation’s activities, but accountability still lies with the board members. In 
that sense, although there is trust, one would assume there would be more active 
board involvement in decision-making. The evidence tells us that with this hands-off 
approach from the board can cause problems moving forward. Some responses 
indicate that the board do not scrutinise the commercial activities of LTO-A, thus, 
heighten the risk of losing sight of their social mission and ultimately encounter 
mission drift. 
 
For LTO-A, power lies with the Managing Director in terms of decision-making on 
daily organisational activities and to a certain extent overall strategy is explicitly 
acknowledged by the board and the Managing Director himself. This is a crucial 
requirement for him as he believes that due to the voluntary nature of the board they 
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should only play a minor role in operation of the organisation The Managing Director 
goes further in suggesting that in terms of accountability and ownership of the 
organisation, they should hold all the control; 
 
If you think about it, the board members are there on a voluntary basis. They may 
have official responsibility for the organisation but in reality it’s my head on the 
chopping block. I, and the management team, need to be in charge because we’re 
there on a day-to-day basis and it’s our jobs that are on the line if things go wrong. 
The board members may have vested interests in the organisation but, for me, the 
amount of impact they can create in terms of decision-making is limited. We have 
experienced professionals working in management roles who I fully trust to do things 
right and in the interest of our stakeholders.  
 
However, this raises questions in regard to governance principles such as 
democracy, solidarity and member participation associated with the co-operative 
model. The Managing Director’s early tenure was focused around fostering trust and 
respect with the board. By persuading the board of his skillset they were more willing 
to relinquish control and bestow power upon the Managing Director. The Asset 
Manager recalls how this relationship was fostered; 
 
He did it the right way by hitting the ground running and so it was about achieving 
some quick wins. In the first few months he achieved some quick wins and got the 
board members on side. Once he had them hooked, he maintained and improved 
performance standards and results on a consistent basis. The views and knowledge 
of the board are always taken into consideration when making operational decisions 
but more often than not the Managing Director is in total control of those decisions.  
 
In times of operational challenges, the Managing Director takes control of the 
strategic side in lieu of the board. For example, with spending cuts resulting from 
austerity measures, a number of their facilities was a predicted to fail according to 
the Managing Director. This evidences the approach LTO-A take in its power 
dynamics. Having the Managing Director sit on the board but hold power facilitates 
decision-making clarity due to the key inside information available to the Managing 
Director. We can assert that LTO-A have a CEO-dominated board. It is apparent the 
board have accepted the Managing Director as the dominant leader of the 
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organisation. However, arguably, this can restrict the input of the members of the 




























This findings chapter examines LTO-B which has a Company Limited by Guarantee 
with Charitable Status (CLG-CS). The themes derived from the data collected on 
LTO-B are the same as those of LTO-A (see figure 4.1. & 5.1.). However, the 
reasons and evidence for the establishment of these themes are different. The 
proceeding presentation of data and subsequent analysis highlights these reasons 
and provides a basis to address the research questions. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Thematic Network Map for LTO-B 
 
 
LTO-B’s mission is "Enhancing the Community through the provision of sport 











Figure 5.2. Thematic Network Map for Competition 
 
5.2.1. Identity Ambiguity 
 
LTO-B state that one of the prevalent governance challenges they are encountering 
is communicating who they are and what they do in relation to competition from 
organisations in the sport provision market. The findings suggest they have 
insufficiently communicated what they are to council commissionaires and 
consumers. LTO-B stress that the council was not capable of fully adapting to a 
situation in which they would have to compete against the private sector and have to 
meet continuously upward-shifting public expectations. Many respondents argued 
that such marketplace competition should not be the role of local councils and that 
they need to understand what LTO-B is. From their perspective, there is confusion in 
the community and their local council of what LTO-B is and what it focuses on 
achieving. The Business Support Manager helps explain this; 
 
We believe we get the message of who we are and what we do. We’re here for the 
community, not profit. I’m not sure what else we can do to make council, and the 
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public, understand this. We always try and work with local community sport 
organisations across the region to make sure there is understanding of what benefits 
our Trust can bring to sport provision. I almost feel there’s an unwillingness from the 
public to embrace our values and how we can help them. It’s fairly clear that as long 
as the quality of sport provision is improving in the region then they don’t really care 
who is providing it.  
 
This is a fairly big assumption being made about the public and their perception of 
LTO-B. Board Trustee B provides a more measured and reasonable explanation of 
what lies at the root of the public not always understanding what they stand for; 
 
We know who we are but Joe Blogg on the street hasn’t got a clue! I don’t think that’s 
our fault. It’s a general problem that society hasn’t grasped what a social enterprise 
is and can do. I don’t blame ourselves because I know we are doing everything 
within our power to get the message out there. It’s a wider societal issue. You never 
see stories about the social enterprise model on the news channels or rarely see any 
column inches dedicated to them in newspapers. People in general need to shout 
louder about the business model because I know there are lots of good stories out 
there about how social enterprise is helping tackle social issues in a time of austerity. 
We’re missing a big opportunity here.  
 
From the observed board meetings, notes taken by the researcher below in one 
meeting indicates a sense of frustration on the part of the board and CEO regarding 
their engagement with the local community; 
 
Trustee C is growing frustrated with the rest of the board regarding community 
understanding of their track record and impact they’ve created in the past. The Board 
Chairman is explaining that it’s the responsibility of the senior management team to 
get the message out there. The CEO responds by pointing out that the board are 
always speaking with their stakeholders, so they need to do more work on explaining 
to the community what they actually stand for.  
 
From LTO-B’s perspective, this lack of understanding stems from the embedded 
ambiguity of what we consider to be social enterprise. They argue this problem is a 
consequence of policymakers constantly reshaping social enterprise in shifting social 
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and political environments. The Community Development Manager highlights this 
issue; 
 
Local authorities are hopeless more often than not, it is full of red tape and they don’t 
understand the sport market. They see the private sector as a quick fix. The council 
doesn’t mind considering a social enterprise for a contract as long as it is on their 
terms. There is quite simply not enough guidance or directives given to local 
authorities from central government. It’s all mixed messages at the moment. The 
government want to encourage social enterprise, well I think they do, but they also 
want councils to prove financial returns when they put a facility out for tendering. It’s 
a complete confliction. I guess this confuses the council on what they should and 
whether they should engage social enterprises like us.  
 
The problem of winning contracts is ostensible for LTO-B as some council 
commissioners understand what they are trying to achieve yet others do not. Also, 
the council’s shift towards preferring private sector providers is hindering the lucidity 
of their identity amongst council commissioners. The Public Services (Social Value) 
Act (2012) would guard against the preference for private sector provision. However, 
the evidence suggests the Social Value Act (2012) is having limited impact within the 
region. The evidence from LTO-B indicate the Social Value Act (2012) has had little 
influence upon local councils, in particular, the council commissioners. The findings 
from LTO-B contradict the argument that this lack of marketing expertise and not an 
outcome of their own actions, but a result of the overall inability to conceptualise 
social enterprise in general. This is compounded by the preference of the local 
council to outsource their sport and leisure facilities to private sector contractors. The 
CEO of LTO-B notes this problem; 
 
The private sector understands the consumer, they are quick to make decisions and 
make prudent investments. We aim to be the best of both, some commissionaires fail 
to see this, but then again, others do. I know one Managing Director. When I was in 
the private sector I tendered against him. And they tendered like a typical private 
sector organisation then. We’re not like that, we won’t lose focus on our core 
stakeholders within the community. The problem then lies with the council and the 
commissioners of the contract. From my experience they don’t always look in enough 
depth into the long-term benefits of our social enterprise model. It’s always about 
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short-term fixes and getting the sport facilities off the books as quick as possible. I 
don’t think there was any point in this Social Value Act, nothing has changed from 
before it was in effect. Maybe it will have some impact further down the link but I 
can’t see it happening.  
 
Notes taken in one of LTO-B’s board meetings indicate a clear sense of frustration 
when it comes to their ability to compete with private contractors and other Leisure 
Trusts; 
 
The CEO leads a discussion on private contractors entering the borough to bid for 
contracts on local leisure centres. A number of trustees seem surprised by this. The 
CEO is telling trustees that rival Leisure Trust is also entering the borough. The CEO 
says that this rival is the biggest Leisure Trust in the UK in terms of sport provision. 
There is clear anger displayed amongst all board trustees and a lot of criticism is laid 
at the foot of the rival Leisure Trust trying to monopolise sport provision. Trustee D 
verbally mocks this Leisure Trust and declares that they are a disgrace to the social 
enterprise movement. 
 
LTO-B are becoming increasingly in competition with other Leisure Trusts as well as 
private sector contractors. This development has seen other regional Trusts, taking 
over management of the local aquatics centre for example. With the investment in 
sport, their competitor sees moving into the North-West as a growth opportunity. 
LTO-B do not see it this way. LTO-B seem to hold a certain amount of resentment 
towards other Leisure Trusts, particularly BenComs and their ‘charitable social 
mission’. They argue the ambiguity of their identity is due to other Trusts operating 
like private sector organisations. Their concern is explained by Board Trustee E who 
describes another Leisure Trust working in sport provision; 
 
Everything inside the ringroad is basically theirs. They have created the mafia as I 
would call it acting like a private contractor. I understand this might be due to market 
pressures but it dilutes our and their identity as a social enterprise and has a wider 
negative effect on people’s understanding of social enterprise in general. Now that 
they have saturated the market down South they are entering our region and are 
bidding for contracts up here. We’re struggling to compete with them but I have 
serious reservations as to what they actually are. It appears, on the face of it, that 
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they say they’re socially driven when in reality there are anything but. They’re a 
machine building a monopoly over the sport provision market.  
 
Although not questioned directly about LTO-A, it is clear there is a certain level of 
frustration exerted from the respondents of LTO-B of how LTO-A operate and the 
confusion their business model causes in relation to our understanding of what social 
enterprise. Board Trustee C summarises LTO-B’s view of LTO-A’s BenCom model; 
 
At the end of the day it’s not necessarily every penny going back into the community. 
Some staff are shareholders and they blur the lines of what a social enterprise 
should be. That is not what a social enterprise is from our perspective.  
 
The approach to conveying their identity to councilors and society creates further 
problems for the understanding of social enterprise. It also highlights the significance 
organisational types have in its development and government preference of using 
them in sport provision. The findings suggest that LTO-B, as a CLG-CS, has to keep 
up with market pressures and the competitive environment that they operate within.  
 
5.2.2. Tendering for Public Service Contracts 
 
LTO-B occasionally take advantage of commercial opportunities such as the 
outsourcing contracts of public sport service delivery, which originates in the 
government’s outsourcing strategy of service delivery combined with spending cuts 
due to austerity. However, as a result of the current political environment LTO-B are 
currently in a hazardous financial position. This is mainly due to the local government 
spending review and their grant income going down to zero at once. The findings 
suggest the host Council place significant emphasis on financial savings when 
outsourcing sport and leisure facilities. LTO-B aim create both social and financial 
value, the latter in this instance appears to be subordinated by council policy to 
achieve the best price, regardless of Government policy and the Social Value Act. If 
the host Council does not appreciate the social value, then LTO-B argue ‘why 
bother’. The Finance Director points towards this problem being one of the main 
reasons why they struggle in tendering processes; 
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They talk about it being about quality (of provision) over the last 30 years or this or 
that, but the reality is it has always been about bottom line. Our experience with the 
local Council consistently points towards financial returns on the contract rather than 
some of the intangible, sometimes tough to measure, social impact we can create. It 
gets to a point when we start to think to ourselves ‘why should we engage in this 
process anymore?’. It’s hard to compete with the bigger Trusts coming in the frame 
alongside the private contractors in which the latter concentrate completely on 
maximising profit from the contract. The council love it when they see those potential 
returns. The wider societal picture and potential impacts never come into play.  
 
In one board meeting, the trustees did a brainstorming task to assess and determine 
what local councils will priortise in the future when outsourcing their sport facilities. 
Below are notes taken by the researcher in the meeting; 
 
Trustee E leads a brainstorming activity on their approach to bidding in a tendering 
process for new facilities. The board has written up a list of criteria on what they think 
the local council will favour when putting a facility up for tender. Top of the list is 
‘monetising social value’. It’s now broken out into open discussion on what tools are 
available to them to ensure they can communicate the tangible impact they create.  
 
The Head of Marketing and Sales provides some reasoning as to why they struggle 
to secure further contracts on the provision of sport services. This respondent felt it 
was a snowball effect in that a number of different variables came together to result 
in a failure to secure more tenders; 
 
Because of the spending cuts, the council see private sector providers as more 
reliable than Trusts at this present time. We’ve entered an era of austerity and from 
our point of view, these spending cuts are only going to get worse. Sport isn’t as 
important as health, infrastructure, education and others so it has been and will be 
the first to suffer. You would think it would provide us with more opportunities but 
strangely the opposite has happened. Rather than going with the ethical and socially 
responsible social enterprise model they are preferring private sector contractors. I 
would argue that’s a directive that has come down from central government rather 
than the council having autonomy over their decisions. The Best Value criteria set 
out has made a mockery of the whole tendering process.  
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The challenges LTO-B face in how to measure and prove social value compounds 
the issue. The challenge of measuring social value means LTO-B is not able to 
effectively measure and communicate their social value added, and this is central to 
social enterprises struggling to procure public services. LTO-B have constantly 
encountered this problem. This combined with the ‘Best Value’ criteria set out by 
commissioners of contracts causes problems for LTO-B. Board Trustee A and the 
Finance Director respectively provide an interesting insight to how the process works 
and how it affects LTO-B; 
 
This Best Value process is being replicated around the country. Our council normally 
split the contract up in to what they want out of it and the bidders need to explain how 
they will meet the criteria set out. For instance, you may see 60% importance placed 
on ‘financial savings’ and 40% importance placed on the creation of social value. It’s 
a load of rubbish most of the time. Financial savings is more likely to be in the region 
of 90% and social value is hardly considered at all.  
 
We can provide value and focus on the quality of provision rather than the facilities 
just being delivered by the council who would constantly look for financial savings. 
The problem is they still do! I understand their motivations when the bottom line is so 
important for them at the moment. Yet they are still unwilling to fully embrace our 
social enterprise model to see if it will actually benefit them and the community in the 
long-term. They trust the private sector more than they trust us.  
 
One tool LTO-B considered as a method of increasing their chances of 
communication the social value they can create to the local council is a Social 
Return On Investment (SROI) report. This tool was explored in a board meeting. The 
researcher’s note on this are presented below;  
 
The SROI reporting mechanism is discussed amongst the board. Trustee B does not 
support the use of this tool because of the potential cost and confusing language 
within it. Other trustees seem to agree. The CEO is adamant the SROI is the only 
viable tool available to the Trust to enable them to compete in a tendering process if 
they decide to enter one.  
 
Building on this, LTO-B lament the council’s unwillingness to address the social 
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needs of the borough’s most deprived areas. When a sport facility is put up for 
tender, the council commissioner communicates to the bidders what the council’s 
objectives are in terms of ‘Best Value’ for the facility. In many cases, financial 
savings surpasses any social value creation in the intended outcome. This inclination 
tends to favour private sector providers as they will primarily focus on the financials 
rather than production of social value which is surprising. The private sector 
organisations, also known as Leisure Management Contractors (LMCs), identify the 
affluent regions of the borough as areas they can maximise profits. From LTO-B’s 
perspective, the local council tends to focus on real money returns rather than the 
intangible social value proposed in the bidding process. This infers their preference 
for private sector contractors as the Finance Director makes a bold reference to. 
 
As LTO-B see themselves as a traditional charitable social enterprise with income 
trading activities they prefer to consolidate their assets rather than expand. This 
creates a problem in the procurement process because of the lack of a track record 
of bidding and winning contracts if council commissioners place little emphasis on 
the importance of social value. This lack of a track record reduces the 
competitiveness of LTO-B, of which is integral criteria for awarding contracts. 
However, as the CEO points out, this is based purely on rational thinking; 
 
Because we’ve got run down old facilities that haven’t been invested in properly then 
that is a major risk. We’ve got to find a lot of money to get through that but because 
of the government spending cuts. We have got to get through it. So we can’t bid for 
contracts we realistically can’t afford. We won’t spend beyond our means and risk 
jeopardising our future. We don’t want to be like other Trusts who have gone at it in 
an overzealous manner by bidding for anything and ultimately failing as a 
consequence. We’ve got to think about the community we serve. If that means just 
focusing on a few facilities and improving them as much as possible then so be it. As 
long as we’re achieving our aim of getting more people more active then I’m happy.  
 
This emphasis on financial return, for LTO-B, is one of the main reasons the 
provision of sport, and thus sport participation, is not developing at the rate it should 
be. The evidence indicates there is a move towards a market-based model for 
reforming public services by concentrating power in the hands of private sector 
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providers within the borough. The Head of Development explains this issue; 
 
The tory council want to social enterprises to behave like businesses and not 
voluntary organisations. So in that sense we’re constantly swimming against the tide 
in the tendering process. If we go up against a reputable private contractor with a 
solid track-record then we’re fighting a losing battle from the off.  
 
It insinuates the loss of public provision is being replaced by a growing private sector 
and a modernisation commitment of the conservative vision of the market (private 
sector) being a more efficient provider of public services. However, this shift may be 
based on the narrative of Labour causing the economic crisis and a need to resolve 
Britain’s economic problems. 
 
5.2.3. Leisure Trust Amalgamation 
 
LTO-B regard central government’s support of social enterprise as ever-increasing. 
They make reference to the fact that their future stability is particularly affected by 
the Charity Commission’s outlook of the social enterprise sector. LTO-B argue The 
Charity Commission are encouraging social enterprises generally to amalgamate, 
particularly where overheads are high and they could be shared. Whilst other Leisure 
Trusts currently engage in this merging approach, LTO-B are yet to embrace this 
approach. Their willingness to engage with this tactic was mostly positive. They 
consider this approach becoming more and more popular in the future for Leisure 
Trusts in the North-West. The CEO clarifies their position on amalgamation;  
 
I think that will happen in the North. If you go over towards other parts of the region 
they have done some work together. One place does all the payroll, accounts and so 
on so that’s sharing resources. For example, you’ve got one area and Trust which is 
very small and others in the same areas which are small. These could easily all be 
amalgamated. We are fairly open to the idea of it but there are a number of issues 
that need to be sorted before we would proceed with something like that. Most Trusts 
don’t have the required resources to achieve growth so pooling resources with 
another Trust does make sense. The problem is that in the future, if this approach is 
adopted you’ll see a couple of massive Trusts taking over everything. There will be a 
reduction of facilities, there will be a rationalization of Leisure Trusts and there will be 
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a Super Trusts model of sport and leisure delivery. 
 
Board Trustee E provides some of the reasons as to why Leisure Trusts working 
together may become problematic;  
 
Basically, it’s ripe to happen but the problem is the politics. You have different 
policies in different areas so how on earth do you balance those out? You have 
completely opposing political ideologies in neighbouring boroughs. You have tory 
councils who want to privaitise sport and left-wing Labour councils who would want to 
keep everything in-house. Leisure Trusts in each area would have to priortise 
different things such as financial returns so how do you balance out those issues? 
 
The Board Chairman offers a note of caution of this growing trend; 
 
A number of years ago one Trust tried to amalgamate with another in the area and it 
nearly ended in financial disaster and closure of both Trusts. The council decided 
they didn’t want to go that way because of different outlooks on what both partners 
wanted out of the merger. The problem was that contracts were already signed and 
one of the partners had already restructured their organisation to cater for the 
merger. It was a complete mess and the councils had to step in to help out. A lot of 
people lost their jobs after that. The point is you can’t jump into a merger without 
thoroughly thinking things through.  
 
There are number of variables involved with potential mergers between LTO-B and 
other Leisure Trusts. Along with clarifying key social and financial objectives, some 
other considerations from LTO-B’s perspective concern the issues of where does 
accountability lie if the partnership fails? Further, who holds power over decision-
making? These are deliberations which LTO-B feel are imperative for any future 
potential amalgamation of Leisure Trusts in the North-West to work. This was one of 
the agenda items of an observed board meeting. LTO-B have confidence an 
amalgamation can work if there is clarity in the negotiation process. Another layer of 
complexity is added when you consider what a Leisure Trust is trying to achieve. 
One Leisure Trust may focus predominantly on the financial goals and assume 
social and environmental impact will be a side product of financial stability. While 
another Leisure Trust may well place all their efforts on solely pursuing social 
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objectives. This is then compounded by the variations of different organisational 
types of social enterprise and their different associated tensions. These tensions 
were visible in a board meeting observed by the researcher, as noted below; 
 
Near end of the meeting, in ‘any other business’, Trustee D raises a point about the 
potential for future mergers with other Leisure Trusts in different boroughs. Trustee D 
notes some of the benefits, mainly focusing on the potential of pooling of resources. 
There is a clear reluctance by the Board Chairman to engage in the discussion and 
wants to move things on. The CEO seems supportive but Trustee A jumps in to 
explain that any merger would damage their core focus on their own community.  
 
When looking at the North West, particularly Greater Manchester, LTO-B are critical 
of the way local and central government have handled the development of sport 
services. Recently, a Leisure Trust, the Manchester Sport and Leisure Trust has 
been developed. According to LTO-B, the Manchester Sport and Leisure Trust was 
only set up as a charity to get the tax savings and then they would contract all the 
sport facilities out to the private sector (sham trust). So that was Manchester City 
Council saving tax. Whereas now they manage nearly half the facilities themselves. 
This criticism is valid in its merit of Manchester City Council of using the Leisure 
Trust model as simply a mechanism to produce tax savings. However, it begs the 
question why LTO-B have not considered managing facilities in the Greater 
Manchester area. The CEO and Finance Director provide some background to this 
development with the region respectively; 
 
I look at Manchester (Sport Trust) and see all the money they have and all the 
facilities they have got and you think why aren't they achieving a lot more. Why aren’t 
they doing a lot more with their sport development, why aren’t they doing far more 
with their facilities? 
 
If you look at a leisure centre ran by that sport trust (Manchester) you have got the 
gym space and you have a cafe space and then the rest is what you call the 
operational space - huge sports hall, huge swimming pool and squash courts etc. 
That's the majority of the space. The gym is a small place. The cafe is an even 
smaller space. So actually what they do is put the non-profit organisation running the 
facility and then their private company runs the gym and cafe. And any profits they 
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get go the private company. And any losses that they make go the other way. 
 
Board Trustee B proposes that it makes sense for as they call them ‘sham trusts’ to 
continue to operate the way they are currently are due to the tax savings they are 
making. It is completely unethical according to Board Trustee B but it pointed out it is 
a common practice amongst contractors of sport services; 
 
People say oh you don’t pay VAT. We paid a lot of VAT last year so we do pay a lot 
of VAT and we can't claim everything back so actually it isn't as good as people think 
it is. These Sham Trusts are paying even less because of these pseudo non-profits 
entities they set up within a private operation. It’s a joke but no one is doing anything 
about it. Why would we, or for that fact anyone, want to work with such an 
organisation.  
 
In essence, the findings suggest the local authorities want to put the sport and 
leisure facilities out to tender, and their choice more often than not is to put them out 
to their own Leisure Trust, to a conglomerate Leisure trust like LTO-A or to the sham 
trust operated by a private company. That in itself causes significant barriers in 
Leisure Trusts working together for mutual benefit because they are in themselves 
considerably different from each other.  
 
5.3. Political Environment 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Thematic Network Map for Political Environment  
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5.3.1. Local Council Relations Are Crucial 
 
LTO-B’s relationship with its local council has become more and more turbulent over 
recent times. A heated area of debate and contention is the impact of the local 
government spending review has had over the stability of LTO-B. The council 
contributed an annual grant to LTO-B of £1.7m but after heated discussions with the 
council LTO-B found themselves with no annual grant. The bone of contention for 
them is not that granting of funds is being reduced; it is the speed in which the 
council intend to proceed with it. To compound this, the relationship between them 
and the council has been strained predominantly as a result of the local government 
spending review.  
 
Currently, in terms of the local market for sport provision in the borough, there is less 
in-house management of sport services than there used to be. Thorough proposals 
have been provided to the council which illustrates a clear plan of action LTO-B can 
pursue in local sport provision. Nevertheless, the host council are proving stubborn 
to negotiate with and are holding out for the cheapest option in the bidding process. 
The findings indicate, from LTO-B’s perspective that it is not government’s (local or 
national) responsibility to act as a facilitator in the production of social value. 
However, according to the respondents, this tension derives from local government 
having their hands tied because of austerity measures and the resulting budgetary 
spending cuts. The Community Development Manager explains how these macro 
implications are affecting LTO-B; 
 
Roughly 20-30% (of sport provision) is in-house. It is close to a third each between 
Leisure Trusts, private sector providers and in-house management. We want to take 
advantage of the local spending cuts by offering to take over management of 
facilities yet are aggravated by the council’s attempts to propose LTO-B do it on a 
string budget or give the contract to the private sector. We grow more frustrated by 
the week at the moment due to the tough discussions we are having with the council 
about a route forward. They want to help us and promote social enterprise but they 
also want financial returns from any contract put out to tender. They can’t have the 
best of both worlds. 
 
That being said, the Finance Director asserts that the council will preserve their 
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commitment to developing the third sector and therein LTO-B. He points the finger 
more broadly. He supports the idea that government austerity fiscal cost-cutting is 
proving to be the Achilles heel for the development and growth of LTO-B, as the 
Finance Director alludes to; 
 
If they can’t afford to do what they’re doing what is going to happen? The council 
have got no money, they have no capital, they have an interest to get rid of public 
sport services and they have no revenue. We’re providing them with proposals to 
move forward with. But sometimes they think they can go out and get someone to 
come in for free. Would someone come into the area and do it for nothing? No they 
wouldn’t. They want to engage with our business model but every single time it’s 
always a case of they want something for nothing. The genesis of all these issues is 
the austerity cuts in place for local authorities. It is starting to bite and councils are 
running round like headless chickens not knowing how to approach the issue of 
externalising certain services.  
 
In one board meeting, a representative from the council was invited to the meeting to 
hold a question and answers session. Notes taken are presented below; 
 
The Board Chairman has set aside 30 minutes for a Q&A session with the council 
representative. A number of the questions are being framed around council support 
for the Trust. One question from Trustee E was “what are you doing to promote the 
use of social enterprise in our communities?’ The representative, who works in the 
sport development department of the council points out that they are struggling 
financially because of the austerity cuts. Questions are also posed about the removal 
of grant support by the council. The representative from the councils replies to these 
questions by pointing out he is not at liberty to discuss those discussions by the 
council. It is getting a bit frosty between the trustees and the council representative. 
Some trustees are saying there is no point in this Q&A session and that it is a waste 
of time because the council won’t talk about the most important issue facing the 
Trust.  
 
Overall, as highlighted above, the relationship between LTO-B and their host council 
is crucial to overall sport policy aim of improving sport provision in the North-West 
and achieving their main objective of getting more people more active. There are a 
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number of challenges LTO-B face when working with local councils. In recent times, 
they have had an uncooperative relationship. The cause of this arguably lies firmly 
with the local government spending review and the removal of grant income LTO-B 
receive. This is a significant bone of contention, as the CEO highlights; 
 
They’re planning on doing it in one sudden action. We’re still negotiating, but it will 
probably be in one go. The decision has already been taken that it will go to zero. It’s 
the process which it is being done that is the main concern. It’s a Tory council so 
what do you expect? They won’t even consider staggering the reduction of the grant 
we receive. It is pure short-termism and they are basically crucifying the only viable 
vehicle for social change through sport in the region. How are meant to fill a million-
pound gap with such short notice. We’ve had no time at all to plan for this happening 
but they don’t seem to care which is a shame.  
 
Board Trustee C supports the viewpoint of the CEO; 
 
It has influenced our decision-making in regard to achieving our financial and social 
goals. It has caused havoc. We currently get £1.7m in an annual grant from the 
conservative council and they want to go to zero! 
 
Their strategy of consolidating the facilities they manage and maximising social 
value rather than expanding their facility portfolio is resulting in financial uncertainty. 
This, according to the respondents, is due to the reliance of grant income and its 
reduction. They argue that the reduction of grant income is the main source of 
conflict between them and their local authority. LTO-B operate in some of the most 
deprived areas and they are bearing the brunt of government spending cuts due to 
the compound effect of larger austerity cuts to local authority budgets. For LTO-B, 
this is exacerbated by them providing a non-statutory public service; sport and 
leisure provision. 
 
5.3.2. Austerity is a Veneer for Privatisation 
 
From the perspective of the respondents, the main reason for private companies 
being awarded contracts for sport facilities in the North-West is the issue surrounding 
Best Value. They affirm that this term refers to what the council’s desired outcomes 
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from the externalisation of the service is. They point out that the local council, in the 
main, tends to either assess Best Value in terms of financial savings or the potential 
to produce social value. Best Value has recently been influenced by the Social Value 
Act (2012) from central government. The findings from LTO-B indicate that this 
alongside an era of austerity has had little impact on the development and/or growth 
of their organisation in sport provision. For the respondents, austerity measures put 
in place has had little impact in the borough. It has not improved the likelihood of 
them being awarded contracts for public sport services. They also pay reference to 
the Big Society concept and argue it is more about raising awareness of community 
ownership rather than actually being of use or benefit to social enterprises 
themselves. The Board Chairman makes reference to the Big Society movement and 
the negligible impact it has had for LTO-B; 
 
We were happening before the Big Society came about so we didn’t change anything 
of note. Does it impact on us? No it does not. Does it make the odd one or two 
people think about social enterprises? Perhaps. But it won’t influence or change 
anything that we do. It hasn’t helped us, that’s for sure. It’s more of a buzzword 
people use to highlight the usefulness of community organisations managing public 
services. This certainly hasn’t been case here since we heard about it. I have no idea 
how, but more private contractors are getting these contracts than they did before 
Big Society came into play. This is probably because of the austerity cuts which has 
counteracted the promotion of community ownership whereby financial cost-cutting is 
paramount at the moment. 
 
Board Trustee C provides evidence to suggest that with or without the Big Society 
movement, community organisations have been enacting social change before it 
was ever a political phrase;  
 
If you look at it from a small-scale perspective, a number of local authorities have 
loads of knackered old buildings that they cannot afford to run anymore. Most 
community organisations are adept at taking over and managing community 
buildings. If you look at places like the Wirral, they have transferred around two 
dozen community buildings to community groups, and it is working! Big Society is 
just a political buzzword. It holds no weight with us. Before austerity, before the 
recession, the social enterprise model was achieving change consistently across the 
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region. Now, it seems we’re in such a dire situation because of austerity that the only 
option local authorities have is to flog the sports service to a private company and get 
rid of the asset completely. It’s absurd.  
 
The evidence, demonstrated above, states that LTO-B believe the idea that the 
approach to increase the outsourcing public services to community organisations is 
having limited impact. We can also see, through the lens of LTO-B, a social 
enterprise’s positive effect on deprived communities within the region can be 
questioned and criticised. The Community Development Manager explains the 
reasons why; 
 
You will get an evaluation matrix for tender which will say that health and safety is 
10%, robustness of the organisation is 10%, price is 40% and quality is 40%. So 
quality is where they would enshrine social value but there are lots of different 
definitions of what social value is. For us, it’s getting more people active and 
improving the quality of the facilities we provide. The problem is that the austerity 
measures are hitting certain deprived areas in the North-West like where we are and 
operate the hardest. There just isn’t the fertile ground at the minute for our model to 
thrive without the help and financial support of the council.  
 
Evidence provided in a board meeting by the CEO supports this trend of the local 
council supporting a shift towards preferring financial value, and ultimately private 
contractors. Notes taken by the researcher are noted below; 
 
The CEO has brought an audit of public sport services to the board meeting. He says 
the audit will give everyone an idea of who contracts on sport services have gone to 
in the last 4 years in the North-West. He points out that nearly 60% of sport facilities 
put up for tender in the North-West have been awarded to private contractors. Most 
trustees do not look surprised. They discuss how they thought the austerity 
measures imposed would provide social enterprises with opportunities but they 
conclude that the opposite has occurred.  
 
The viewpoints above suggest that austerity measures imposed are providing an 
opportunity for the conservative held council to promote the use of private sector 
providers in sport and leisure provision. Arguably, this development can be assumed 
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to be a façade for the reappearance of Thatcherism and the idea of a minimal state. 
It may be that this development is curtailing the commitment New Labour made to 
reduce the strain on public services by growing the role of social enterprise. As 
highlighted above, the respondents believe that there is capacity to take advantage 
of the austerity measures in place for the concept to work. They insist, however, that 
the local authority need to think pragmatically about the political and economic 
environment we are currently in. By taking this mind-set, more sport and leisure 
services can be transferred to community organisation such as LTO-B. To this end, it 
can help address issues within ‘socially broken’ communities in the borough.  
 
5.3.3. Financial Support is Pivotal in Avoiding Mission Drift 
 
There is common understanding among the respondents from LTO-B that their 
current and planned amount of funding needs to increase. They argue that the main 
challenge facing them is the access to funding and grants. The evidence from 
respondents below suggests that LTO-B have been reactive as opposed to proactive 
in their approach to addressing funding challenges. However, they are aware of the 
challenges they face and will face in the future. Yet, it is unclear as to what 
approaches have been adopted to help address these concerns. The most recent 
challenge they face is the withdrawal of grant support from the local Council. 
Respondents argue they seek independence and avoid being reliant on council 
financial support. However, they are currently seeking council grants so the evidence 
would suggest otherwise. Nevertheless, there is little clarity on how this grant funding 
gap will be filled once it is cut completely. One recent consequence in the absence of 
grant funding has been termination of contracts of sport and leisure facilities leading 
to the closer of a facility. It is clear from the evidence that LTO-B do not want the 
council to have an influence on what they do or how they do it. As grant funding 
decreases, LTO-B’s overall control over the management of the sport facilities 
increases. However, minimising the financial support from the council will affect the 
trust’s ability to remain financially stable. The Finance Director provides an account 
of the historical and sometimes turbulent relationship with the council; 
 
We started in 2006 and 35% of our budget was a council grant. This year it’s down to 
11% of our overall budget and in that time we’ve taken on more facilities and taken 
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on sports development. This shows that it’s always been decreasing. We know it will 
eventually go to zero. We’ve been appreciative of the council over the years for their 
financial support and we understand it is not going to be there forever. The problem 
is that because we don’t have a large portfolio of managed facilities, our trading 
opportunities are limited. This is compounded by operating in areas of socio-
economic problems where austerity has hit hard. You’ve also got the trend of the 
council preferring private contractors to run their sport services. This all put together 
causes problems. When the grant support goes in one swoop, we will struggle to 
resource the social programmes we have in place. The rapport with the council has 
gradually deteriorated over the years and the removal of the grant support is 
basically the breaking point.  
 
The evidence indicates that LTO-B are willing to try and withstand the financial 
pressures upon them. Although they have identified the challenges ahead there does 
not seem to be a conclusive strategic approach as to how they will address the ever-
increasing disparity between the declining capital available and operational costs. 
Possibly, cash-flow contentions lead LTO-B to disappointment and frustration at the 
council’s withdrawal of grant support to help improve sport provision. The CEO 
concedes this is a problem that was not foreseen and built into their strategic 
planning; 
 
It’s about what we want to do, not the council. So to go to zero, does it affect us? 
Yes. Will taking a £1.7m out anyone’s business affect you? Yes. Will we be able to 
still do our raison d’etre? Yes. Will we be able to do as much? Not to begin with. Will 
we survive? Yes. Will we be better in the long-term? Yes. Will it be painful during it? 
Yes. Will we have to make changes to some staffing? Yes. Will we have to lose 
some people? Yes. But that’s what I’m paid to do. There’s only so much blame that 
can be assigned to me but it is board which is ultimately responsible for the future 
direction. This scenario wasn’t considered in previous discussions.  
 
From examining LTO-B’s profit/loss financial accounts, the removal of the annual 
grant would result in them making net loss of £420k for the year 14/15. However, 
surprisingly, when discussing the same issue, the Board Chairman pointed out that 
they are more focused on their social objectives rather than increasing their trading 
income and revenue streams. He stated bluntly; 
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Our main interest is to acquire grants or subsidies. That’s what we rely on to ensure 
we effect some positive change in the community.  
 
This suggests LTO-B are perhaps overly focused on creating social value and often 
overlook the need to develop their revenue channels in order to sustain the whole 
operation. Although this approach ensues they do not drift from their core mission, it 
has arguably resulted in a high-risk reliance on financial support which. As Board 
Trustee E highlights, this can make LTO-B an unsustainable venture; 
 
The council must be aware the Trust is struggling financially, so to remove the grant 
in one sudden action is counterproductive. Yet, it is not their responsibility to keep us 
afloat, it’s ours. As a board, we all agree the social impact is the most important thing 
but that was only made possible with the grant support we got. Now it’s gone, there 
is nothing to fill that gap from a funding perspective.  
 
Notes taken by the research in one board meeting provides an alternative insight to 
the possible impact of removal of grant support; 
 
An agenda item focusing on the removal of grant support is being discussed. There 
is widespread disappointment amongst the trustees about the council’s decision. 
There is agreement that this puts the Trust’s survival at great risk. The CEO points 
out that the board should have predicted this was going to happen. He insinuates 
that responsibility lies with the board. The Board Chairman defends the planning and 
decisions made by the board. Trustee E says this will have serious ramifications for 
their resource allocation in the coming year. 
 
Instead of providing continued financial support, the findings indicate the council are 
increasing the possibility of regaining control of the facilities and delivering services 
themselves or seeking alternative providers. LTO-B affirm that this goes against the 
sole reason any past service was externalised in the first place. The CLG-CS 
structure does not help in this sense as it restricts sources of finance available to the 
organisation. This is something Board Trustee D refers to; 
 
I think everyone can agree that we would like to increase our revenue year on year. 
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But people sometimes fail to understand that we are registered as a CLG with 
charitable status. This has lots of implications in regards to what we can and can’t do 
from a trading perspective. It means our social mission and community objectives 
take complete precedence when it comes to how we conduct ourselves. If we begin 
to focus on increasing revenue channels, we run the risk of neglecting our core 
mission. The charitable status has given us a pathway in terms of finance but those 
pathways are now closing off because of the wider austerity issues throughout the 
country. There are valid criticisms of the BenCom model rightly so, but in these 
political and austerity conditions, that model is best placed to take advantage of it 
whereas our hands are fairly tied.  
 
Arguably, LTO-B are overlooking their financial health and this oversight can hinder 
them from building the kind of competitive, surplus orientated culture that is essential 
for them and many other social enterprises. The oversight is also neglecting a need 
to seek non-traditional financial sources when operating in a challenging political and 
economic environment. Yet, the generally held view of the respondents is that being 
over commercialised will result in mission drift, in that they lose focus on their own 
mission and social objectives. However, as stated above by Board Trustee D, the 
CLG-CS structure holds a significant bearing on this approach. Thus, there is an 
absence of pragmatism in LTO-B in relation to potential impact the grant reduction 
can have and their focus remains idealistic.  
 
A clear example of this issue occurred in an observed board meeting which focused 
on solving the issue of the grant removal. The researcher’s notes from the meeting 
below help explain what happened; 
 
The Board Chairman asks trustees to split up into groups and work on a set activity. 
The task is centered around providing solutions to the removal of the annual council 
grant of £1.7m. One group suggests they could approach other sporting bodies and 
the National Lottery to try and secure some future funding. Another group suggests 
they will have to make cutbacks in terms of staff and hand back some of their 
facilities to the council. No trustees suggest that they should try and increase their 
trading income to fill the gap left by council grant.  
 
This reliance on grant funding can potentially result in mission drift in the future, as 
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LTO-B is unable to successfully evaluate challenges of being financially stable and 
being able to produce social value concurrently. However, there has been no overt 
mission drift as they are still solely acting in line with their social mission. There may 
be problems in the future when income streams dwindle and they are unable to 
resource the creative of social value. The findings indicate the focus LTO-B are 
placing on their social goals is highly influenced by the limited availability of funding. 
However, the evidence from LTO-B suggests grant reduction is making them more 
determined to fulfil their social mission. This is unsurprising, bearing in mind that 
more often than not, grant funding makes up a substantial proportion of their income, 
which is a characteristic of CLGs with charitable status. The Community 
Development Manager and Board Trustee A display this determination via their 
respective responses; 
 
If you’re going to play sport in the borough, there’s an opportunity. We have to make 
sure we are developing the provision of grassroots sport in the borough. If we don’t, 
then we’ll get the blame even though there’s going to be no financial support. We will 
make it work, we might not be able to improve the provision as quick as we would 
like to but we will get there in the end.  We’ve worked on a tight budget for years 
already so I have full confidence in the board and management team to see us 
through.  
 
Well we’d prefer it not to go! But we’re also realists and that is what we’ve been 
planning for recently. We have an experienced CEO who has been through similar 
experiences in the past. By working together, we know we’ll become more pro-active 
and take advantage of opportunities that present themselves.  
 
It can be argued that the situation at LTO-B means there is significant pressure to 
unremittingly attain funding support to ensure the they are in a solvent position. The 
responses from LTO-B show that while they are producing trading income, the 
amount is small in relation to the funding support from the council. Notwithstanding 
the possibility of LTO-B increasing their trading income, the evidence suggests they 
are in a position of possibly becoming financially unstable. This is because they are 
neglecting engagement in new trading opportunities in order to achieve their social 
mission. Whilst there is no current mission drift, when we consider the council’s 
intention to reduce their grant funding to zero in one sole action, this harms the 
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stability of LTO-B as a feasible and functional operation as they do not have enough 
trading income to balance the loss of their council grant. 
 
5.3.4. Focus is placed on affluent geographical areas 
 
In the past, LTO-B has pursued a strategic approach of taking over management of 
a Golf Course. Management of the golf course was part of a larger agreement with 
the town whereby LTO-B managed and operated all of their sport centres. However, 
recently, this agreement has run into problems. LTO-B have withdrawn from 
management of the sports centres due to financial pressures resulting from the grant 
cuts from the council. The rationale for originally operating in the area was the 
appeal of generating revenue in an affluent area of the borough. The Finance 
Manager helps explain this strategic approach; 
 
We are seen as an affluent borough so whilst we’ve got bare to see deprivation in 
other areas which is amongst the 5% most deprived in the UK, you’ve then got other 
places which are amongst the 5% richest areas in the UK. So that is the dilemma you 
have but when you look at the borough as a whole, it’s rich. Common logic would 
suggest there are higher levels of disposable income in so although we’re socially 
focused, we thought we could increase trade in those areas. There is misconception 
that social enterprises need to always operate in deprived areas. They definitely 
should but there is also scope to argue an organisation like ours can still create some 
sort of social impact in affluent areas.  
 
In terms of securing capital moving forward, as outlined above, LTO-B have 
considered various options. The reasoning behind their grant funding being 
withdrawn is down to where the Leisure Trust operates. LTO-B operate in some 
affluent areas yet there are still pockets of severe deprivation. However, from the 
viewpoint of the respondents, when the council assesses whether LTO-B qualify to 
receive grant income they are now not seen as suitable chiefly due to the 
government spending review and the effects of austerity. Arguably, this indicates the 
Conservative controlled council they work with assume third sector providers such as 
LTO-B will fill the gaps and ‘pick up the pieces’ created by the reduction of state 
spending and the withdrawal of grant support. The Board Chairman argues their past 
success in affluent and deprived areas of the borough has ultimately had a negative 
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bearing on council support; 
 
It’s like the Carlsberg quote, we’re probably we’re amongst the best Trusts in the UK. 
But you can’t quantify that and there’s no merit to say that. But I would like to think if 
you go from 750k visits in year one to 2.3m last year, if you go from £3m turnover to 
£9m this year, if you go from 200 to 500 employees, if you go from no investment in 
the borough in the previous 10 years to over £20m in leisure in the last 10 years, 
those are all fantastic achievements and tells us we are successfully utilising our 
capital in all areas of the borough. Yet this has become a double-edged sword. The 
council look at us and say ‘well if you’re doing so well, you can cope without the grant 
monies’. That grant support is an integral part of us being able to carry out our sport 
development programmes across the borough so it is really frustrating when the 
council take that view.  
 
The Head of Development provides an example on how other local authorities treat 
social enterprise sport providers in other boroughs; 
 
So, if you take them next door, they’re seen as a deprived authority so they get 
grants for everything whereas we don’t. The council assume because we have 
reached a certain size we don’t need any more financial support. It’s one rule one 
and another rule for the other. There is a complete lack of fairness when it comes to 
financial support from councils. The implication is that because we operate in affluent 
areas within the borough it’s assumed the possible increase in trading income in 
those locations will fill gap previously filled by the grant support. This is not true.  
 
This reduction of grant support is an instrument used by the Conservative council to 
increase the role of the private sector in deprived areas according to LTO-B. 
Although respondents concede that central government is devolving power to local 
government and encouraging local communities to take over public services it can 
be proposed this policy is to an extent a ‘rhetorical intervention’ to soften the 
Conservative party’s image with a range of audiences. However, the findings from 
LTO-B infer that the Conservative council never thought through the nature of this 
policy and how it functioned in relation to the requirements of LTO-B and sport 






Figure 5.4. Thematic Network Map for Governance  
 
5.4.1. Neglect of Commercial Focus can cause Mission Drift 
 
For LTO-B, achieving their social mission is claimed to be important because it 
guides their work and enables them to identify themselves with the communities they 
serve. Their mission encompasses tacking issues such as increasing participation in 
sport and improving the provision of sport by means of developing the sport and 
leisure facilities they manage and deliver. The need to attain social objectives 
features heavily for LTO-B. Although they aim to generate trading income, achieving 
their social objectives is the central concern and takes precedence in their decision-
making. LTO-B argue that by developing the provision of sport facilities, accessibility 
will increase resulting in better participation. Participation numbers within the 
borough have increased in the past five years according to LTO-B and their 
reasoning behind this is the re-investment of surplus in the facilities they provide. 
The CEO helps provide some clarity on their social focus at the expense of 
continued growth; 
 
Don’t forget, we’re registered as a charity and our trading income makes up less than 
50% of our total turnover. The whole reason why we were set up in the first place 
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was to solely focus on creating lasting impact in the local communities. That means 
all our efforts are directed at the people we serve. We could easily pursue a strategy 
of expansion and move into different areas. But that would limit the impact we would 
have in our home borough, which is something we are not willing to risk damaging.  
 
Balancing social and financial objectives can be a challenging and hazardous 
endeavor. This appears to be apparent within LTO-B. While the attention of LTO-B, 
which is a CLG-CS, surrounds addressing their charitable social mission, there is an 
acknowledgement whereby generating trading income is a concern for them. LTO-B 
hold a strong social orientation with a conservative approach to developing trading 
income e.g. consideration of limited expansion and procurement of more sport 
facilities within the borough. Board Trustee B describes their approach; 
 
It was, and is, about protecting the services we provide. We make decisions based 
on the whole rather than individual incidences. We see sport as being a mechanism 
for a number of issues facing the community. We can tackle health issues such as 
obesity through improving our provision of sport. In order to that, we need to be fully 
committed to our local community and focus all our resources on creating some kind 
of tangible impact. If we start thinking about revenue this, revenue that, we will end 
forgetting about what we exist to do within the borough. It’s as simple as that.  
 
From the perspective of Board Trustee E, it is clear this is a consistent view which is 
held across the board of trustees and of the senior management teams; 
 
It’s all about focusing on what you can impact on, what you can do insuring that you 
don’t over-stretch yourself. We reaffirm these values every year when we go away as 
a board and management team up to the Highlands for a couple of days. We review 
what we’ve done the previous year and assess whether we are sticking to those 
values of creating impact within the borough. We then establish a plan of action to 
make sure we’re all singing from the same hymn sheet and that there’s no confusion 
as to how socially driven we are.  
 
Board Trustee E explains how this process works on their away-days. When 
discussing the Board taking control of decision-making, she brought up one example 
when the Board decided to withdraw from the bidding process on a new sport facility. 
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The CEO did not agree with the decision but the Board displayed their authority and 
made the decision, as Board Trustee E outlines; 
 
There are healthy and long debate between us and the senior management. There 
are merits on both sides but actually it was the right decision to make if we were to 
fulfil our social objectives within Trafford 
 
LTO-B make it clear that it is crucial to achieve their social mission and ensure all 
senior management and the board of trustees understand how it will be achieved. To 
a similar extent, the Board Chairman outlines the potential consequences that may 
occur if they lose focus of their social mission; 
 
It doesn’t work (commercial focus). If you focus on finance, then that’s what you’ll 
get. You’ll get good financial results. We could have made a lot more money, a lot 
more money, on lots of things. We’re bound by what we are, a registered charity. 
Shifting our approach to be commercially driven would go against everything we 
stand for. We’re happy improving what we have for the sake of the stakeholders.  
 
Alike to the views of the Board Chairman, Board Trustee A provides an example of 
an opportunity they have not taken up in the past due to their core social objectives 
relating to sport provision in the borough; 
 
There’s schools that have facilities we could manage on their behalf. It’s not 
necessarily about making money, it’s about making the service better. We get asked 
almost monthly if we wish to take control of libraries and other things but we’re a 
leisure trust that is only really bothered about sport.  
 
As seen, respondents argue this social value creation approach in sport is vital if 
they are to maintain their social mission – delivering social value to their 
beneficiaries via increased participation and service improvement. However, it is 
acknowledged by respondents that this approach can cause conflict between the 
CEO and board. LTO-B try to avoid this conflict occurring through their annual away-
days. The board meetings observed suggested there was complete consensus 
across the board and the thoughts of the CEO were always at the forefront of 
discussions. Arguably, LTO-B avoid being on ‘a blurred frontier’ between the non-
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profit and for-profit sectors. This, as highlighted in the findings, is due to their 
reluctance to increase their commercial activities.  
 
However, this overt emphasis on social goals does not increase the risk of mission 
drift immediately but that excessive focus on social value creation and neglect of 
financial stability may cause problems in the future and divergence from their 
mission. They may reach a point whereby in order to survive as a viable 
organisation, they must alter their focus to their commercial activities to the detriment 
of their social mission. This is when mission drift may occur. However, the viewpoints 
of respondents suggest that they do not subscribe to the notion that notwithstanding 
their need to achieve social objectives, they should become commercially driven. 
The findings are in line with the view that surplus must be generated, but a balance 
must be struck. 
 
This balance is pursued through trading income and a reliance on financial support. 
By doing this, conceivably, they address the concerns often associated with the 
CLG-CS model in that they are not losing sight of their social mission because of a 
concerted effort to generate revenue. However, the neglect of a commercial focus is 
preventing LTO-B from generating a sustainable source of surplus, something of 
which is seen as an innovative means of achieving a social mission. Ultimately, the 
findings indicate LTO-B has pursued the creation of social value at the expense of 
commercial viability. The perception from the CEO is that although they are creating 
value for stakeholders in their small portfolio, moving forward they, and more 
importantly the board, need to be savvier when thinking about the financial stability; 
 
I concede on occasions we are quite idealistic about what we can achieve. I make no 
apologies for that. We are in difficult position at the minute financially. On reflection, 
we might have got some things wrong especially when it comes to increasing our 
trading income. As it stands, the removal of the grant support can’t be serviced by 
the trading income so we’ve got problems. There is a slight narrow-mindedness on 
the board when it comes to actually running a business. Just because we have 
charitable status shouldn’t mean we can’t, or won’t try, to develop a robust business 
for the future. Some trustees think money is just going to appear from nowhere. The 
professionalism of the board isn’t quite there and because they’re in control, there’s 
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not much I and the management team can do. I’ve made my feelings clear in the 
past but it fell on deaf ears. I just get on with what I’m paid to do and carry out the 
decisions of the board. Generally, we should be doing a bit of both. Things overtake 
it, so the market you existed in dictates the balance between social and financial 
goals. Sometimes we should make sacrifices in terms of the sport development plans 
we have in order to make financial savings in the short-term. 
 
The CEO emphasises that the decision to develop existing sport facilities or to look 
for new financially appealing opportunities can be dependent upon market 
conditions. It is apparent that the over-emphasis on financial goals does negate 
social impact from the CEO’s standpoint. Yet, other respondents within LTO-B 
believe that being solely focused on financial targets will not naturally produce social 
impact for communities within the borough. They focus purely on creating social 
value in the borough and not being attracted by potentially profitable opportunities 
elsewhere. One of the main reasons behind respondents having this stance is that 
they want to avoid the borough returning to the situation it was in before they existed. 
There was a significant private sector provider presence and they opted against 
promoting the schemes in the disadvantaged areas of the borough. The Finance 
Director postulates as to why LTO-B do not want the borough to return to those past-
times; 
 
Why would you have these private sport development schemes? It meant that 
instead of reinvesting £3 from a swim per person they would just pocket it. That’s the 
commercial mentality whereas we will promote it because we want those 
disadvantaged people to get active. Any profit we generate gets pumped straight 
back into the business. Normally it goes to improving service quality or helping 
reduce our price points to get more people playing sport. Back then, participation 
rates were falling through the floor and most of the facilities were in disrepair. They 
didn’t get any better when the (private) contractor took over.  
 
For LTO-B, maintaining sport provision in deprived areas is the key difference they 
desire to maintain over private contractors. They believe it would be socially 
irresponsible to focus on sport provision, where there are high profit margins, and 
forget access to sport in the deprived areas of the borough. This would be the easy 
option for LTO-B but it goes against the CLG-CS’s explicit socially driven ethos and 
 182 
their pursuit of developing sport provision resulting in improved participation 
numbers. Nevertheless, LTO-B must be capable of strategically deploying a 
combination of resources such as their social mission and commercial revenue in 
order to engage in markets while avoiding erosion of their social identity and 
reducing the risk of mission drift.  
 
LTO-B are struggling to do this as many respondents, barring the CEO, seem to be 
against increasing trading income whilst their grant funding is being removed. On the 
other hand, by restraining the pursuit of added commercial activities, LTO-B are not 
exposed to contradictions or potential inconsistencies that could harm the overall 
social purpose of their organisation and therein avoiding mission drift. Additionally, it 
is clear LTO-B are not inherently at risk of giving priority to their commercial 
activities. However, the Board Chairman presents a somewhat naïve statement 
which while clearly establishes their social identity it also makes it clear that 
commercial stability is not an overt concern; 
 
Our aims are simply to get more people active. The business element is a secondary 
concern.  
 
Comparable to the view of the Board Chairman, Board Trustee F reiterates this 
unblemished commitment to their social goals and oversight when it comes to 
securing financial stability; 
 
We need to concert our efforts on implementing the sport development programmes 
within the borough before we can start thinking about expansion and more 
commercial activities. We can’t get lost in our mission through chasing revenue all 
over the place.  
 
The approach for LTO-B is fervently socially focused. A contributing factor to this is 
that their board of trustees hold a firm social conscience. Further, to a slightly less 
extent, the senior management/CEO have a social conscience. From the perspective 
of respondents, all their senior staff and trustees live in different parts of the borough. 
They want to make sure that their community and the provision of sport facilities 
develop in what they state as ‘the best way’ (meaning local provision for local 
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people, governed by local people). The CEO defends this approach by pointing out; 
 
If you bring people in from outside the borough, then what affinity have they got with 
the borough? They need to live and breathe it. If they have a vested interest in what 
we go because it directly impacts them or people they know, then that is a key 
motivator that we want to encourage and embrace.  
 
The Head of Marketing and Sales emphasises that even if someone has not worked 
in the third sector previously, as long as you are from the borough, then that will 
stand you in good stead in being an employee of LTO-B; 
 
I previously worked in the private sector and was very much a commercially driven 
person. I was focusing on sales, on bottom line because my salary depended on 
that. I didn’t give a hoot about social responsibility. Now, whilst I still have all those 
skills, I’m focused on social responsibility. Being from a local town, I can see the 
direct impact our work is having in that area. Don’t get me wrong, salary is important 
but the satisfaction I get out doing this for the community trumps it every time.  
 
Although LTO-B are specifically focused on social goals, they do not underestimate 
the importance of possessing senior management with specific skills which 
contribute to commercial stability. The skillset and background of senior 
management LTO-B employ is not overlooked in their pursuit of social objectives.  
 
5.4.2. Traditional Stakeholder Models of Governance can facilitate Mission Drift  
 
The board is crucial in determining the social mission of LTO-B. Their board consists 
of unpaid voluntary trustees. Analysis of the composition of the board and the 
functions of the board of LTO-B leaves us with an interesting insight to approaches 
within LTO-B and the CLG-CS governance model. All the board members live in the 
borough. There are representatives namely from the borough council and members 
from local community interest groups. The Board Chairman provides some detail on 
the composition of the board; 
 
7 board members have been with us from the beginning, we only lost 2 recently in 
April who had been there from the beginning. So that’s 9 of the 12 who’ve been there 
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from the beginning. Overall, the retainment rate has been phenomenal for the people 
we want to keep. They all from across the borough to ensure each area is 
represented and not overlooked.  
 
Board Trustee B confirms this representative approach to their governance model 
but insists that even though there is a hole when it comes to skills and expertise on 
the board, the professional management team ensure decisions are well informed;  
 
We have experts across different areas of business but the priority is having key 
stakeholders on the board, people who represent the views of the beneficiaries of our 
services. This helps us arrive at informed decisions that are always in the interest of 
our stakeholders. We consult the CEO when needed particularly when certain 
expertise is required. Some of the representatives on the board are retired but they 
have had careers in certain functions that are extremely valuable. They bring their 
knowledge and experience with them.  
 
This approach is typical of representative governance models typified by volunteers 
and protection of assets to ensure societal value. From the perspective of the 
respondents, this stakeholder led model of governance puts the views of the LTO-B 
community at the forefront of their decision-making. However, although inclusive, 
there does not seem to be a detailed plan of action in relation to how different 
stakeholder groups are represented in their decision-making processes. Yet, the 
consensus from respondents is that this governance structure provides clarity in 
what and how the organisation achieves their social mission and that there is 
stakeholder engagement. The findings indicate that formal dialogue between the 
organisation and stakeholders does go beyond mere exchanges of different 
viewpoints. Further, the evidence arguably dismisses the views that stakeholder 
dialogue is often superficial, and they are unable to grasp the complexity of issues 
being discussed. Through observed meetings LTO-B ensure the stakeholder 
viewpoint is heard and integrated into decision making on a consistent basis. Board 
Trustee D underpins these points by explaining it and providing an example of the 
work they do; 
 
We are all giving up our time for this. There’s no remuneration involved. We are 
doing it for the sake of the community. All the trustees are in and about the 
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community on a daily basis. Most of us have are in constant conversations with 
people about how we can use sport to tackle social issues. We’ve developed a few 
sport development programmes over the last couple of years. There have been 
problems in the past with youth crime so we decided to develop an access to 
different sports programme whereby 16-20 year olds would come and get taster 
sessions from basketball to rugby. It was massively successful and now we run it 
annually.  
 
Board Trustee A offers an insight into how the board engage with their stakeholders 
to help inform their strategic decisions. She admits that although they actively 
engage with the community, there is still room for improvement and refinement of 
their engagement activities; 
 
We work with local community organisations to organise bi-monthly open meetings 
with the public. We hold two meetings, one in one area and the other in another 
town. The meetings are fairly productive and generally well attended. It gives us an 
idea of what the current challenges are within the community and how we can use 
sport to help tackle some of those issues. It’s fair to say we haven’t really kept up 
with the times when it comes to engaging with the community. We need to do more 
to use social media platforms like Twitter or Instagram to engage a younger 
generation of users. The participation trends tell us the younger generation are 
playing less sport more than ever before. This can have wider implications in terms 
of health issues in the future. If we can target and speak to this generation, we will 
have a better idea of how we can provide a service which they will use and hopefully 
knock those trends on its head.  
 
The casual link between stakeholder input and decision-making is clear to see within 
LTO-B. Yet it is unclear from the findings, and responses to relevant questions, as to 
how they ensure different stakeholder groups hold equal weight in terms of their 
input to decision-making. From their perspective, having consistent and valuable 
engagement with community stakeholders enables them to avoid the concerns that if 
stakeholder engagement is vague and limited then relations with these stakeholders 
can turn sour. The processes LTO-B currently have in place stops stakeholders from 
holding back from collaborating with them as they do not perceive it as being a waste 
of time. They argue that they ensure this by engaging with their stakeholders and 
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their viewpoints to a limited extent. This causes a problem in that by reducing 
stakeholder engagement to reduce the likelihood of friction with stakeholders they 
are in turn limiting stakeholder involvement which goes against their main line of 
argument for their governance. Perceivably, the stakeholders of LTO-B are able to 
provide a valuable but limited contribution to board decisions that will ultimately 
affect them and their neighbours. However, a concern for LTO-B is that they are 
trying to please a range of stakeholder groups within the borough rather than 
segment their focus. The CEO pays reference to this issue; 
 
We’re all about getting the view of the user-group. We need to know what they want. 
Having a number of people representing them on the board allows this discussion to 
take place. That being said, there is sometimes an impression amongst management 
that the board are trying to be all-things to all-people. There is a lack of pragmatism 
and a lack of awareness when it comes to the amount of resources required to 
implement all these promises made to the stakeholders. 
 
LTO-B try to cater for this issue by also recruiting a range of representatives with at 
least some business experience to the board of trustees. They also try to recruit 
trustees they feel can contribute to, or further their social mission. The board 
recruitment phase is thorough and makes sure each trustee is in line with their social 
mission. LTO-B have been prudent in ensuring that every trustee first of all has 
experience in the sports industry and can contribute in a specific area of need. 
Although, it is unclear as to how these board representatives actually represent 
certain stakeholder groups. Nevertheless, they argue this process helps LTO-B build 
their network within the borough and increase engagement with key stakeholders 
and ultimately ensure they benefit from the service LTO-B provide. This arguably 
helps address the tension of asset lock, which is associated with CLG-CS types. The 
Board Chairman highlights the importance of this process; 
 
It isn’t just about getting anyone to sit on the board and fill the spaces. The 
recruitment process of trustees is very thorough and rigorous. It has to be in order to 
maintain our social focus. We know we have got it right because the trustee turnover 
is very low. When they do move on, it is mainly due to time constraints and nothing to 
do with their performance as a trustee.   
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However, there has been conflict between the CEO/senior management and the 
board. This stems from the CEO lobbying for the removal of certain trustees due to a 
lack of contribution which is contrary to the view of the Board Chairman. Respect 
between the CEO and the board has been an issue at times. There was angst 
amongst senior management towards the then incumbent Chairman of the board. At 
the inception stage of LTO-B, the CEO believed the Chairman was unfit to run LTO-
B and raised their concerns to the whole board; 
 
A week before the Trust went live we told the council that the chairman of the Trust is 
not right person and it will fail if he’s in charge. It was the head of leisure from the 
council who chaired the board. The only reason the LTO-B existed was because of 
his incompetence when the facilities were under council control. He failed sport 
within the council so there was no way I was going to let him ruin sport through the 
Trust.  
 
The Community Development Manager also points out that there are still trustees 
who sit on the board to this day who are self-serving and do not have the social 
mission of LTO-B at the forefront of their thinking; 
 
We have some stakeholders on the board who just look after themselves. They don’t 
care about the success of the Trust, just their interest group. It sometimes comes 
across as a competition on the board of who can get what out of it. The lack of 
mutuality is staggering sometimes but that’s the problem with having a wide base of 
stakeholder representatives sitting on the board. 
 
From the perspective of respondents, LTO-B has a wide representation of 
stakeholder groups on the board of trustees. This is in line with the stakeholder view 
of social enterprise in which the key purpose is to guarantee that the board is both 
representative and adequately skilled to enable the social enterprise to maximise its 
social value to its targeted communities and stakeholders. However, there is a lack 
of transparency in relation to what stakeholder groups they represent. For LTO-B, 
these stakeholders are primarily anyone who wishes to participate in sport or 
physical exercise. Though, there is a lack of pragmatism in relation to utilising the 
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experience of certain trustees. This lack of focus on the skills available to them is 
hampered by their inclination to prioritise the stakeholder viewpoint. This stakeholder 
approach prevents LTO-B from reacting to political and economic challenges and 
restricts growth. Additionally, some observations from the board meetings suggest 
that Board Trustee D concentrated on addressing their own interests rather than 
those of the whole stakeholder base.  
 
The board of LTO-B perform a strategic and controlling role as observed in the board 
meetings. LTO-B’s social logic has shown to increase the risk of mission drift in the 
future, particularly in markets where political and economic challenges are highly 
prevalent. This purely social logic arguably quickens the process of potential mission 
drift. LTO-B overlook the potential to generate further surplus which would be 
valuable given their current standing because it comes with no strings attached. 
Increasing trading income could then be used to ensure they achieve their social 
mission – ‘getting people active’. Consequently, they are facing tensions not 
normally associated with CLG-CS types. The fervent commitment to producing social 
value is resulting in LTO-B facing tensions relating to satisfying levels of societal 
value due to being unable to adequately resource its creation. This is normally 
associated with solidarity types of social enterprise. However, the underpinning 
reason why this is the case is that are unable to satisfy levels of trading income. 
While the board of trustees exhibit a stakeholder model of governance, they are also 
controlling and monitoring the CEO. 
 
5.4.3. Internal Power Dynamics Determine the Focus on Social and Financial 
Objectives 
 
LTO-B consider the most crucial way to shape and form an effective governance 
team and achieve their social objectives is to develop personal trust between the 
team. From their perspective, once trust runs filters through senior management and 
the board of trustees it helps facilitate an open and honest environment of discussion 
around organisational issues and decision-making. However, although trust is 
emphasised by the respondents, there does not seem to be much trust between the 
CEO and board. The CEO, from his perspective, is in control of LTO-B and contrary 
to other respondents believes there is no reason to trust the board because they are 
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there on a voluntary basis; 
 
They think they’re in charge but in reality they are just there to be a sounding board. I 
run the Trust. They’re just there to put bums on seats. We can recommend 
something to them in a board paper and they always have to sign it off first. The 
process to be a minor checking boxes exercise. I can’t remember them suggesting 
something that we haven’t already thought of. 
 
For LTO-B, it is the responsibility of the CEO and senior management team to 
implement the strategy formulated by the board of trustees. It would appear from the 
findings that the board are rigid and constraining in their strategic direction. Board 
Trustee B and the Board Chairman respectively provide explain how this process 
works; 
 
The board work hand in hand with the CEO. We control what happens at 
management level but give the CEO free reign to a small extent. We need to be kept 
abreast weekly of everything that is happening so that can feed into our planning as 
a board. 
 
It is our responsibility to make sure management are doing their job, the staff are 
accountable to us as a board. We review the performance of the CEO annually to 
make sure he is operating within the directives given to him by us.  
 
Observations in a board meeting confirm a sense of conflict is occurring between the 
CEO and the board of trustees. The researcher noted; 
 
Trustee C raises concerns that there are signs of conflict between the board and 
CEO. He feels the CEO is not following the directives given to him by the board. The 
CEO responds by defending his performance but also reminds the board that they 
are volunteers and he is there on a daily basis and that he has to react to what is 
happening in front of him in the best interests of the Trust. The Board Chairman has 
stepped in to remind the CEO of his responsibilities. The CEO is visibly annoyed by 
the board’s comments but does not reply to the Board Chairman.   
 
Although there is a certain level of trust of the CEO by the board, the findings 
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suggest that the board does not wholeheartedly trust the CEO and are not very 
comfortable relying on information provided by management. Respondents from the 
board imply they use the CEO as a mechanism to implement the strategy they 
themselves form. Therefore, as outlined by respondents below, the board undertake 
high levels of monitoring of their CEO because more rigorous monitoring is deemed 
necessary. In the case of LTO-B, the CEO sits on the board and this enables the 
board to build a sense of trust but also actively monitor the CEO. This approach, 
according to trustees, guarantees key inside information through executive 
presence. The roles of the board trustees and the CEO are inter-dependent and the 
boundaries between the two are often necessarily somewhat blurred. However, the 
board trustees point out that there are no blurred lines in relation to what their and 
the CEO’s responsibilities are. 
 
The separation of roles between the CEO and board is clear from the trustee 
perspective. The board have less involvement with operational roles and more 
involvement with governance roles. LTO-B’s board focus predominantly on social 
mission, it appears they focus less on the income to support that mission as there is 
angst amongst management and the CEO regarding an oversight of the financial 
stability. The Head of Development explains this reservation;  
 
It’s annoying at times because we’re here on a day-to-day basis making things 
happen. We know what the community want so the board almost becomes 
redundant. They don’t seem to be aware of the difficulties we face in terms of 
balancing the books. Their thinking is up the sky sometimes. They will give us the 
spiel on what they want us to do but it is often unrealistic. Then we get criticised by 
the board when we can’t deliver what they want.  
 
It is clear the independent, predominantly voluntary board struggles to manage their 
commercial activities effectively and transparently. The CEO is actively trying to 
address the tension of satisfying levels of trading income within the Trust but the 
board are restraining his ability to do so. The Finance Director sums up the 
management’s feelings towards this issue; 
 
The problem is the board think from a purely social perspective. They forget 
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sometimes you need to be financially stable to operate and survive. Unless we’re in 
charge in think from a commercial point of view the Trust will fall apart. 
 
There is positive conflict amongst the LTO-B board over decision-making and 
consequently the ambition is there to avoid becoming a minimalist board. However, 
this perspective over separation of power is not shared by the CEO of LTO-B. As we 
know, power dynamics between boards and CEOs depends upon a variety of 
individual, organisational, and environmental factors such as external challenges, 
which in the case of LTO-B is chiefly the austerity measures put in place by 
government. The power dynamics are quite complex in that both the board and the 
CEO believe that they hold the power over decision making. The responses from the 
Board Chairman and the CEO respectively highlight this situation; 
 
We don’t give him total freedom, which would be reckless. We accept that we are 
volunteers and that they are the professionals. But it our responsibility to ensure 
we’re doing the right things and the CEO is doing what we tell him to do. The roles of 
the trustees and the CEO are clear. We make the strategy and grow the 
organisation, they are in charge of operational side of things. 
 
If I change something that’s my call, I don’t have to go back to them. If I promote 
somebody that is my decision, it’s not theirs. If I change the structure of pay that’s 
totally mine to manage. They give me the bottom line and that’s mine to manage 
accordingly.  
 
The removal of LTO-B’s annual grant is a predicament the CEO is ready for, yet the 
board dismiss this as a minor hurdle to overcome. The CEO sees the removal of the 
annual grant from as an opportunity to gain authentic power over decision-making. 
The importance of the CEO having an influence on the strategic decisions made by 
the board in order to encourage organisational stability is something the 
management are supportive of, but the board are resistant. These challenges appear 
be addressed with CEO control over decision-making. However, according to 
trustees, it is the board who are in formal control of decision-making. It can be 
assumed from the responses that there is a lack of power sharing between the 
trustees and the CEO. It is clear from senior management responses that there is a 
desire to have a CEO-dominated board in order to address financial pressures they 
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are facing. The emphasis LTO-B place on their social mission has been to the 
detriment of building a stable financial footing. This is arguably compounded by 
neglecting the pursuit of commercial opportunities combined with macro governance 
challenges, particularly a lack of financial support and being in an era of austerity.  
 
It was ostensible from the findings that the board of LTO-B hold control of the 
organisation but give the CEO some leeway in terms of control of day to day 
activities. However, the CEO and senior management insist power over decision-
making lies with the CEO. The findings also reveal that the roles of the CEO and 
board trustees are unclear and consequently produces conflict in relation to maintain 
their social focus and avoiding mission drift. The case of LTO-B suggests it is the 
CEO who desires to pursue commercial goals, but the rest of the board is preventing 
this due to the risk of mission drift. Consequently, there is a lack of balance with 
financial stability and the production of social value is therefore potentially hampered 
moving forward. The political challenge of having financial support removed may 
persuade LTO-B to become more commercially orientated in order to survive. 
However, the evidence suggest this is currently not occurring. Their hands are also 
tied due to the nature of limited access to finance within a CLG-CS.  
 
The findings also imply that the stringent control procedures laid down by trustees is 
proving counterproductive because they are not allowing the CEO to attain the 
objectives of the organisation through pro-actively addressing current commercial 
challenges. It is apparent the internal imbalance of power is playing an integral part 
in the likelihood of mission drift occurring in the future. This is due to competing 
logics between the board and CEO. The board are placing emphasis on asset lock, a 
tension associated with social business types whilst the CEO is trying to address the 
tension of satisfying levels of trading income which is also associated with CLG-CS 
types. Consequently, a lack of strategic foresight and conflict is apparent. By keeping 
a close eye on the activities of the CEO, the board is encouraging and implementing 
its own decisions which is consistent with charities. Although the CEO of LTO-B is in 
close contact with the board, it does not appear that he is being formally empowered 
to make decisions for the benefit of the financial stability of the organisation. 
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5.5. Findings Chapters Conclusion 
 
The analysis in chapter four (LTO-A) and five (LTO-B) reflects the governance 
processes involved in two types of social enterprise; LTO-A (BenCom) and LTO-B 
(CLG-CS). It has provided an in depth understanding of the two Leisure Trusts under 
investigation and provides a crucial insight into the governance challenges Leisure 
Trusts face at different stages and how it can contribute to our understanding of 
social enterprise in the context of sport provision. 
 
In the literature review chapter, the integration of governance theory helped analyse 
the financial and social objectives and the governance processes of the Leisure 
Trusts. We have found that LTO-B are significantly reliant on grant funding from the 
council and has a corresponding governance model which is in line with 
representative stakeholder ownership to an extent. It is apparent that both LTO-B 
and LTO-A exist and conduct their operations within an environment with distinct 
challenges. The political, economic factors, and competition make the objective of 
avoiding mission drift difficult to maintain within LTO-B. The challenges identified 
have a significant impact upon each type of social enterprise addressing tensions 
associated with them.  
 
Both LTO-B and LTO-A adopt very different approaches to try and evade issues of 
mission drift. The analysis has enabled the researcher to pinpoint key themes 
concerning the political environment, competition and governance processes and 
how this affects the occurrence of mission drift. Additionally, the evidence from the 
findings chapters also confirm the challenges both Leisure Trusts face in increasing 
revenue generation when grant funding from respective local authorities is being 
continuously decreased as a result of local spending cuts by central government 
austerity measures. Each type facilitates a different reaction to this problem. LTO-A 
can attract various sources of finance whereas LTO-B is severely restricted. The 
findings indicate that the adoption of certain governance models has an impact upon 
organisational stability in competitive markets, of which the provision of sport 
facilities is one. Particularly with the emergence of private sector contractors 
tendering for local authority contracts in both cases. In this instance, moving towards 
stewardship models of governance that are driven by commercial growth, 
 194 
exemplified by LTO-A’s social bond initiative and Managing Director control has 
opened up avenues that LTO-A exploit and LTO-B choose to avoid. 
 
The findings provide insight into how two very different types of social enterprise 
address governance challenges when facing financial adversity. As identified in the 
literature review, this is still a developing area of research and critical debate. The 
findings of this study indicate that the factors that determine both case study 
organisations’ governance models are multifaceted. The governance challenges, 
specifically relating to austerity measures, and the resulting governance processes 
put in place impact upon both organisations in contrasting ways. For instance, LTO-
B and their governance structure face restrictions in attracting certain types of 
finance in comparison to LTO-A with a more commercial orientation and an ability to 
access different sources of finance. As discussed in the findings, austerity measures 
put in place have either hindered or facilitated the pursuit of increasing their revenue 
streams.  
 
The evidence does suggest that the stakeholder model of governance remains 
appropriate in the third sector. The stakeholder approach still performs a crucial role 
in helping LTO-B achieve their social mission. Nevertheless, because of the 
increasing pressures to become more commercially orientated, there is a steady 
move from stakeholder models to more commercial focused models of governance 
e.g. stewardship. LTO-A has pursued this route. This mirrors the development of 
social enterprises in the UK as they react to challenges imposed by austerity, and 
alongside increased demand for their services. As discussed, LTO-B once secured 
grant funding from their council. However, although this funding enabled LTO-B to 
meet their social objectives, it is not sufficient enough to help maintain financial 
stability. The removal of grant support for LTO-B makes this even more difficult. Yet, 
it is representative of the third sector, in that grant funding is becoming restricted in 
the third sector due to austerity spending cuts imposed on local authorities. LTO-B’s 
resilient approach to their social mission arguably presents a dangerous hazard to 
them and other CLG-CSs who may be in a similar position. LTO-B are embracing a 
philanthropic approach and believe there is not an essential need to operate as an 
efficient pro-market business. However, the Conservative council assume LTO-B will 
be unaffected by withdrawal of grant support and that they will simply supplement 
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the gaps created as they operate in affluent areas of the borough.  
 
LTO-A on the other hand, embrace operating as a commercial business but insist 
their social mission is always a central focus. LTO-A believe by adopting a 
commercial approach they will grow organically which enables them to be prepared 
to tender for more sport facility contracts with local authorities. It is clear that LTO-A 
aim to develop and foster a healthy commercially focused business model in which 
the Managing Director holds control. This approach challenges conventional views 
on social enterprise which argue a commercial orientation should not be a central 
focus. The analysis on both organisations show us that social enterprises do have an 
interdependent connection with the commercial market. The next chapter discusses 





























This chapter incorporates and delves deeper into the key themes discussed in the 
findings chapters. The findings are analysed in relation to the review of literature in 
chapter two. This study had examined the challenges of different types of Leisure 
Trusts by investigating their governance in order to further our understanding of 
social enterprise and its role in sport provision. Specifically, the aim is to explore the 
relationship between a social enterprise’s governance and its ability to avoid mission 
drift within the sport provision context. The overall findings of the investigation show 
that there is a relationship between the governance approach each Leisure Trust 
adopts and how they manage the tensions between two competing logics; balancing 
social and financial objectives. This chapter will focus on establishing the specific 
contributions to knowledge from this study. The tensions applicable to both LTO-B 
and LTO-A are highlighted and explored. The findings suggest there is a specific 
connection between a social enterprise’s capacity to avoid mission drift, its legal 
identity, the impact of austerity measures and their subsequent governance model.  
 
The case study of LTO-A, which is a BenCom, demonstrates flexibility which permits 
them to benefit from social bond investments. The flexibility of the BenCom type 
presents LTO-A with opportunities to attract financial resources from a range of 
sources. The BenCom legal structure and governance processes of LTO-A 
encourages a rewarding partnership between the social enterprise and its 
stakeholders, thereby improving the level of surplus put into the communities they 
serve. This comes at a time when there is pressure to engage in creative methods of 
delivering public services in the UK (Civil Exchange, 2015; Corbett & Walker, 2013; 
Dommett, 2015; Smith & Jones, 2015). This is a noteworthy finding which opposes 
conventional views on social enterprises that preclude full blown commercial 
activities in the social enterprise sector (Harding, 2006). The evidence from LTO-A 
also supports Gallagher et al. (2012) who argue that the board and management of a 
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sport social enterprise should actively aim to maximise their revenue streams to 
ensure financial stability which can they be used to create social value. 
 
On the other hand, it is evident that LTO-B, which is a CLG-CS, is limited in terms of 
the forms of finance it can attract, chiefly grant funding. The evidence from the LTO-
B case study leads us to suggest that this reliance can potentially result in mission 
drift for LTO-B moving forward, and ultimately failure. Herranz et al. (2010), Young 
(2012) and Young & Kim (2015) share a similar viewpoint on other social enterprises 
with a CLG-CS identity. However, this study recognises that the CLG-CS legal 
structure does not always result in substandard financial performance, but permits 
LTO-B to take advantage of the limited forms of financial resources available. This 
clearly becomes a barrier to achieving social objectives and causes tensions to rise 
within the governance of LTO-B in relation to the duality of social and financial 
objectives. Battilana (2018), Maier et al. (2016) and Pache & Santos (2013) argue 
these tensions can result in mission drift. The CLG-CS structure still allows LTO-B to 
achieve their social objectives and places their full attention on the needs of their 
stakeholders. This approach is in line with the process Burchell and Cook (2008) and 
Mason (2010) describe as a democratic stakeholder approach to governance. 
 
The findings of this study allow us to understand how the type of legal structure 
influences how each type addresses associated tensions. This is an important 
contribution to knowledge this study presents. The importance is heightened given 
the lack of literature in this area (Bull, 2018). Bull (2018), Peattie and Morley (2008) 
and Bull and Ridley-Duff (2018) acknowledge that there is an inadequate level of 
critical debate in this area of social enterprise understanding. The discussion will 
now focus on the factors affecting LTO-B and LTO-A’s ability to address specific 
tensions associated with their organisational type.  
 
6.2. The Role of the Political Environment 
 
The findings from both case studies show that the prevailing political environment 
and policy approach to social enterprise can have a profound influence on the 
success of both Leisure Trusts. The challenges surround pressures from political 
ideology, austerity measures (spending cuts) and an increasingly competitive 
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market. Although this did impact LTO-A, it seems there has been a deeper and more 
profound impact on LTO-B. This is in part down to the position the host council had 
in relation to withdrawing financial support. Albrow (2012), Clifford et al. (2010), 
Hastings et al. (2012) and Slocock (2012) argue this removal of grant support 
signifies a shift towards private ownership of public assets. What was clear is the 
borough council (Conservative held) were actively reducing their financial support to 
address socio-economic deprivation in the borough, something of which Clifford et 
al. (2010), Hastings et al., (2012) and Lindsey and Bullock (2013) argue is becoming 
more common amongst Conservative held councils. It also provides an example to 
support the view of Widdop et al. (2018) who argue the Conservatives have used the 
austerity agenda as a lever for radically reducing state spending, reforming welfare 
and increasing the role of the private sector in public service provision in sport.  
  
The challenges associated with current political environment and access to financial 
support may encourage the avoidance of legal structures such as the CLG-CS. 
However, this movement would reduce the capability of communities participating in 
the running of such organisations. The evidence from the LTO-B cannot be 
generalised to all CLG-CS organisations but it does offer an insight to the reasons 
why such a social enterprise can lose sight of their organisational stability. The LTO-
B case study demonstrates that a CLG-CS legal status strengthens societal values 
within the organisation, something of which Bridge et al. (2009) and Doherty et al. 
(2014) strongly argue. However, as shown in the evidence provided, the reduction of 
financial support and political agenda of promoting privatisation may stop social 
enterprises setting up as a CLG-CS and persuade them to favour a CIC or BenCom 
legal identity. This is due to a wider range of financing options in these legal 
structures, something of which Doherty et al. (2009) points out.   
 
We can see that both case studies make use of a range of finance options to 
supplement/resource the production of social value. Chiefly, these include grants, 
membership fees, trading income, social bond investments and support from 
sporting bodies. The findings propose that grant funding is the most important 
income avenue for LTO-B. However, researchers such as Agafanow (2015), 
Ebrahim et al. (2014) and Wry and Zhao (2018) suggest that an overreliance on 
grant funding is restricting the growth and survival of social enterprises. The 
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evidence from LTO-B supports this argument. Findings from the literature review 
(Civil Exchange, 2015; Lindsey and Bullock, 2013; Smith, 2014) and the case study 
analysis show that the reduction of financial support available has not been 
supplemented by a drop in the needs of community stakeholders. The twofold 
challenge of no annual grant and the rising pressure to create social value are 
forcing social enterprises to formulate pro-active approaches to achieve financial 
stability, something of which the CLG-CS structure investigated in this study is 
inhibiting.  
 
The findings lead us to assert that financial support for both Leisure Trusts is no 
longer safeguarded by government support. This general development has been 
anticipated by Dommett (2015). This means LTO-A and LTO-B must survey and 
pursue particular courses of action to secure capital resources and compete with 
other social enterprises and private sector organisations in the sport provision 
market. Clifford et al. (2010) argues this is a source of many social enterprises 
failing. LTO-A has pro-actively addressed this by issuing social bonds and increasing 
their trading activity. In the current policy environment of austerity cuts, the findings 
on this within LTO-A are in line with the claims made by Gilmore et al (2011) and 
Cohen and Welty-Peachey (2015) who found that the role of the CEO in social 
enterprise needs to be professionalised in order for the social enterprise to pro-
actively plan for contextual challenges they will face. The findings from LTO-A 
provide evidence that the CEO is using their expertise to develop a sustainable 
business model which can resource the creation of social value in a turbulent 
political environment. The CEO takes a leading role within LTO-A and is empowered 
by the board to grow the social enterprise and achieve their social objectives. This 
contradicts Griffiths and Armour (2014) who claim there is a responsibility for 
everyone within the social enterprise to take a leading role in decision-making.  
 
The evidence from LTO-A lead us to assert that they are self-sustainable through 
embracing a commercial orientation in their day to day activities in order to secure 
public service contracts. Barraket and Archer (2009), Grant Thorton (2014) and 
Munoz (2009) state that unless this is done it will increase the prevalence of private 
sector provision and social enterprise failure. Yet, the evidence tells us it is slightly 
duplicitous of the local authority, and central government to impart continuous 
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encouragement and verbal support (Gamble, 2015; Teasdale et al., 2012, UK 
Coalition Government, 2010) to social enterprise whilst limiting financial support and 
encouraging privatisation. This development is further evidence that supports the 
notion we are returning to a policy of Thatcherism and a policy of spending cuts in 
the public sector to create opportunities for privatisation (Albrow, 2012; Corbett & 
Walker, 2013). Lindsey and Bulloch (2013) found that the central ethos of the 
austerity agenda is to expect civil society to ‘pick up the pieces’ (Lindsey & Bulloch, 
2013:113) in deprived areas. The findings from LTO-B do not support these claims 
regarding the role of social enterprise being mobilized in deprived areas. The 
findings suggest, contrary to the views of Lindsey and Bulloch (2013), that the 
austerity agenda is actually increasing the likelihood of private contractors picking up 
the pieces in deprived areas. Albeit, this is only evidence from one region.  
 
The current political environment of central austerity-based spending cuts is 
providing LTO-A with a foundation to flourish. With their commercial focus and 
resulting surplus generation, they are able to compete against private sector 
providers when public sport and leisure facilities are to put to tender. Barraket and 
Archer (2009) and Munoz (2009) argue this ability to demonstrate solid financial 
performance is crucial for social enterprises to compete in a tendering process. The 
findings contradict the view of Teasdale et al. (2012) in that social value creation is 
an integral criterion for council commissioners. The analysis suggests that an 
organisation with a CLG-CS legal status can encounter problems in developing 
sustainable business models. Hence, this reliance on grant funding can lead to 
severe reductions in LTO-B’s income. They are unwilling and unable to take 
advantage of commercial opportunities. It demonstrates an apathetic approach to 
building a sustainable organisation, which is illustrated by the views of its board of 
trustees. To this end, it is clear social enterprises need to adapt to these political 
challenges and policy development in order to survive as businesses. The CLG-CS 
legal status restricts its adaptability to address these external political and economic 
challenges. Whereas, the BenCom structure provides the flexibility required to cater 
for political and economic difficulties. 
 
Understanding the contextual variables that enable us to understand the use of 
social enterprise in sport provision is something which is lacking (Chew, 2010). Both 
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case studies in this study contribute to this gap in knowledge and adds to the debate 
within this area of study. For instance, it was assumed by Gallagher et al. (2012) that 
this era of austerity provides a perfect opportunity for social enterprise to take a 
leading role in sport provision. Evidence from both case studies suggest this is not 
always the case. Instead, the findings suggest that Misener and Misener’s (2017) 
claims sport provision is following an upwards trend of privatisation is partly true. 
Findings from LTO-A provide evidence to explain how social enterprises can combat 
this challenge in sport provision. For example, the push towards the use of SROI 
reports is enabling LTO-A to compete with private sector contractors. This, 
accompanied by a strategy of growth and revenue generation, displays a willingness 
for the social enterprise to become more commercialised. This approach is 
supported by other studies (Coates et al., 2014; Wicker et al., 2013) who argue that 
sport social enterprises require a strong business-led model in order to reduce fears 
about their financial stability and allow them to compete with private sector providers 
whilst maintaining their social focus. However, LTO-A, as evidenced do suffer from 
diluting the social value they can create as they continue to grow. This is something 
Findlay-King et al. (2018) and Wicker et al. (2013) suggested would be an auxiliary 
concern when sport social enterprises pursue commercial growth. 
 
6.3. Theoretical Implications of Austerity on Types of Social Enterprise 
 
In the literature review chapter one of the most useful insights provided on both 
types of social enterprises examined in this study was offered by Bull (2018) (figure 
6.1.). In this analysis, this is revisited and adopted as a framework to understand the 
social enterprise case studies in this research and understand the implications of 
their associated characteristics and tensions. We have previously established that 
our understanding of social enterprise is too vague when considering the various 
organisational forms social enterprise can take (Bull, 2018; & Bull & Ridley-Duff, 
2018; Mason, 2010; Peattie & Morley, 2008; Vickers, 2010). Bull (2018) provided a 
categorisation of social enterprise by identifying three specific types, and how 
particular legal structures are positioned within these three types. For instance, Bull 
(2018) positions a BenCom at a boundary between a ‘trading charitable type’ and a 
‘solidarity type’ whereas a CLG-CS is situated between a ‘trading charitable type’ 
and a ‘social business type’. Although Bull (2018) acknowledges there are 
 202 
organisations (BenCom/CLG-CS) that can span across the three core types, there is 
still limited knowledge of the contributing factors influencing this potential crossover. 
Studying LTO-A and LTO-B allows us to establish how and why these transitions are 
not static. The influence of the political environment upon the transition of both LTO-
A and LTO-B is evident. 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Bull (2018:18) 3 Different Types of Social Enterprise in the UK 
 
The evidence shows us that LTO-A (BenCom) is shifting away from a trading charity 
type towards a bona fide solidarity type. A main cause of this transition is the current 
policy on social enterprise development and austerity spending cuts. LTO-A has pro-
actively addressed the tough political conditions of little or no financial support for 
social enterprise and encouraging the use of the private sector in public service 
provision (Dommett, 2015; Slocock, 2012; Widdop et al., 2018). This policy pressure 
has forced LTO-A to address the tension of satisfying levels of trading income, 
typically associated with trading charity types (Bull, 2018). Firstly, in order to 
persuade council commissioners they are a viable option in the tendering process, 
they must exhibit a proven track record of delivering financial value on managed 
facilities. LTO-A achieve this through communication with local councils and a 
consideration of embracing SROI reports. Secondly, LTO-A assert the austerity 
agenda is simply political rhetoric which holds little sway in the third sector. This 
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foresight enables LTO-A to act promptly and begin a growth approach to their 
operations, thus the pressure on satisfying trading income tensions is reduced. 
Thirdly, building upon the previous point, LTO-A target their growth within socially 
and economically diverse areas of the UK. Their rationale is based on being able to 
augment their surplus generation within affluent areas. 
 
Consequently, they ease their reliance on financial support by increasing their 
trading income. This causes a distinct shift away from being positioned as a trading 
charity type towards being a bona-fide solidarity type. However, this approach by 
LTO-A raises concerns surrounding their capability to tackle challenges in areas of 
deprivation within the UK, something of which Lindsey and Bullock (2013) argue is a 
problem for larger social enterprises. Local authorities in deprived areas are already 
facing the highest spending cuts by UK government (Clifford et al., 2010; Hastings et 
al., 2015) and by shifting their attention to affluent areas. Consequently, although 
LTO-A have transitioned towards a solidarity type they are confronting its associated 
tension of satisfying the creation of social value within society. Nevertheless, LTO-A 
affirm this tension is implicitly managed by their pursuit of commercial growth. They 
proclaim they have the ability to be commercially savvy and use the additional 
surplus to implement social value in the communities which need it. This approach, 
although pragmatic, is hampered by their difficulties in measuring social value, 
highlighted through the findings. Therefore, they are not effectively managing the 
tension of satisfying societal social value beyond their directors or members, 
particularly community stakeholders. 
 
On the other hand, we can establish LTO-B lies in a position between a trading 
charity type and a social business type. The case study analysis of a LTO-B shows 
us the political environment has had a glaring impact upon the identity of LTO-B and 
how it is perceived amongst its stakeholders. They have been resolute in their 
approach to the tumultuous policy approach of austerity. However, it is clear LTO-B 
has significant difficulties in tackling the tension of satisfying levels of trading income 
and becoming totally reliant on grant income. These difficulties are associated with a 
trading charity type (Bull, 2018). Firstly, the decision by the Conservative controlled 
borough council to eliminate grant funding (immediately) has significantly raised the 
tensions on increasing trading income. However, this is not committed to because of 
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the board’s approach to asset consolidation rather than organisational growth. LTO-
B assume the Conservative modernisation strategy in relation to the state was based 
on a commitment to core welfare provision, but with a greater role and support for 
social enterprise as a consequence of austerity. That being said, the opposite has 
occurred and the evidence leads us to infer that the austerity agenda offers evidence 
to the claim that it is a return to a policy of funding cuts in the public sector to create 
opportunities for privatisation, as argued by Clifford et al. (2010), Corbett and Walker 
(2013) and Hastings et al. (2015). This has a detrimental impact upon LTO-B to 
sustain their operations due to minimal trading activity and an over-reliance on grant 
funding. 
 
Secondly, as a consequence of the above, competition from private sector providers 
(and other social enterprises) is reducing the opportunities to ease the tension of 
trading income. Evidence from LTO-B shows us the local council is placing emphasis 
on financial value rather social value when outsourcing public services. 
Consequently, this restricts the ability of LTO-B to grow and increase their trading 
income due to the preference of organisations with an established track record of 
producing financial value. Barraket and Archer (2008) and Munoz (2009) argue this 
is becoming a common occurrence in the outsourcing of public services. Thirdly, the 
core focus of LTO-B on creating social value within deprived areas of the borough is 
hindering their ability to increase trading income. By taking into account these factors 
we can see the policy approach to social enterprise means there is a transition of 
LTO-B fervently moving towards becoming an undeniable trading charity type. 
However, this shift raises major concerns surrounding a CLG-CS’s ability to address 
to shortfall of financial support whilst maintaining minimal trading income. Thus, 
LTO-B may struggle to avoid mission drift moving forward.  
 
This study’s findings indicate that government policy on the third sector is playing a 
pivotal role in the development of social enterprise types, as explored in both case 
studies. The political factors discussed in this section also have a particular impact 
upon our understanding of specific types of social enterprise and their involvement in 
sport provision. We have managed to get underneath the umbrella of social 
enterprise and examine the political factors influencing our understanding of a 
BenCom and a CLG-CS. Given the fact certain austerity measures have been 
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implemented across all local authorities in the form of spending cuts, the challenges 
and consequences highlighted in LTO-A and LTO-B will be duplicated in other social 
enterprises nationwide to a certain degree. The next section critiques the analysis of 
the impact of the governance of LTO-A and LTO-B in respect to the development 
and our understanding of social enterprise in the context of sport provision.  
 
6.4. The role of Governance in LTO-A and LTO-B 
 
The case study analysis has shown the boards of both LTO-A and LTO-B are 
accountable for ensuring the their organisation strives to achieve their social mission. 
However, the degree to which this is enforced varies significantly. The analysis 
discussed the impact of contrasting governance models of upon each type of social 
enterprise. Overall, the discussion surrounding the roles and functions of the board 
and CEO/Managing Director tells us that the adopted governance approach is based 
on and informed by their mission, legal structure and contextual variables affecting 
both organisations. Therefore, the legal structure influencing the adoption of a 
specific governance model enables or inhibits each Leisure Trust’s ability to work 
towards their social mission. 
 
The analysis of LTO-B’s and LTO-A’s governance processes show that internal 
dynamics, a neglect of a commercial focus and traditional stakeholder models of 
governance promote the possibility of mission drift and contribute to our 
understanding of both types of Leisure Trust. The dependence on financial support 
and social focus demonstrated by LTO-B means that the interest in additional trading 
income avenues was not of significant relevance. Battilana et al. (2017) and Mason 
(2010) asserted this social focus can result in disregarding commercial opportunities. 
For LTO-B, their social mission is influenced by their CLG-CS identity. The CLG-CS 
form enables LTO-B to achieve their social objectives in the short term but this 
preference is resulting in considerable tensions with generating trading income, a 
common characteristic of CLG-CS types. 
 
The governance processes of both organisations enable them to actively serve their 
community stakeholders. This is ostensible in their governance which encourages 
stakeholder involvement from these communities, more so in LTO-B. This mirrors 
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the nature of stakeholder involvement outlined by Burchell and Cook (2008) and 
Steane (2001). LTO-B has a controlling ‘democratic board’, as labelled by Murray et 
al. (1992), with a core focus on social value. However, the voluntary board of 
trustees are unable to manage their commercial activities pro-actively and 
transparently. Spear et al. (2009) note this is a possibility for independent voluntary 
boards. The case study findings reveal that LTO-B is governed by a voluntary board 
at strategic, and operational level in terms of control of the CEO. The role of the 
trustees in LTO-B is purely to cater for the needs of their stakeholder base and 
manage community assets and resources on their behalf. This is conducted within a 
stakeholder model of governance in that the trustees are representatives of the 
community. However, as noted in the findings, who and how they represent certain 
stakeholder groups is unclear. It is also evident that the governance model of LTO-B 
does present a picture of roles of the trustees and CEO being ambiguous. From the 
board’s perspective, they control the organisation’s CEO but the findings suggest 
there is confusion from the CEO’s perspective in terms of who holds formal power 
over decision-making.  
 
The decision-making dynamics within LTO-B exacerbates its functionality and ability 
to address competing logics of social and financial objectives. The board trustees, 
and Board Chairman wield considerable power and control over the CEO. The result 
of this has been the manifestation of what McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) label a 
‘minimalist board’ whereby the organisation is run wholly by the board, and what 
Murray et al. (1992) also label a ‘chair-dominated board’. The lack of role separation 
between the board and CEO roles in LTO-B is potentially compromising their 
survival. Mordaunt and Cornforth (2004) and Reid and Turbide (2014) argue this 
dynamic can cause and is caused by organisational crises, in the case of LTO-B the 
removal of financial support and austerity spending cuts, which Garrow and 
Hasenfled (2012) and York et al. (2016) claim is a cause of mission drift. This is a 
challenge which the CEO acknowledged but the trustees and Board Chairman 
dismissed. Although the CLG-CS structure enables LTO-B to adopt this approach, it 
raises future issues regarding their ability to achieve their social mission due to 
overlooking financial stability, which is in line with the findings of Battilana et al. 
(2017) and Walker and Dorsey (2012). This can be one of the critical reasons for the 
failure of governance in social enterprises (Low, 2006) and subsequent mission drift 
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(Agafanow, 2015; Garrow & Hasenfeld, 2012; Wry & Zhao, 2018). 
 
This study reveals that the trustees of LTO-B lack the capacity and readiness 
required for them to grow within competitive markets, something of which Teasdale 
and Buckingham (2013) make clear must be avoided in order to engage in markets 
and survive as a social enterprise. LTO-B exhibit a clear reluctance to utilise the 
skills of its CEO to address governance challenges highlighted in this study. The 
CEO of LTO-B is unable to instill a business culture in the organisation, which Caers 
et al. (2006), Pache and Santos (2013) and Roberts et al. (2005) point out can affect 
the achievement of social objectives. There has been an averseness of LTO-B to 
take advantage of the expertise of the CEO through boundary spanning (Muth & 
Donaldson, 1998), a key feature of a stewardship approach to governance. 
 
The evidence from LTO-B and LTO-A highlight the importance of recruiting board 
members for a Leisure Trust. However, the way in which each Leisure Trust 
approaches this process is different. LTO-B recruit board trustees on their ability to 
be truly representative of the community stakeholders they serve. They focus on 
their board trustee holding a clear social conscience in order to maintain their efforts 
on their social mission and avoid mission drift. On the other hand, the findings from 
LTO-A tell us that they tend to recruit board members who hold knowledge and/or 
expertise in a certain function of the organisation. This approach from LTO-A is in 
line with arguments made by Olson (2000) and García-Meca and Palacio (2018) who 
claim that board members with extensive professional backgrounds strengthen the 
board’s ability to offer advice to senior management It also supports the view that 
recruiting board members with appropriate skills, experiences and expertise is 
important for organisational decision-making (Spear et al., 2009). However, some of 
the responses from the Managing Director in LTO-A suggest that he does not utilise 
the skills and expertise of board members sufficiently enough. This is due to his 
sense of autonomy and ownership over the LTO-A’s future growth.  
 
The governance processes of LTO-A are evidently different from LTO-B. The role of 
the LTO-A board is limited to a discussion forum and a sounding board for the 
Managing Director. The Managing Director acts as the CEO and is provided with the 
independence to make important decisions and become the steward of the social 
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enterprise. Their CEO chairs board meetings and the board recognise and respect 
his expertise. The evidence tells us there is an absence of conflict between board 
members and the Managing Director. This is a fundamental principle of the 
stewardship governance (Muth & Donaldson, 1998; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; 
Puyvelde et al., 2011).  The findings present evidence to contradict the findings of 
Bruneel et al. (2018) and Schillemans and Bovens (2019) who argue the stakeholder 
model of governance is the most beneficial model for third sector organisations. The 
CEO takes a formal leadership role over strategic planning and uses the board 
members as a sounding board for ideas. The board are evidently content with 
transferring control to the CEO because they hold high levels of trust in his ability to 
deliver on their social mission.  
 
Clearly, LTO-A has a governance model that empowers the CEO. This feature of the 
stewardship approach is a recent course of action social enterprises are considering 
(Cornforth & Macmillan, 2016; Reid & Turbide, 2014). The governance model 
reflects their willingness to address current economic and political challenges facing 
them, and the third sector. Garrow and Hassenfeld (2012) argue this steward-led 
governance model is crucial because of the voluntary nature of social enterprise 
boards. Adopting a stewardship approach infers an understanding of the 
weaknesses of stakeholder governance accompanied by an inclination to take 
calculated risks in order to resource social value creation. For LTO-B, it is evident 
that their governance model corresponds with the philanthropic ideology 
underpinning the concept of social enterprise (Bruneel et al., 2018; Schillemans & 
Bovens, 2019). 
 
6.5. Theoretical Implications of Governance Processes on Types of Social 
Enterprise 
 
We have previously discussed the role of the political environment upon our 
understanding of social enterprise. Building upon this, we have found that the 
governance models and processes within a BenCom and CLG-CS can contribute to 
our understanding of social enterprise in the UK (Doherty et al., 2014). It is 
understood that governance models of social enterprises should be designed not 
only to manage commercial activities efficiently and effectively, but also to maintain 
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relations with its core stakeholders to create social value (Vidal, 2014). It has also 
been argued that social enterprises need to be more pragmatic in the governance 
model adopted due to competing logics (Laville et al., 2015; Doherty et al., 2014) 
and institutional challenges such as political social policy (Alcock, 2010; Sepulveda, 
2015; Sepulveda et al., 2013). Consequently, this literature along with the research 
findings tell us the governance models of both Leisure Trusts play a pivotal role in 
managing the tensions within trading charity types, social business types and 
solidarity types (Bull, 2018; Bull & Ridley-Duff, 2018). 
 
Firstly, the evidence shows us that the LTO-A (BenCom) is demonstrating 
characteristics associated with a solidarity type of social enterprise. The governance 
model and processes within LTO-A is a main cause of this association with a 
solidarity type. Firstly, the analysis showed us LTO-A maintain a strong desire to 
achieve commercial objectives. Although they acknowledged, what Austin et al. 
(2006) allude to, that the commercial and social dimension within the enterprise 
creates a source of tension indefinitely they continue to pursue a surplus generating 
orientation. LTO-A is endeavouring to balance its pursuit of commercial objectives 
with an unambiguous social mission. As Agafanow (2015) argues, surplus must be 
generated but a balance must be struck. LTO-A aim to balance the duality of mission 
by focusing on their organisational values and social mission. Battilana et al. (2017) 
and Dacin et al. (2011) claim this emphasis on these values help social enterprises 
balance the potential tension between commercial and social goals.  
 
However, the analysis tells us although they have addressed the tension of satisfying 
trading income tensions (trading charity type), they are beginning to encounter 
tensions surrounding the production of social value (solidarity type). This is due to 
the hurried growth of the organisation and the potential dilution of the social value 
they can create. The capability of LTO-A to instill its social ethos upon new facilities 
and staff in an instant manner can be questioned. Therefore, albeit for different 
reasons, there is potential for LTO-A to encounter mission drift moving forward. 
 
Secondly, the decision-making dynamics between the CEO and the board in LTO-A 
harbour little or no conflict in decision-making and the current or future direction of 
the organisation. The development of trust and transparency between both parties 
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has facilitated the achievement of their aims. Power over decision-making is 
imparted to the Managing Director and it has been argued that this power and 
resulting commercial orientation aids the balancing of competing social and financial 
tensions (Ebrahim, 2010). Consequently, trading income tensions are addressed 
through the pursuit of commercial opportunities by the Managing Director. However, 
the tension of satisfying levels of social value creation associated with solidarity 
types is occurring because, as Kreps and Monin (2011) argue, boards that do not 
scrutinise commercial activities run the risk of losing sight of their social mission. The 
findings also suggest that although LTO-A’s board structure encourages member 
participation, giving power to the Managing Director has restricted the role of 
members in decision-making. Particularly, issues relating surplus allocation and 
future opportunities. This may cause subsequent issues pertaining to their focus on 
their social mission.  
 
Thirdly, through the decision-making dynamics observed, we can see that LTO-A 
adopts a stewardship model of governance. They believe that traditional stakeholder 
models of governance are redundant in today’s environment. The roles of the board 
of directors are clearly outlined and there is significant employee representation on 
the board which is associated with solidarity types of social enterprise (Bull, 2018). 
Although this approach to governance is a pragmatic reaction to the political and 
economic environment, it is unclear how this, combined with continued growth will 
balance the tensions between trading income and creating social value. LTO-A are 
demonstrating characteristics associated with solidarity types (Bull, 2018) and are 
addressing the tension of creating social value by increasing trading income to 
resource their social objectives. In the short term, LTO-A see this as a reasonable 
trade-off. 
 
As established previously, LTO-B lies in a position between a trading charity type 
and a social business type (Bull, 2018). The case study analysis of LTO-B (CLG-CS) 
reveals its governance is having a detrimental impact upon its avoidance of mission 
drift and ultimately, survival. Additionally, it provides us with further reasoning as to 
how governance processes determine our understanding of a CLG-CS and its role in 
sport provision. It is clear from the evidence that LTO-B are demonstrating tensions 
associated with trading charitable types. Specifically, satisfying tensions in relation to 
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levels of trading income. Firstly, their neglect of a commercial focus and an 
unwavering core focus on social value production restricts their surplus generation, 
something of which Defourney and Nyssens (2012) argue is crucial for social 
enterprise survival. Therefore, trading income remains limited, which is a concern for 
trading charitable types. This characterisation of a CLG-CS is reinforced by the 
organisations preference for asset lock/consolidation and disseminating surplus 
generated back into the community. Thus, this reduces the tension associated with 
social business types. 
 
The internal decision-making dynamics of LTO-B present further insight into how 
tensions associated with trading charity types and social business types are 
managed. The voluntary board of trustees exert unmitigated control of decision 
making, and their CEO. This has led to internal conflict as the CEO’s skillset is not 
being utilised and the board is not reacting to external pressures. The inability to 
react to funding reductions lies at the root of the problem for LTO-B. Becoming 
excessively focused on asset lock demonstrates characteristics of a trading charity 
type but at the same time curtails their ability and willingness to address the tension 
of minimal trading income. To this end, it is clear both LTO-B and LTO-A are 
encountering tensions between social and financial goals to varying degrees. As a 
result, there is a risk of mission drift. This is critiqued further below. 
 
6.6. Managing Competing Tensions within LTO-A and LTO-B 
 
The influence of mission has a direct impact on the achievement of social and 
financial objectives within a social enterprise (Battilana, 2018; Agafanow, 2015; 
Harmer et al., 2013; Young & Kim, 2015). From the evidence, it is LTO-A which 
pursues a predominantly commercial path. They intend to manage the tension 
between commercial and social tensions by actively pursuing surplus generation to 
resource the social value they create. This approach to avoid mission drift is 
supported by Ebrahim et al. (2014) and Renz and Andersson (2014). This approach 
has allowed LTO-A to take advantage of various sport and leisure contracts 
throughout the UK. This demonstrates a willingness to develop a sustainable 
business model underpinned by a proactive approach to surplus generation. 
Although LTO-A embrace their social mission, their mission is serviced by a focus on 
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surplus generation. This is evidenced by them bidding for sport facility contracts in 
regions outside of their home borough. However, the findings have shown us that as 
LTO-A continue to expand there is a clear risk of mission drift due to resource 
dilution and a focus on generating surplus. Sabeti (2011) and Battilana et al. (2017) 
point out this expansion strategy and potential mission drift threatens a social 
enterprise’s very raison d’etre; they will fail to deliver social value to their 
beneficiaries. 
 
On the other hand, LTO-B has a more philanthropic outlook which allows them to 
primarily satisfy levels of societal value expected by their stakeholders. LTO-B has 
been financially supported for a chief aim of improving sport provision and they do 
not show any willingness to pursue substantial trading activities to generate revenue 
and grow their organisation. This has left them in a precarious financial position. The 
strong focus on social objectives has caused a certain degree of friction between 
social and financial goals due to being dependent entirely on the availability of grant 
funding to supplement their trading income. Dacin et al. (2010), Garrow and 
Hasenfeld (2012) and Smith et al. (2010) note this reliance on grant funding will 
ultimately cause mission drift. This, as the findings suggest, is due to the board’s 
unwillingness to acknowledge the competitive market of sport provision which has 
been heightened by austerity measures. This is accompanied by an insular view of 
focusing on what they currently manage and the threat other Leisure Trusts and 
private sector organisations pose for their future stability. It is clear the board, 
through restraining the role of the CEO has been reactive rather than pro-active in 
the strategic thinking. For instance, the board did not foresee the removal of their 
annual grant of £1.7m even though the political environment they currently operate 
within suggests such an event could occur.  
 
LTO-B’s CLG-CS legal structure is unlikely to help them in increasing sources of 
financial income and avoid mission drift. The dependence on grants has stifled 
creativity and innovation. This highlights general problems associated with legal 
structures by social ownership. As Smallbone et al. (2001) and Bridge et al. (2009) 
suggest, the CLG-CS structure severely limits a social enterprise’s capacity to 
secure substantial levels of trading income or to bid for large public service 
contracts. The CLG-CS status, as Bridge et al. (2009) argue, acts as a barrier to 
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attracting equity finance, a vital financial alternative for organisations operating in 
competitive markets, of which sport is one. Yet, while the CLG-CS structure enables 
LTO-B to work towards their social mission, it is not advantageous in terms of 
achieving their financial objectives. LTO-B’s strong socially driven mission arguably 
presents a moral hazard. They are pursuing a social orientation and feel that they do 
not need to embrace a commercially focused approach. Notwithstanding their 
unwillingness to embrace further trading opportunities, the CLG-CS legal status 
helps them build avenues for channeling funding and support to communities and 
address sport inclusion issues. 
 
Conversely, the analysis of LTO-A tells us that by embracing a BenCom legal 
structure it intends to arrive at a balanced business model. LTO-A issue social 
bonds, which helped generate significant amounts in additional capital, resources the 
creation of social value, specifically improving the quality and quantity of sport 
provision. Implementing this approach provides chances to increase their surplus 
and consequently strengthen their social mission. The evidence from LTO-A 
demonstrates that they have a symbiotic relationship with the market, thus agreeing 
with the views of Teasdale and Buckingham (2013). Consequently, LTO-A have not 
outright precluded and disregarded the approach of for-profit organisations and their 
focus on commercial objectives. Nevertheless, the pursuit of organisational growth 
necessitates prudence. It has been found in current literature that social enterprises 
who embrace and focus on a commercial approach do not always succeed. Dacin et 
al. (2010) observed that most social enterprises battle to sustain their operations 
whilst maintaining focus on their social mission. We can see this in the dangers 
associated with the commercialisation of LTO-A which have been discussed, 
particularly the pursuit of growth and resulting in potential dilution of their social 
impact. Moving forward, LTO-A do risk compromising their reputation due to its 
difficulty in conveying to the consumer and local councils who they and what they 
can do, from a social value perspective, and therein encounter mission drift. 
 
LTO-A face these challenges in balancing tensions while pursuing a policy of growth. 
The findings help build upon the work of Young (2012) who points out it may be 
difficult for social enterprises to give equal weight to social and economic objectives 
and achieve a stable balance between both. However, Young (2012) fails to explain 
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how this tension is managed. This case study of LTO-A addresses this knowledge 
gap by identifying a stewardship approach and BenCom legal structure as being 
beneficial for avoiding mission drift in the contemporary political and economic 
environment. The characteristics of varying social enterprises may be different but 
the essence of how the competing logics of social and financial tensions can occur, 
and how it can be managed still applies to other social enterprises. From the 
evidence, LTO-A is less likely to experience mission drift than LTO-B. LTO-A has not 
experienced mission drift since the achievement of their social mission is based on 
generating surplus to resource the production of social value. Nevertheless, LTO-A 
are likely to experience a perceived mission drift. To expand, there may be 
accusations of mission drift from external stakeholders who do not clearly 
understand the decision-making of LTO-A. Yet, the findings reveal that the 
commercial focus of the Managing Director and board members help combat 
mission drift by providing the financial resources necessary to implement social 
value and improve their sport provision. Pache and Santos (2013) argue that this 
approach is helping social enterprises deal with perceived mission drift. 
 
In the future, LTO-A may not be aware of mission drift occurring due to their 
pragmatic approach. For example, as they increase focus on stabilising a new facility 
financially, the amount of social value being created may become diluted. It can be 
contended that LTO-A may find themselves, on what Emerson (2006) labels ‘blurred 
frontiers’, where they are located on a frontier between the non-profit and the for-
profit sectors. This can increase the risk of mission drift associated with the pursuit of 
conflicting goals (Defourney & Nyssens, 2012). LTO-A assert that the short-term 
sacrifices are worth the long-term gain in terms of social value. They manage to 
strike the balance between what Defourney and Nyssens (2012) describe as the 
tension that arises when maximising the opportunities to generate surplus whilst 
focusing on their primary goal of producing social value and democratic governance. 
 
Conversely, LTO-B are compromising their chances of financial stability and 
longevity with a highly unfocused approach to growth. The resulting financial worries 
for LTO-B can be a cause of mission drift, something of which Herranz et al. (2010) 
point out is a destabilising effect of mission drift but also an intrinsic characteristic of 
stakeholder-based models of social enterprise governance. This is compounded by a 
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CLG-CS status which has led LTO-B to become heavily reliant on grant funding. 
LTO-A have more control over the mission drift process, although their risk of 
mission drift is still fairly low. They are characterised by giving preference to 
organisational growth strategies in some situations and to produce social value as a 
consequence of this approach. Their preference of organisational growth strategies 
is different to LTO-B and their approach of focusing predominantly on the creation of 
social value in their borough. LTO-A has to do more to develop a strong social 
enterprise identity to minimise the risk of perceived mission drift occurring. 
 
In summary, LTO-B has superior awareness of new social value opportunities. They 
are able to focus on producing social value rather than shifting towards having a 
wholly commercial focus. Their strategy of consolidating rather than expanding 
facilitates this approach. Cornforth (2012) suggests that this may be a prudent 
approach for social enterprises that want to give their full attention to the 
organisation’s social mission and purpose for existence. LTO-A, on the other hand, 
may be accused of perceived mission drift by external stakeholders if their senior 
management and board do not proactively engage with local communities and be 
seen to provide social value. This issue around identity and community engagement 
was highlighted in the findings. Pearce (2003) and Harding (2006) allude to this 
potential downfall by pointing out that a social enterprise’s focus on its social mission 
can be diluted if there is a lack of engagement with key stakeholders. Further, by 
being predominantly focused on commercial revenue growth opportunities LTO-A 
can be seen to be overlooking valuable opportunities for creating social value. 
Subsequently, it is suggested that LTO-A adopt a more all-rounded approach to 
avoid mission drift as they continue to grow. 
 
6.7. Theoretical Implications of Social and Financial Tensions on Types of 
Social Enterprise 
 
The findings provide us with the evidence to suggest mission drift is a central issue 
when understanding specific types of social enterprise. The tensions between 
trading income, social value creation and asset lock in types of social enterprise are 
key determinants of potential mission drift. This is illustrated through the findings of 
LTO-A (BenCom) and LTO-B (CLG-CS). Each type of social enterprise has followed 
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a different approach to managing then tensions outlined by Bull (2018). This has 
allowed us gain a valuable insight under the umbrella of organisational forms of 
social enterprise, which Doherty et al. (2014) and Peattie and Morley (2008) have 
called for. It can be asserted that the political and economic environment combined 
with the governance of each type of social enterprise provides the basis for potential 
mission drift.  
 
Mission drift within LTO-B can be caused by their heavy reliance of grant funding 
and its immediate withdrawal. Additionally, as the board are acting as stewards of 
the organisation they are maintaining their social focus without accounting for the 
withdrawal of financial support and increasing competition within the marketplace. 
Subsequently, LTO-B is suffering from significant difficulties in addressing the 
tension of increasing trading income which is associated with trading charity types. 
Moving forward, being unable to support their social mission through minimal trading, 
no financial support and consolidation of assets means the survival of LTO-B can be 
questioned. The board of trustees within LTO-B have restricted the role of the CEO 
and therefore are unwilling, and in some cases unaware, of the need to react to 
governance challenges, specifically austerity measures. This has caused a systemic 
imbalance between social and financial tensions. 
 
Contrary to this, LTO-A is managing tensions in satisfying social value creation by 
easing the tension associate trading charity types of satisfying levels of trading 
income. Therefore, in terms of our understanding. They are managing the competing 
tensions for now, thus avoiding mission drift. However, as discussed, there is no 
guarantee this avoidance of mission drift will be maintained moving forward. It is 
clear the governance challenges discovered and critiqued in this study provide 
consistently changing variables which inherently cause an increase on the need to 
address to specific tensions associated with a BenCom. From this, we can assert 
that the possibility of mission drift is a fluid process rather than being intrinsically 
fixed and rigid when assessing other BenCom organisations. The risk is dependent 
upon the political environment, competition within the marketplace and the 
governance of particular types of social enterprise. We can conclude LTO-B is more 
susceptible to mission drift than LTO-A in the current political and economic 
environment in the context of sport provision. The role of the voluntary board within 
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LTO-B inhibits the organisation’s ability to pro-activity address governance 
challenges.  
 
6.8. Discussion Summary 
 
This study highlights how the decision to select a legal structure has ramifications as 
to how the organisation can be categorised and how they manage mission drift. The 
findings of each Leisure Trust emphasise the governance challenges and 
characteristics that affect their ability to manage social and financial tensions. This 
study shows that there are wider issues to be considered, in particular the process of 
identifying a suitable legal structure becoming a crucial decision. This supports the 
views of Bull (2018), Bull and Ridley-Duff (2018) and Peattie and Morley (2008) in 
that the legal structures of social enterprise are still developing, yet vital for the 
development of the third sector, and therein the provision of sport through social 
enterprise. This study shows that social and financial tensions, resulting from 
austerity, underpin both Leisure Trusts’ approach in the pursuit of their social 
missions. These are challenges that will be apparent for other Leisure Trusts and 
social enterprises operating in other areas of provision. However, it must be stated 
that the impact of these challenges will vary and the challenges highlighted in this 
study are not claimed to be homogenous across all social enterprises in the UK. 
Instead, we have provided an in-depth insight to how two different types of social 
enterprise operating in the same area of provision manage to address contextual 
challenges and associated tensions. This is something which is lacking in research 
on the role of social enterprise in sport.   
 
Selecting either a BenCom or CLG-CS legal structure, as well as others, is a key 
part of the organisation’s growth and stability. This study reveals that the effects of 
either legal structure comprise of an array of challenges which had previously 
escaped sufficient academic debate. The legal structure and these factors influence 
the governance model and its capability to avoid mission drift to an extent. It also 
informs us of the factors affecting our understanding of social enterprise, specifically 
in the UK. The stakeholder model of governance still plays a crucial role in facilitating 
the achievement of social objectives. However, due to pressures to become more 
business-like, based on challenges identified in this study, there may be 
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encouragement to shift from a stakeholder model to stewardship governance. This is 
exemplified within the LTO-A case study.  
 
This study suggests that it is crucial that both Leisure Trusts seek to source 
opportunities for surplus generation in order to remain stable and avoid mission drift. 
The case study findings justify the need for social enterprises to no longer ignore 
political and economic challenges facing them, in this case austerity spending cuts, 
something of which Garrow and Hasenfeld (2012) and Hastings et. (2015) suggest is 
required. They are competing in markets against private sector providers of public 
services, something as Widdop et al. (2018) note is increasing. Both types of Leisure 
Trust have to prove that they can compete with other organisations, particularly 
private sector providers, and proactively address challenges associated with the 
austerity measures placed on them. Most crucially, it was seen that a BenCom legal 
structure enhances LTO-A’s ability to draw in a wide range of resources and 
expertise, something of which the CLG-CS structure restricts LTO-B. The final 
chapter focuses on the conclusions, contributions to knowledge of this study and 


















Chapter Seven  
 




This chapter presents the conclusion and directions for future research arising out of 
this study. The key contributions to knowledge are also outlined. Additionally, 
recommendations for future research necessary to strengthen our understanding of 
social enterprise in the UK are presented. In addressing the research questions, the 
contributions to knowledge are discussed below. Particularly, consideration is given 
to the practical implications of the study. Further reflections as to the limitations of 
the study (discussed in chapter three) are also provided, since these make a realistic 
appraisal of the findings reviewed in chapters four and five possible. The purpose of 
this study was to contribute to our understanding of social enterprise by investigating 
the governance of specific organisational forms of social enterprise; LTO-A (a 
BenCom Leisure Trust) and LTO-B (a CLG-CS Leisure Trust) within the context of 
sport provision in the UK. The discussion of each research question below clarifies 
how this aim has been achieved. 
 
7.2. Research Question One 
RQ1 - How does a Leisure Trust survive and achieve its social mission in an 
unstable and resource-scarce era of austerity?  
Throughout this study, we have explored and scrutinised the political challenges 
facing two different Leisure Trusts. This study establishes key political challenges 
facing a CLG-CS and BenCom social enterprise. Examining both Leisure Trusts 
allowed us to acquire an in-depth insight to the political landscape and its role in 
social enterprise development. This took the form of two qualitative case studies. It 
was established in the literature review that the implications and consequences of 
having a BenCom or CLG-CS status is not sufficiently researched. Researchers 
have established the view that government policy plays a pivotal role in the 
development of social enterprise, and for the third sector (Dommett, 2015; Slocock, 
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2012; Smith & Jones, 2015; Smith, 2014). The role of social enterprise in public 
service delivery was to be encouraged by the austerity agenda imposed by central 
government (Civil Exchange, 2015). However, critics have argued that austerity 
measures have had little impact and has become political rhetoric for a return to 
privatisation of public service delivery (Civil Exchange, 2015; Dommett, 2013; 
Lindsey, 2013; Smith & Jones, 2015). This study provides valuable knowledge to 
build upon this work and specifically examines it within particular two varying types of 
social enterprise in the form of Leisure Trusts; a BenCom and a CLG-CS. 
 
It is argued in this study that the role of government policy plays a significant role in 
the development of both case study organisations. The foremost contribution to 
knowledge is a range of political issues hampering and helping the development of 
both organisations. These issues were presented in the analysis of two types of 
social enterprise, and qualitative data from interviews of key respondents. These 
political factors are complex and involve a number of interconnected variables that 
have not previously been subject to academic debate within different types of social 
enterprise. As discussed in this study, the impact of these political factors is 
influenced by the legal status of the social enterprise. For instance, LTO-B, which is 
a CLG-CS, is more exposed to the reduction of financial grant support than LTO-A, 
which is a BenCom, because of its governance model. The voluntary board of 
trustees within LTO-B act as stewards of organisation and place total focus on 
creating social value to satisfy their stakeholders within the borough. Although this 
avoids mission drift, it inhibits their willingness and awareness of the need to 
increase trading income as result of grant withdrawal. This is compounded by their 
approach of asset lock and consolidating the facilities they operate. Consequently, 
LTO-B is struggling to maintain its achievement of its social mission of getting more 
people more active.  
 
The contribution from this study is that although austerity is becoming a veneer for 
privatisation of public service delivery, it is creating opportunities for LTO-A to thrive 
and grow. Conversely, it is having a detrimental impact upon LTO-B. Both its ability 
to survive and avoid mission drift is compromised. LTO-A can attract different 
sources of finance and take advantage of commercial opportunities, such as 
member investment bonds and some public service contracts. This allows LTO-A to 
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compete with private sector providers in the tendering process, and ultimately reduce 
the prominence of private sector provision of public sport services. As discovered in 
this research, local authorities are placing increasing emphasis on the production of 
financial value rather than society social value. This counteracts the policy of 
increased community ownership (Cameron, 2011; Civil Exchange, 2015). The link 
between prevailing government policy and its impact upon the development of 
specific types of social enterprise has been neglected by researchers. This is 
because it has been assumed all organisational forms fall under an umbrella of 
‘social enterprise’ (Bull, 2018; Bull & Ridley-Duff, 2015; Peattie & Morley, 2008). The 
influence of these policy challenges upon particular types of social enterprise is 
multifaceted and varies in degree, which is established in this study. Contemporary 
discourse on this issue is limited at best and it is predicated on the assumption that 
the adoption of a particular legal status is a mere administrative procedure. 
 
7.3. Research Question Two 
 
RQ 2 - How does the governance model and processes of different Leisure Trusts 
impact upon their associated tensions? 
 
This study sought to examine the governance models of LTO-A and LTO-B. In 
particular, the aim was to establish how the governance models of both 
organisations can contribute to our understanding of social enterprise in the UK. The 
model provided by Bull (2018) provided a clear conceptual framework for analysis 
within this study of their governance models. It is argued within this study that 
despite increasing interest in social enterprise governance, little or no attention has 
been devoted to the governance of specific types of social enterprise. The insight 
acquired in this study contributes to the understanding of social enterprise in the UK 
by determining how governance processes enable a social enterprise to address 
tensions associated with their type. 
 
The study has added to existing knowledge by investigating how governance models 
of two social enterprises affect their drifting between the associated tensions of the 
three types of social enterprise presented by Bull (2018); trading charity types, 
solidarity types and social business types (figure 6.1.). The investigation found 
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contrasting models of governance with varying outcomes within LTO-A and LTO-B. 
These models are fundamentally linked to the legal status of each Leisure Trust. 
Another variable which was integral to the governance processes of both 
organisations was government policy and competition within the marketplace.  
  
LTO-B with a CLG-CS legal status adopt a stakeholder model of governance. This is 
a common model of governance for CLG-CSs as the board of trustees’ act as 
stewards for the core purpose of their stakeholders (Doherty et al., 2014). However, 
their core focus on producing social value for their stakeholders is clouded by 
withdrawal of grant funding. As a result, LTO-B is unable to address the tension of 
minimal trading income associated with trading charitable types of social enterprise. 
This is because they are heavily reliant on an annual grants as opposed to 
generating trading income to balance the competing tensions of trading charitable 
and social business types. We have also found that the tension of trading income for 
LTO-B is being severely enhanced due to increasing competition within the 
marketplace, from other social enterprises and private sector providers. The strong 
philanthropic nature of the stakeholder model of governance has been facilitated by 
their CLG-CS status. These issues are underpinned by the board’s unwillingness to 
utilise the skills and expertise of the CEO. The board are failing to pro-actively 
address financial tensions.  
 
LTO-A with a BenCom legal status have a stewardship model of governance. The 
Managing Director acts as the steward of the organisation. LTO-A was found to 
possess a robust business model which enables them to take advantage of 
commercial opportunities whilst retaining the creation of social value. This approach 
ensures LTO-A can balance the tensions associated with trading charitable and 
solidarity types of social enterprise. The co-operative approach to governance allows 
the organisation to utilise the expertise and skills from both the board and senior 
management. It is clear the structure, roles and processes of governance within 
LTO-A impact upon the operational approach and outcomes of the organisation. It is 
clear from both case studies the power dynamics between the board and CEO 
contribute to our understanding of social enterprise. 
 
We have found that the stakeholder model of governance within LTO-B prevents the 
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CEO from performing their role adequately to address the challenges they face. 
There are significant tensions between the CEO and board due to the voluntary 
nature of the trustees. LTO-B restricts the influence of the CEO in determining the 
direction of the Leisure Trust. Contrary to this, the stewardship model within LTO-A 
empowers the Managing Director to take control of their operational and strategic 
approach. Enabling the Managing Director to take control allows them to consistently 
react to challenges, which affects their ability to manage social and trading income 
tensions. Consequently, we can conclude LTO-A is more likely to avoid mission drift 
than LTO-B. 
 
7.4. Research Question Three 
 
RQ 3 – How do Leisure Trusts guard against encountering mission drift? 
 
This study has placed specific emphasis on how LTO-B and LTO-A manage to 
remain financially sustainable whilst concurrently achieving their social objectives. 
We have also seen how the links between the challenges faced and the legal identity 
of the social enterprise is a contributing factor in determining whether it runs the risk 
of mission drift occurring. These links are critiqued in the discussion chapter. For 
instance, although LTO-A has an explicitly defined social mission, it is still 
underpinned by commercial objectives. Consequently, LTO-A intend to manage the 
tension between commercial and social tensions by actively pursuing surplus 
generation to resource the social value they create. This is in line with the views of 
Ebrahim et al. (2014) and Renz and Andersson (2014). In contrast, the issue of 
mission drift is not a concern for LTO-B. It has a more philanthropic outlook which 
allows it to focus on producing social value and therein their social mission. 
However, as discussed, there has been an oversight of financial stability which has 
resulted in the possibility of mission drift occurring. Thus, confirming the views of 
Sabeti (2011) and Battilana and Lee (2014) who argue this approach can be the 
chief cause of mission drift. 
 
This study has added to knowledge on how a BenCom and a CLG-CS manage 
social and financial tensions with the intention of avoiding mission drift. We have 
established, from two case studies, that a BenCom and CLG-CS tackle the issue of 
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mission drift in different ways. This study presents findings which highlight specific 
challenges facing different types of social enterprise and how they impact upon the 
occurrence of mission drift. The findings show us that there is no single distinct 
approach of managing competing logics across the different types of social 
enterprise. This study claims that mission drift is a fluid process and is influenced by 
numerous factors, particularly the political environment, legal structure of the social 
enterprise and resulting power dynamics in relation to decision-making. 
 
We have established that LTO-B is at considerable risk of mission drift because of 
their unwavering focus on social objectives and oversight of financial stability. This is 
compounded by their near complete reliance on grant funding, and as found in LTO-
B, its sudden withdrawal. This reliance on financial support is a characteristic of 
CLG-CSs (Doherty et al., 2014). Conversely, the BenCom legal structure provides 
the flexibility and capability to move towards a balanced business model for LTO-A. 
The flexibility in terms of the composition and roles of the board and Managing 
Director allow LTO-A to react to market pressures. Therefore, this raises questions 
regarding a social enterprise’s relationship with the market (Teasdale & Buckingham, 
2013). The evidence from this study relating to the sport and leisure provision market 
tells us that sport social enterprises must consider maintaining and/or pursue trading 
income to avoid mission drift. This investigation leads us to assert a BenCom 
structure can help facilitate an avoidance of mission drift more than a CLG-CS status 
in the current political and economic environment in provision of sport. However, it is 
prudent to note the bounds of this assertion to a marketplace when private sector 
competitors and/or other social enterprises are present.  
 
Moving forward, particularly within sport and leisure provision, having a balanced 
business model is crucial because of the competitive nature of the market. Although 
we have gained an insight into a BenCom and CLG-CS, the study has not examined 
a CIC within this market. However, this is because Leisure Trusts predominantly 
adopt a BenCom, CLG or CLG-CS legal structure (Hughes & Hodgkinson, 2012; 
Simmons, 2008). Therefore, adopting a CIC structure may allow Leisure Trusts to 
access a wider range of finance (Doherty et al., 2014), thus bolstering their position 
against private sector providers. This study has already established privatisation, 
particularly in sport and leisure, is becoming prevalent within public service delivery 
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of sport facilities.  
 
7.5. Conclusions Summary 
 
The overall conclusion from this investigation is that the governance of a social 
enterprise is crucial for supporting their social objectives. Their legal status and 
resulting governance model and processes is essential in understanding how social 
enterprises manage social and financial tensions associated with trading charitable 
types, social business types and solidarity types. This study also concludes that 
government policy on social enterprise, via various government commitments (e.g. 
Social Value Act, 2012) and an era of austerity, is affecting social enterprises to 
varying degrees. It was concluded the main determinant of this impact is how each 
social enterprise reacts to market conditions and specific sometimes location-based 
challenges. The study also presents contemporary empirical evidence to identify the 
main challenges facing social enterprise and how different social enterprises react to 
the same challenge, e.g. spending cuts imposed through government austerity 
measures.  
 
Additionally, the governance of social enterprises is shaped and guided by the 
motives of the people within them. The power dynamics between the board and CEO 
play a vital role in determining how particular challenges are met and mission drift is 
avoided or encountered. In conclusion, the challenges facing LTO-B and LTO-A 
highlighted in this study enable us move under the umbrella of social enterprise and 
examine specific types. This furthers previous work conducted on understanding 
social enterprise, by determining the factors that influence the management of 
tensions associated with different types of social enterprise. This provides robust 
groundwork for the advancement of social enterprise in the UK. If there is more 
clarity provided on what specific types of social enterprise can provide then policy 
makers, specifically government, will have arguably have a firmer grasp of how a 
social enterprise can provide solutions to local public service delivery. The lack of 
awareness by local government of what each social enterprise can do in the local 





Recommendations will now be made based on the above conclusions. These 
suggestions have implications for government policy on social enterprise, theory and 
practice. 
 
The findings from this study show that there is a need to confront traditional thinking 
on the development of social enterprise as public service delivery vehicles in the UK. 
It is crucial academics and policy-makers acknowledge that social enterprises are 
businesses that exist, survive and compete in a marketplace. From this study alone 
we have seen what impact political and market forces can have upon different types 
of social enterprise. The practical implications of this research in light of the 
conclusions drawn earlier suggest that current government policy is inhibiting the 
development of social enterprise within the provision of sport. The current political 
agenda of encouraging private sector provision in public sport service delivery 
increases competition in the market and inhibits the impact Leisure Trusts such as 
LTO-A and LTO-B can have. Therefore, moving forward, both Leisure Trusts need to 
be flexible and creative in how they compete for public service contracts and against 
other organisations. 
 
The LTO-B governance model combined with the prevailing challenges identified in 
this study lead us to recommend that LTO-B should consider their governance 
approach and how it influences the management of financial tensions. To that end, 
the board must empower the CEO to actively address these tensions. If this does not 
occur, LTO-B will encounter mission drift and ultimately become an unsustainable 
operation. Conversely, it is recommended that LTO-A continue with their pragmatic 
approach to governance. The BenCom structure enables them to actively empower 
the Managing Director to address social and financial tensions. However, as it 
stands, the tension of satisfying levels of social value will increase the faster LTO-A 
grow. LTO-A must concentrate on their existing services to ensure social value 
tensions are addressed. 
 
To facilitate this, The Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) ought to 
consider and promote appropriate governance structures to perspective Leisure 
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Trusts. To this end, the adoption of a particular legal status is a pivotal consideration 
for a Leisure Trust, and therein a social enterprise. Customary legal structures such 
as the co-operative model (BenCom) and a CLG-CS are suitable for most social 
enterprises, but they do not always cater for a competitive marketplace in which 
raising capital is crucial for stability. It is therefore recommended that social 
enterprises consider alternative legal structures to meet this demand. For social 
enterprises considering service provision it is suggested they explore CIC structures 
and the benefits that model can provide.  
 
As discussed in chapter two, these structures can offer additional flexibility, in terms 
of raising capital for social enterprises to succeed in a competitive market (Doherty 
et al., 2014). To aid this development, from a policy perspective, there must be 
specific legal support networks. However, the dearth of research and specialists in 
legal forms of social enterprise restricts policy progression. This need is amplified by 
the rise of private sector providers in public service provision, social enterprises 
competing with them and private sector organisations forming social enterprise 




The main limitations of this study stem from its empirical methods. Data gathered in 
this study can be criticised for being reliant on accurate recall, prone to conscious or 
unconscious respondent bias such as defensiveness or social desirability, and the 
adequacy of the questioning and interpretation process. The study adopted a 
number of suggestions made by Guba and Lincoln (2007) and Flyvberg (2006) to 
balance these methodological difficulties and ensure the trustworthiness of the data 
was maintained. These limitations were overcome by the development of context-
dependent knowledge, which this research aimed to pursue. Another limitation of the 
data collection and analysis method used in this study is its labour-intensive nature. 
It is, therefore, not suited for evaluating social enterprises when data needs to be 
collected from the entire social enterprise population in the UK. Future researchers 
may choose to adopt alternative survey-based methods to assess the large and 
varying population of social enterprises within the UK. This discussion of study 
limitations points to promising avenues for future research, which are summarised in 
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the following section. 
 
7.8. Further Research 
 
The conclusions of this study raise additional questions for further research on social 
enterprise. This is vital because as discussed in this investigation we are still in a 
stage of understanding the phenomenon itself. The findings from this study aim to 
supplement and support our understanding of social enterprise in the UK. Further 
research is crucial for contributing to understanding, policy development and practice 
within the third sector. In view of the study’s findings and limitations the chapter 
concludes by suggesting some directions for future research, which concerns issues 
related to: a, b and c below. 
 
A. Further Understanding of Social Enterprise Types 
 
This study has only touched the surface of the often multifaceted and fluid element of 
social enterprise understanding. Additional studies are needed in order to explore 
some of the key themes identified in this study. Firstly, despite the evidenced 
benefits, the adoption of the BenCom legal structure within the third sector in the UK 
is still relatively low (Cabras, 2011). Further research is necessary to scrutinise the 
ability of BenComs to manage their extended stakeholder base as the social 
enterprise transitions from a start-up stage to a growth stage. To supplement this, 
the impact of type of legal structure on social enterprises in other regions or social 
contexts also requires investigation. It was seen the two regions examined in this 
study have significant differences in the impact of the challenges faced. Building a 
broader bank of contextual knowledge will aid our understanding of social enterprise 
and contribute to the understanding of trading charity types, social business types 
and solidarity types in the UK.  
 
B. Governance Shift within Social Enterprise 
 
Secondly, the findings of this study underline the crucial importance of governance 
models within social enterprises and how it enables the organisation to achieve its 
mission. The study provides findings which advocate a shift away from traditional 
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democratic stakeholder-based models of governance within social enterprises. The 
evidence suggests social enterprises are adopting different models of governance 
such as stewardship models. However, as evidence in this study suggests, little is 
known of how stakeholder interests are maintained as the organisation continues to 
grow whilst ensuring mission drift is avoided. As a result, the findings of this study 
should be supplemented by further research on the relationship between 
stewardship governance models and the legal structure of a social enterprise. This 
will inform us how mission drift is avoided or encountered at different stages of their 
business life cycle. This is important given the adoption of traditional democratic 
governance models. Stewardship models raise questions of how conflict is managed 
between the board and CEO and how growth impacts upon being able to satisfy a 
protracted stakeholder base. These areas require further investigation. 
 
C. Social Enterprise Amalgamation 
 
Thirdly, building upon the adoption of stewardship governance, we have found that a 
BenCom organisation adopting this approach is pursuing growth which includes 
amalgamation of social enterprises. This raises questions and concerns surrounding 
the understanding of social enterprise. Little is known of the difficulties and/or 
advantages of social enterprises merging within the same market. The varying legal 
structures social enterprise can adopt make this approach more complex. Thus, it is 
recommended research is conducted on such organisations adopting a merging 
approach with organisations with an alternative legal structure. As seen in this study, 
different legal structures determine how a social enterprise is governed and how it 
addresses challenges. Therefore, merging with different legal types of social 
enterprise raises questions on how producing social value and trading income 
tensions are managed. Underpinning this, it will be necessary to establish the impact 
of the impending exit of the European Union upon the sport provision market within 
the UK. Will it result it an upwards trend of outsourcing or in-house management of 





8. Bibliography  
 
Adam, S. and Browne, J. (2012) Reforming council tax benefit. Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
 
Agafonow, A. (2015) ‘Value Creation, Value Capture, and Value Devolution Where Do 
Social Enterprises Stand?’ Administration & Society, 47(8), pp.1038-1060. 
 
Ahmed, R., Finneron, D., Miller, S. and Singh, H. (2004) Tools for Regeneration: Practical 
Advice for Faith Communities. Faith Based Regeneration Network. 
 
Albrow, M. (2012) ‘Big Society’ as a rhetorical intervention.’ The Big Society debate: A new 
agenda for social welfare. pp.105-115. 
 
Alcock, P. (2010) ‘A strategic unity: defining the third sector in the UK.’ Voluntary Sector 
Review, 1(1), pp.5-24. 
 
Alter, K. (2004) Social Enterprise Typology, Virtue Ventures LLC. 
 
Alter, S.A. (2006) Social enterprise Models and their Mission and Money Relationships. 
Social Entrepreneurship: New Paradigms of Sustainable Social Change, Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Alvesson, M. and Deetz, S. (2000) Doing Critical Management Research, Sage Publications: 
London. 
 
Alvesson, M. and Skoldberg, K. (2009) ‘positivism, social constructionism, critical realism: 
Three reference points in the philosophy of science.’ Reflexive methodology: New vistas for 
qualitative research, pp.15-52. 
 
Amin, A. (2005) ‘Local community on trial.’ Economy and Society, 34(4), pp. 612-633. 
 
Amin, A. (2009) ‘Extraordinarily ordinary: working in the social economy.’ Social Enterprise 
Journal, Vol.5(1), pp.30-49. 
 
Amin, A., Cameron, A. and Hudson, R. (2002) Placing the Social Economy: Contemporary 
Political Economy Series.  Routledge London. 
 
Amis, J. and Slack, T. (1996) ‘The size-structure relationship in voluntary sport 
organizations.’ Journal of Sport Management, 10, pp.76–86.  
 
Anagnostopoulos, C., and Shilbury, D. (2013) ‘Implementing corporate social responsibility 
in English football: Towards multi-theoretical integration.’ Sport, Business and Management: 
An International Journal, 3(4), pp. 268-284. 
 
Anagnostopoulos, C., and Winand, M. (2019) ‘The board–executive relationship in team 
sport charitable foundations: unpacking trust building through ‘exchange 
currencies’. Research Handbook on Sport Governance, p.236. 
 
Anderson, A.R., Younis, S., Hashim, H. and Air, C. (2019) ‘Social enterprising informing our 
concept; exploring informal micro social enterprise.’ Social Enterprise Journal, 15(1), pp.94-
110. 
Angen, M. (2000) ‘Evaluating interpretive inquiry: reviewing the validity debate and opening 
the dialogue.’ Qualitative Health Research. 10(3), pp.378-395.  
 231 
Appleby, J. and Lee, L. (2012) Health care in Britain: Is there a problem and what needs to 
change? In: E. Clery, J. Curtice, M. Phillips and D. Utting (eds.) British Social Attitudes 29. 
London: NatCen Social Research. 
Association for Public Service Excellence. (2012). The ensuring council. An alternative 
vision for the future of local government. Manchester, APSE.  
Attride-Stirling, J. (2001) ‘Thematic networks: an analytic tool for qualitative research.’ 
Qualitative research, 1(3), pp.385-405. 
Audit Commission. Reducing spending on low value services, London: Audit Commission, 
2011. 
 
Auld, C. and Schulz, J. (2006) ‘Perceptions of role ambiguity by chairpersons and executive 
directors in Queensland sporting organizations.’ Sport Management Review, 9, pp.183–201. 
Austin, J., Stevenson, H. and Wei-Skillern, J. (2006) ‘Social and commercial 
entrepreneurship: Same, different, or both?’ Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 30, 
pp.1-22.  
Bacq, S. and Janssen, F. (2011) ‘The multiple faces of social entrepreneurship: A review of 
definitional issues based on geographical and thematic criteria.’ Entrepreneurship & 
Regional Development. 23(5), pp.373-403. 
 
Bakker, R.M. and Shepherd, D.A. (2017) ‘Pull the plug or take the plunge: Multiple 
opportunities and the speed of venturing decisions in the Australian mining 
industry.’ Academy of Management Journal, 60(1), pp.130-155. 
 
Bank of England. (2003), The Financing of Social Enterprises: A Special Report. The Bank 
of England UK. 
 
Barraket, J. and Archer, V. (2009) ‘Changing the rules in use? An examination of social 
enterprise in local governance’. Third Sector Review. 
 
Battilana, J., Besharov, M., and Mitzinneck, B. (2017) ‘On hybrids and hybrid organizing: A 
review and roadmap for future research.’ The SAGE handbook of organizational 
institutionalism, 2, pp.133-169. 
 
Battilana, J. and Lee, M. (2014) ‘Advancing research on hybrid organizing–Insights from the 
study of social enterprises.’ The Academy of Management Annals, 8(1), pp.397-441. 
 
Battilana, J., (2018) ‘Cracking the organizational challenge of pursuing joint social and 
financial goals: Social enterprise as a laboratory to understand hybrid 
organizing.’ Management, 21(4). 
 
Billis, D. (2010) Towards a theory of hybrid organizations. In Billis, D. (ed.), Hybrid 
Organizations and the Third Sector. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 46–69. 
 
Birchall, J. (2011) ‘The big society and the 'mutualisation' of public services: A critical 
commentary.’ The Political Quarterly. 82(1), pp.145–157. 
 
Blackburn, R. and Ram, M. (2006) ‘Fix or Fixation? The Contributions and Limitations of 
Entrepreneurship and Small Firms to Combating Social Exclusion.’ Entrepreneurship and 
Regional Development, 18(1), pp.73–89. 
 232 
 
Blaikie, N. (2010) Designing Social Research. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Boon, J. (2018) ‘Moving the governance of shared service centres (SSCs) forward: 
juxtaposing agency theory and stewardship theory.’ Public Money & Management, 38(2), 
pp.97-104. 
 
Borzaga ,C. (2007) Social Enterprises and Welfare Systems: Preliminary Version. 
Routledge, London. 
 
Borzaga, C. and Becchetti, L. (2010) The Economics of Social Responsibility: The World of 
Social Enterprises. Routledge. 
 
Bridge, S. Murtach, B. and O’Neil, K. (2009) Understanding the Social Economy and the 
Third Sector. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Bromley, P. and Powell, W. (2012) ‘From smoke and mirrors to walking the talk: Decoupling 
in the contemporary world.’ Academy of Management Annals, 6, pp.483–530.  
Brown, J. (2006) ‘Equity finance for social enterprises.’ Social Enterprise Journal, 2(1), 
pp.73-81. 
 
Bruneel, J., Clarysse, B., Weemaes, S. and Staessens, M. (2018) ‘BREAKING WITH THE 
PAST: THE NEED FOR INNOVATION IN THE GOVERNANCE OF NONPROFIT SOCIAL 
ENTERPRISES.’ Academy of Management Perspectives, 21(4), pp.220-234. 
 
Bryman, A. (2001). Social Research Methods. Oxford University Press Inc, New York. 
 
Bryman, A. and Bell, E. (2003). Business Research Methods. Oxford University Press Inc, 
New York. 
 
Buckingham, H., Pinch, S. and Sunley, P. (2012) ‘The enigmatic regional geography of 
social enterprise in the UK: a conceptual framework and synthesis of the evidence.’ Area, 
44(1), pp.83-91. 
 
Bull, M., Crompton, H. and Jayawarna, D. (2008) ‘Coming from the heart (the road is long).’ 
Social Enterprise Journal, 4(2), pp. 108-125. 
 
Bull, M. (2008) ‘Challenging tensions: critical, theoretical and empirical perspectives on 
social enterprise.’ International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behavior & Research, 14(5), 
pp.268-275. 
 
Bull, M. (2018) ‘Reconceptualising social enterprise in the UK through an appreciation of 
legal identities.’ International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behavior & Research, 24(3), pp.587-
605. 
 
Bull, M. and Ridley-Duff, R. (2018) Towards an appreciation of ethics in social enterprise 
business models. Journal of Business Ethics, pp.1-16. 
 
Burchell, J. and Cook, J. (2008) ‘Stakeholder dialogue and organisational learning: changing 




Cabinet Office. (2008) Is Social Enterprise at the Cross Roads? COI Strategic Consultancy 
and Research Division for Social Enterprise Team, Office of the Third Sector. 
 
Cabinet Office. (2015) Sporting future: A new strategy for an active nation. 
 
Cabras, I. (2011) Industrial and provident societies and village pubs: exploring community 
cohesion in rural Britain.’ Environment and Planning, 43(10), pp.2419-2434. 
 
Caers, R., Du Bois, C., Jegers, M., De Gieter, S., Schepers, C. and Pepermans, R. (2006). 
Principal-Agent Relationships on the Stewardship-Agency Axis.’ Nonprofit Management and 
Leadership, 17(1), pp. 25-47. 
 
Callen, J., Klein, A., and Tinkelman, D. (2010) ‘The Contextual Impact of Nonprofit Board 
Composition and Structure on Organizational Performance: Agency and Resource 
Dependence Perspectives.’ Voluntas, 21, pp. 101–125. 
 
Cameron, D. (2011) Speech on the Big Society, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-on-big-society, accessed 6 June 
2014. 
Carmel, E. and Harlock, J. (2008) ‘Instituting the ‘third sector’ as a governable terrain: 
partnership, procurement and performance in the UK.’ Policy & Politics, 36(2), pp.155-171. 
Caulley, D. (1999) A critical review of Lincoln and Guba’s trustworthiness criteria for 
qualitative research. Association for Qualitative Research. Issues of Rigour in Qualitative 
Research. Melbourne: Australia.  
Chell, E. (2007) ‘Social enterprise and entrepreneurship: towards a convergent theory of the 
entrepreneurial process.’ International Small Business Journal, 25, pp. 5-26. 
Chew, C. (2010) ‘Strategic positioning and organizational adaption in social enterprise 
subsidiaries of voluntary organizations.’ Public Management Review. 12(5), 609- 634.  
Chew, C. and Lyon, F. (2012) ‘Innovation and social enterprise activity in third sector 
organisations.’ (83). Third Sector Research Centre. 
Civil Exchange. (2013). Big Society Audit 2013. London: Civil Exchange.  
Civil Exchange. (2015). Whose Society: The Final Big Society Audit. London: Civil 
Exchange.  
Clifford, D., Geyne-Rahme, F. and Mohan, J. (2013) ‘Variations between organisations and 
localities in government funding of third-sector activity: evidence from the national survey of 
third-sector organisations in England.’ Urban Studies, 50(5), pp.959-976. 
Coates D., Wicker, P., Feiler, S. & Breuer, C. (2014) ‘A bivariate probit examination of 
financial and volunteer problems of non-profit sport clubs.’ International Journal of Sport 
Finance. 9(3), pp.230-248.  
Cohen, A. & Welty Peachey, J. (2015) ‘The making of a social entrepreneur: From 
participant to cause champion within a sport-for-development context.’ Sport Management 
Review. 18(1), pp.111-125.  
 234 
Communities and Local Government Committee. (2012) Mutual and Co-operative 
Approaches to Delivering Local Services. London: House of Commons. 
Contu, A. and Willmott, H. (2003) ‘Re-embedding situatedness: the importance of power 
relations in learning theory.’ Organization Science, 14(3), pp.283–96. 
Coote, A. (2010). Ten Big Questions about the Big Society. New Economics Foundation, 
London.  
Corbett, S. and Walker, A. (2013) ‘The big society: Rediscovery of ‘the social’ or rhetorical 
fig-leaf for neo-liberalism?.’ Critical Social Policy, 33(3), pp.451-472. 
Cornforth, C. (1988) ‘Can entrepreneurship be institutionalized? The case of worker 
cooperatives.’ International Small Business Journal, 6(4). 
Cornforth, C. (2003) The Governance of Public and Non-Profit Organisations – What Do 
Boards Do? Routledge: London. 
 
Cornforth, C. (2004) ‘The governance of co-operatives and mutual associations: a paradox 
perspective.’ Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 75(1), pp. 11–32. 
 
Cornforth, C. (2012) ‘Nonprofit Governance Research: Limitations of the Focus on Boards 
and Suggestions for New Directions.’ Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 1(6) 
pp.1117–1136. 
 
Cornforth, C. (2014) ‘Understanding and combating mission drift in social enterprises.’ Social 
Enterprise Journal, 10(1) pp. 3–20. 
 
Cornforth, C., Harrison, Y. and Murray, V. (2012) ‘Perceptions of board chair leadership 
effectiveness in nonprofit and voluntary sector organizations.’ Voluntas: International Journal 
of Voluntary Nonprofit Organizations, 24(3), pp. 688-712. 
 
Cornforth, C. and Macmillan, R. (2016) ‘Evolution in Board Chair–CEO Relationships; A 
Negotiated Order Perspective.’ Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly.  
 
Correia, A., Soares, J. and Rosado, A. (2010) ‘Political factors in the decision-making 
process in voluntary sports associations.’ European Sport Management Quarterly, 10(1), 
pp.5-29. 
 
CPS (1998) Leisure and Library Trusts, London, UNISON. 
 
Crawford, R. and Phillips, D. (2012) Local government spending: Where is the axe falling. In: 
IFS Green Budget 2012. London: Institute of Fiscal Studies. 
 
Creswell J. (2013) Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Method 
Approaches. Thousand Oaks CA, Sage. 
 
Crotty, M. (1998) The foundations of social science research: Meaning and perspective in 
the research process. London: Sage. 
 
Dacin, P., Dacin, T. and Matear, M. (2010) ‘Social entrepreneurship: Why we don't need a 
new theory and how we move forward from here.’ The Academy of Management 
perspectives, 24(3), pp.37-57. 
 
 235 
Dart, R. (2004) ‘The legitimacy of social enterprise.’ Non-profit Management & Leadership, 
14, pp. 411-24. 
 
David, F. R. (1989) ‘How companies define their mission.’ Long range planning, 22(1), pp. 
90-97. 
 
Davis, J., Schoorman, F. and Donaldson, L. (1997) ‘Towards a stewardship theory of 
management.’ Academy of Management Review, 22(1), pp. 20- 47. 
 
Dawson, I. and Dunn, A. (2011) Governance Codes of Practice in the Not‐for‐Profit Sector.’ 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 14(1), pp.33-42. 
 
DCMS. (2002) Game Plan: A Strategy for Delivering the Government’s Sport and Physical 
Activity Objectives. London. 
 
Dees, J.G. (1998) ‘Enterprising non-profits.’ Harvard Business Review, 76(1), pp. 54-67. 
 
Dees, J. (1998). The Meaning of Social Entrepreneurship. Kansas City: Kauffman 
Foundation. 
 
Dees, J., Emerson, J., and Economy, P. (2001) Enterprising Nonprofits: A Toolkit for Social 
Entrepreneurs. John Wiley & Sons Inc. 
 
Dees, J., and Anderson, B. (2003) For Profit Social Ventures. Social Entrepreneurship. 
Senate Hall Academic Publishing Birmingham. 
 
Defourny, J. (2001) From Third Sector to Social enterprise. The Emergence of Social 
Enterprise. Routledge, London. 
 
Defourny, J. and Nyssens, M. (2012) ‘Conceptions of Social Enterprises in Europe: A 
Comparative Perspective with the United States,’ in Gidron, B. and Hasenfeld, Y. Social 
Enterprises: An Organizational Perspective. New York: Palgrave- Macmillian, pp. 71–90. 
 
Denscombe, M. (2003) The Good Research Guide for Small Scale Social Research 
Projects. Open University Press Philadelphia. Hines. 
 
Denzin, N. (1978) The Research Act: An Introduction to Sociological Methods. McGraw Hill 
New York. 
 
Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (2003) Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry, Second Edition, 
California:SAGE.  
 
Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (Eds.). (2011) The Sage handbook of qualitative research. 
California:SAGE. 
 
Department of Culture, Media and Sport. (2002) Game Plan: A Strategy for Delivering the 
Government’s Sport and Physical Activity Objectives. London. 
 
Department of Culture, Media and Sport. (2013) Creating a sporting habit for life: a new 
youth sport strategy. London.  
 
Dey, P and Steyaert, C. (2010) ‘The politics of narrating social entrepreneurship.’ Journal of 
Enterprising Communities: People and Places in the Global Economy, 4(1), pp. 85 – 108. 
 
 236 
Di Domenico, M., Haugh, H. and Tracey, P. (2010) ‘Social bricolage: Theorizing social value 
creation in social enterprises.’ Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34(4), pp. 681-703. 
 
Doherty, B., Foster, G., Mason, C., Meehan, J., Meehan, K. and Rotheroe, M. (2009) 
Management of Social Enterprise. Sage Publications. 
 
Diochon, M. and Anderson, A. (2009) ‘Social enterprise and effectiveness: a process 
typology.’ Social Enterprise Journal, 5(1), pp.7-29. 
 
Doherty, B., Haugh, H. and Lyon, F. (2014) ‘Social enterprises as hybrid organizations: A 
review and research agenda.’ International Journal of Management Reviews, 16(4), pp.417-
436. 
 
Doherty, B., Powell, M., Gillett, A. (2019) ‘Sustainability in social enterprise: hybrid 
organizing in public services.’ Public Management Review, 21(2), pp.159-186 
 
Dommett, K. (2015) ‘The theory and practice of party modernisation: The conservative party 
under David Cameron 2005–2015.’ British Politics. 10(2), pp.249–266. 
Driver, M. (2012) ‘An interview with Michael Porter: Social entrepreneurship and the 
transformation of capitalism.’ Academy of Management Learning & Education, 11, pp.421-
431.  
Drucker, P. (1990) ‘What Business Can Learn from Non-profits.’ Harvard Business Review, 
July-August, p. 88-93. 
 
DTI. (2002) Social Enterprise: A Strategy for Success. Department of Trade and Industry 
UK. 
 
DTI. (2003) Enterprise for Communities: Proposals for a Community Interest Company 
Report on the Public Consultation and the Government’s Intentions. Department of Trade 
and Industry UK. 
 
DTI. (2004) An introduction to Community Interest Companies. Department of Trade and 
Industry UK. 
 
DTI. (2008) A Progress Report on Social Enterprise: A Strategy for Success. Department of 
Trade and Industry UK. 
 
Easterby-Smith, M., Thorpe, R. and Jackson, P. (2008) Management Research, 
London:SAGE. 
Ebrahim, A. (2010) The many faces of nonprofit accountability. In D. O. Renz (Ed.), The 
Jossey–Bass handbook of nonprofit leadership and management (3rd ed., pp. 110–121). 
San Francisco  
Ebrahim, A., Battilana, J. and Mair, J. (2014) ‘The governance of social enterprises: Mission 
drift and accountability challenges in hybrid organizations.’ Research in Organizational 
Behavior, 34, pp.81-100. 
 
Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989) Building theories from case study research,’ Academy of 
Management Review, 14(4), pp.532-50. 
 
 237 
Eisenhardt K. M., & Graebner M. E. (2007) ‘Theory building from cases: opportunities and 
challenges.’ Academy of Management Journal, 50(1), pp.25-32. 
 
Emerson, J. (2006) ‘Moving Ahead Together: Implications of a Blended Value Framework for 
the Future of Social Entrepreneurship.’ in Nicholls, A. (ed.) Social Entrepreneurship, New 
Models of Sustainable Social Change, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 391-406.  
Evans, K. (2011) ‘Big society’ in the UK: A policy review.’ Children & Society, 25(2), pp.164–
171. 
 
Farmer, J., De Cotta, T., McKinnon, K., Barraket, J., Munoz, S.A., Douglas, H. and Roy, 
M.J., (2016) ‘Social enterprise and wellbeing in community life.’ Social Enterprise 
Journal, 12(2), pp.235-254. 
 
Ferkins, L., Shilbury, D. and McDonald, G. (2005) ‘The role of the board in building strategic 
capability: Towards an integrated model of sport governance research.’ Sport Management 
Review, 8, pp.195–225. 
Fielding, N. and Thomas, H. (2001) Qualitative Interviewing, in N. Gilbert (ed.)  Researching 
Social Life, pp.123–44. London: Sage. 
Findlay-King, L., Nichols, G., Forbes, D., & Macfadyen, G. (2018) ‘Localism and the Big 
Society: the asset transfer of leisure centres and libraries–fighting closures or empowering 
communities?’ Leisure Studies, 37(2), pp. 158-170. 
 
Flyvbjerg, B. (2006) ‘Five misunderstandings about case-study research.’ Qualitative Inquiry, 
12(2), pp.219–245. 
 
Foster, D. and Jonker, J. (2005) ‘Stakeholder relationships: the dialogue of engagement.’ 
Corporate Governance, 5(5), pp. 51-57. 
Fowler, A. (2000) ‘NGDOs as a moment in history: Beyond aid to social entrepreneurship or 
civic innovation?’ Third World Quarterly, 21, pp.637– 654.  
Friedman, A., & Phillips, M. (2004) Balancing strategy and accountability: a model for the 
governance of professional associations. Nonprofit Management and Leadership.’ 15(2) 
pp.187-204. 
 
Gallagher, D., Gilmore, A., and Stolz, A. (2012) ‘The strategic marketing of small sports 
clubs: From fundraising to social entrepreneurship.’ Journal of Strategic Marketing, 20(3), 
pp.231-247. 
 
Gamble, A. (2015) Austerity as statecraft. Parliamentary Affairs, 68(1) pp.42–57. 
 
Gamble, A. (2015) After New Labour: The Corbyn surge and the future of social democracy 
in Britain. Policy Network. 
 
García-Meca, E., and Palacio, C. (2018) ‘Board composition and firm reputation: The role of 
business experts, support specialists and community influentials.’ BRQ Business Research 




Garrow, E., & Hasenfeld, Y. (2012) Managing conflicting institutional logics: Social service 
versus market. In B. Gidron & Y. Hasenfeld (Eds.), Social enterprises: An organizational 
perspective (pp. 121-143). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Gazley, B. and Nicholson-Crotty, J. (2018) ‘What Drives Good Governance? A Structural 
Equation Model of Nonprofit BoardPerformance.’ Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly, 47(2), pp.262-285. 
 
Geddes, M. (2005) ‘Neoliberalism and local governance: cross-national perspectives and 
speculation.’ Policy Studies, 26(3), pp.359– 77. 
 
Gerring, J. (2007) ‘Is there a (viable) crucial-case method?’ Comparative Political Studies, 
40(3), pp.231-253. 
Gibbon, J. & Affleck, A. (2008) ‘Social enterprise resisting social accounting: Reflecting on 
lived experiences.’ Social Enterprise Journal. 4(1), pp.41-56. 
Gillingwater, C. (2016) Supporting positive health outcomes through leisure and culture 
trusts. Perspectives in Public Health, 136(5), pp. 262–263. 
Gilmore A., Gallagher, D. & O ́Dwyer, M. (2011) ‘Is social entrepreneurship an untapped 
marketing resource? A commentary on its potential for small sport clubs.’ Journal of Small 
Business and Entrepreneurship. 24(1), pp.11-15. 
Glaveli, N. and Geormas, K., (2018) ‘Doing well and doing good: Exploring how strategic 
and market orientation impacts social enterprise performance.’ International Journal of 
Entrepreneurial Behavior & Research, 24(1), pp.147-170. 
 
Glynn, M. (2000), ‘When cymbals become symbols: Conflict over organizational identity 
within a symphony orchestra.’ Organization Science, 11, pp.285–298. 
 
Golensky, M. (1993) ‘The board‐executive relationship in nonprofit organizations: 
Partnership or power struggle?.’ Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 4(2), pp.177-191. 
 
Gordon, M. (2009) Accounting for Making a Difference, Social Enterprise Magazine, 25th 
November. 
 
Grant Thorton. (2014) Responding to the challenge: Alternative delivery models in local 
government, http://www.grant-thornton.co.uk/Documents/Alternative-Delivery-Models-
LG.pdf, accessed 18 September 2014. 
Grenier, P. (2009) Social Entrepreneurship in the UK: from Rhetoric to Reality. in Ziegler R 
(ed) An Introduction to Social Entrepreneurship: Voices, Preconditions, Contexts. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Griffiths, M., and Armour, K. (2014) ‘Volunteer sports coaches as community assets? A 
realist review of the research evidence.’ International journal of sport policy and politics, 6(3), 
pp.307-326. 
 
Grimes, M., Williams, T., and Zhao, E. (2019) ‘Anchors aweigh: The sources, variety, and 
challenges of mission drift.’ Academy of Management Review, 44(4), pp.819-845. 
 239 
Guba, E. and Lincoln, Y. (1986) ‘But is it rigorous? Trustworthiness and authenticity in 
naturalistic evaluation.’ New directions for program evaluation, 30, pp.73-84. 
Hammersley, M. (1992) What’s Wrong with Ethnography: Methodological Explorations. 
London: Routledge.   
 
Hammersley, M. (2008). Questioning qualitative inquiry: Critical essays. Sage. 
 
Harding, R. (2004) ‘Social enterprise. The new economic engine?’ Business Strategy 
Review, 15(4), pp. 39-43. 
 
Harding (2006) Social Entrepreneurship Monitor GEM UK. London: London Business School 
and The Work Foundation. 
Harmer, A., Spicer, N., Aleshkina, J., Bogdan, D., Chkhatarashvili, K., Murzalieva, G. and 
Walt, G. (2013) ‘Has global fund support for civil society advocacy in the former soviet union 
established meaningful engagement or “a lot of jabber about nothing?’ Health Policy and 
Planning, 28, pp.299-308.   
Hastings, A., Bailey, N., Besemer, K. and Bramley, G. (2013) ‘Coping with the cuts? The 
management of the worst financial settlement in living memory.’ Local Government Studies, 
41(4), pp.601-621. 
 
Hastings, A., Bailey, N. and Bramley, G. (2015) ‘Symposium introduction: Local responses 
to ‘austerity’.’ Local Government Studies, 41(4), pp.571-581. 
 
Haugh, H. (2012) ‘The importance of theory in social enterprise research.’ Social Enterprise 
Journal, 8(1), pp.7-15. 
 
Haugh, H and Kitson, M. (2007) ‘The Third Way and the third sector: New Labour’s 
economic policy and the social economy.’ Cambridge Journal of Economics, 31, pp.973-994. 
 
Haugh, H. and Talwar, A. (2016) ‘Linking social entrepreneurship and social change: The 
mediating role of empowerment.’ Journal of Business Ethics, 133(4), pp.643-658. 
 
Hay, C. (1997) ‘Divided by a common language: Political theory and the concept of power.’ 
Politics, 17(1), pp.45-52. 
 
Herman, R.D. and Renz, D. (1998) ‘Nonprofit organizational effectiveness: Contrasts 
between especially effective and less effective organizations.’ Nonprofit Management and 
Leadership, 9, pp.23-38. 
 
Herranz, J., Logan R. and McKay, B. (2010) ‘Tri-Value Organization as a Form of Social 
Enterprise: The Case of Seattle’s Fare Start.’ Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly. 
 
Herzlinger, R. (1994) ‘Effective Oversight, A Guide for Nonprofit Directors.’ Harvard 
Business Review, 72(4), pp. 52-60. 
 
Hines, T. and Quinn, L. (2005) ‘Socially constructed realities and the hidden face of market 
segmentation.’ Journal of marketing Management, 21(5), pp.529-543. 
 
HM Government (2012) Public Services (Social Value) Act. London: HMSO 
 
 240 
HM Government. (2012) Making it Easier for Civil Society to Work with the State – Update 
Report. London. 
 
HM Treasury. (1999) Enterprise and Social Exclusion, London: HM Treasury National 
Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal Policy Action Team 3.  
 
HM Treasury. (2010) The Future Role of the Third Sector in Social and Economic 
Regeneration-Interim Report. HM Treasury UK. 
 
HM Treasury. (2011) ‘Department for Business Innovation and Skills. The plan for growth. 
HM Treasury UK. 
 
HM Treasury (2015). Spending review and autumn statement 2015. The Stationery Office, 
London. 
 
Hodgkinson, I. and Hughes, P. (2012) ‘A level playing field: social inclusion in public leisure.’ 
International Journal of Public Sector Management, 25(1), pp.48-63. 
 
Hogg, E. and Baines, S. (2011) ‘Changing responsibilities and roles of the voluntary and 
community sector in the welfare mix: a review.’ Social Policy and Society, 10(3), pp.341-352. 
 
Houlihan, B. and Lindsey, I. (2012) Sport policy in Britain. Routledge. 
 
Hoye, R. (2006) ‘Leadership within Australian voluntary sport organization boards.’ Nonprofit 
Management and Leadership, 16, pp.297–313. 
 
Huybrechts, B., and Nicholls, A. (2012) ‘Social entrepreneurship: definitions, drivers and 
challenges.’ Social entrepreneurship and social business, pp.31-48. 
 
Iecovich, E. (2005) The profile of board membership in Israeli voluntary organisations.’ 
International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organisations. 16(2) pp.161-180. 
 
Iecovich, E. and Bar-Mor, H. (2007) ‘Relationships between chairpersons and CEOs in 
nonprofit organizations.’ Administration in Social Work, 31(4), pp.21-40. 
 
Inglis, S. (1997) ‘Roles of the Board in Amateur Sport Organisations.’ Journal of Sport 
Management, 11, pp.160-176. 
 
Ingram, R. (2003) Ten basic responsibilities of nonprofit boards. Washington, DC: National 
Center for Nonprofit Boards. 
 
Jackson, B., Nicoll, M. and Roy, M.J. (2018) ‘The distinctive challenges and opportunities for 
creating leadership within social enterprises.’ Social Enterprise Journal, 14(1), pp.71-91. 
 
Jensen, M. (2001) ‘Value maximization, stakeholder theory, and the corporate objective 
function.’ Journal of applied corporate finance, 14(3), pp.8-21. 
Jones, M. (2007) ‘The multiple sources of mission drift.’ Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly, 36, pp.299–307. 
Jonker, J. and Nijhof, A. (2006) ‘Looking through the eyes of others: assessing mutual 
expectations and experiences in order to shape dialogue and collaboration between 




Kelly, D., Steiner, A., Mazzei, M. and Baker, R. (2019) ‘Filling a void? The role of social 
enterprise in addressing social isolation and loneliness in rural communities.’ Journal of 
Rural Studies. 
Kennedy, D. and Kennedy, P. (2015) ‘Grass-roots football, autonomous activity and the 
forging of new social relationships.’ Sport in Society. 18(4), 497-513.  
Keohane, N., Parker, S. and Ebanks, D. (2011) Realising community wealth: Local 
government and the Big Society. New Local Government Network. 
 
Kerlin, J. (2009) Social enterprise: A global comparison. UPNE. 
 
Kerlin, J. and Pollack, T. (2011) ‘Nonprofit Commercial Revenue A Replacement for 
Declining Government Grants and Private Contributions?.’ The American Review of Public 
Administration, 41(6), pp.686-704. 
Kiernan, A. & Porter, C. (2014) ‘Little United and the Big Society: Negotiating the gaps 
between football, community and the politics of inclusion.’ Soccer & Society. 16(6), pp.847-
863.  
Kikulis, L. M. (2000) ‘Continuity and change in governance and decision making in national 
sport organisations: institutional explanations.’ Journal of Sport Management, 14(4), pp.293-
320. 
 
King, N. (2014) ‘Making the case for sport and recreation services: The utility of social return 
on investment (SROI) analysis.’ International Journal of Public Sector Management, 27(2), 
pp.152-164. 
 
Kreps, T. and Monin, B. (2011) ‘Doing well by doing good’? Ambivalent moral framing in 
organizations.’ Research in Organizational Behavior, 31, pp.99–123. 
Kuhn, T.S. (1962) The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Labour Party Manifesto. (1997) Britain Will be Better With New Labour. London. 
 
Labour Party Manifesto. (2001)  Ambitions for Britain, Labour Party. London. 
 
Laville, J., Young, D. and Eynaud, P. (2015) Civil Society, the Third Sector and Social 
Enterprise: Governance and Democracy. Routledge. 
 
Leadbeater, C. (2002) Life in No man’s Land. New Statesman Ltd. 
 
Leisure Trust Organisation A. (2019) LTO-A Key Facts. [Online] [Accessed 8th November 
2019] https://www.lto-a.org/b2b/facts  [URL Anonymized].  
 
Leisure Trust Organisation A. (2019b) LTO-A Strategy, Vision, Culture. [Online] [Accessed 
8th November 2019] https://www.lto-a.org/b2b/pages/vision-culture  [URL Anonymized].  
 
Leisure Trust Organisation A Sport Foundation. (2019) LTO-A Sport Foundation Objectives. 
[Online] [Accessed 10th November 2019] https://www.lto-asportfoundation.org/about-us/  
[URL Anonymized].  
 
 242 
Leisure Trust Organisation B. (2019) LTO-B Roll of Honour. [Online] [Accessed 14th 
November 2019] http://lto-b.org.uk/history-achievements/roll-of-honour-2004-to-date/  [URL 
Anonymized].  
 
Leisure Trust Organisation B. (2019b) LTO-B Annual Reports and Accounts. [Online] 
[Accessed 14th November 2019] http://lto-b.org.uk/about-us/annual-reports/  [URL 
Anonymized].  
 
Leslie, D. (2002) Rural Social Enterprises in Cumbria-Who Makes Them? VAC. 
 
Letza, S., Sun, X. and Kirkbride, J. (2004) ‘Shareholding versus stakeholding: a critical 
review of corporate governance’.’ Corporate Governance, 12(3), pp.242-62. 
 
Levitas, R. (2012) ‘The Just's Umbrella: Austerity and the Big Society in Coalition policy and 
beyond.’ Critical Social Policy.  
 
Lincoln, Y. and Guba, E. (1985) Naturalistic Inquiry. London: Sage. 
 
Lindsey, R. and Bulloch, S. (2013) What the public think of the ‘Big Society’: Mass 
Observers’ views on individual and community capacity for civic engagement. TSRC 
Working Paper 95, University of Birmingham. 
Livsey, G. (2015) ‘Leisure facility management operators’. Annals of Leisure. 53(2). pp.45-
48. 
Local Gov. (2014) Outsourcing in local government increases by nearly 60% 
http://www.localgov.co.uk/Outsourcing-in-local-government-increases-by-nearly-60/36326, 
accessed 9 September 2014. 
Lorimer, J. (2010) International conservation “volunteering” and the geographies of global 
environmental citizenship. Political Geography, Vol.29, pp.311-322. 
Lovaglia, M., Mannix, E., Samuelson, C., Sell, J. and Wilson, R. (2005) ‘Conflict, power, and 
status in groups.’ Theories of small groups: Interdisciplinary perspectives.12(2), pp.139-184. 
 
Low, C. (2006) ‘A framework for the governance of social enterprise.’ International Journal of 
Social Economics, 33, pp.376-85. 
 
Low, C. and Chinnock, C. (2008) ‘Governance failure in social enterprise.’ Education, 
Knowledge and Economy. 2(3), pp.203-212. 
 
Lowndes, V. and Pratchett, L. (2012) ‘Local governance under the coalition government: 
Austerity, localism and the ‘Big Society’.’ Local government studies, 38(1), pp.21-40. 
 
Lowndes, V. and Squires, S. (2012) ‘Cuts, collaboration and creativity.’ Public Money & 
Management, 32(6), pp.401-408. 
 
Lowndes, V., and Gardner, A. (2016) ‘Local governance under the conservatives: Super-
austerity, devolution and the ‘smarter state’. Local government studies, 42(3), pp.357-375. 
 
Lozano, J. (2005) ‘Towards the relational corporation: from managing stakeholder 
relationships to building stakeholder relationships.’ Corporate Governance, 5(2), pp.60-77. 
 
 243 
Luke, B. (2019) A Review of Third Sector Reporting Frameworks: Communicating Value 
Created in Small and Micro Social Enterprises. In Handbook of Research on Value Creation 
for Small and Micro Social Enterprises (pp. 26-45). IGI Global. 
Lyon, F. and Humbert, L. (2012) ‘Gender balance in the governance of social enterprise.’ 
Local Economy, 27(8), pp.831-845.  
Lyon, F. and Sepulveda, L. (2009) ‘Mapping social enterprises: past approaches, challenges 
and future direction.’ Social Enterprise Journal, 5(1), pp.83–94. 
 
Lyons, S., Duxbury, L., and Higgins, C. (2006) ‘A comparison of the values and commitment 
of private sector, public sector, and parapublic sector employees.’ Public administration 
review, 66(4), pp.605-618. 
 
Macaulay, B., Roy, M.J., Donaldson, C., Teasdale, S. and Kay, A. (2017) ‘Conceptualizing 
the health and well-being impacts of social enterprise: a UK-based study.’ Health promotion 
international, 33(5), pp.748-759 
Macmillan, R. (2013) ‘Making sense of the Big Society: perspectives from the third sector.’ 
Maier, F., Meyer, M. and Steinbereithner, M. (2016) ‘Nonprofit Organizations Becoming 
Business-Like A Systematic Review.’ Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 45(1), 
pp.64-86. 
 
Mair, J. (2010) ‘Social entrepreneurship: Taking stock and looking ahead.’ In Fayolle, 
A. and Matlay, H. (Eds.), Handbook of research and social entrepreneurship, pp.15–
28. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Manning, P. (2008) ‘Goffman on organizations,’ Organization Studies, 29(5), pp.677-699.  
Martin, R. and Osberg, S. (2007) ‘Social entrepreneurship: The case for definition.’ Stanford 
Social Innovation Review, 7(1), pp.29-39.  
Martin, F. and Thompson, B. (2010) Social Enterprise: Developing Sustainable Businesses. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Mason, C., Kirkbride, J. and Bryde, D. (2006) ‘From stakeholders to institutions: the 
changing face of social enterprise governance theory.’ Management Decision, 45(2), pp.284 
– 301. 
 
Mason, C. (2010) ‘Choosing sides: contrasting attitudes to governance issues in Social 
Firms in the UK.’ Social Enterprise Journal, 6(1), pp. 6-22. 
 
Mason, C. and Simmons, J. (2014) ‘Embedding corporate social responsibility in corporate 
governance: A stakeholder systems approach.’ Journal of Business Ethics, 119(1), pp.77-
86. 
 
May, A. (1991) ‘Interview techniques in qualitative research: Concerns and 
challenges.’ Qualitative nursing research: A contemporary dialogue, pp.188-201. 
 
McNulty, T. and Pettigrew, A. (1999) ‘Strategists on the board.’ Journal of Management 
Studies, 20(1), pp.47-74. 
 
 244 
Miles, M. and Huberman, M. (1994) Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook. 
Beverly Hills CA, Sage Publications. 
 
Miller, J. (2002) ‘The board as a monitor of organizational activity: The application of agency 
theory to nonprofit boards.’ Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 12, pp.429–450. 
 
Miller, T. and Wesley, I. (2010) ‘Assessing mission and resources for social change: An 
organizational identity perspective on social venture capitalists' decision criteria.’ 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34(4), pp.705-733. 
 
Miller-Millensen, J. (2003) Understanding the behavior of nonprofit boards of directors. A 
theory based approached.’ Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly. 32(4), pp.521-547. 
 
Misener, K.E. and Misener, L. (2017) ‘Grey is the new black: Advancing understanding of 
new organizational forms and blurring sector boundaries in sport management.’ Journal of 
sport management, 31(2), pp.125-132. 
 
Mongelli, L. and Rullani, F., (2017) ‘Inequality and marginalisation: social innovation, social 
entrepreneurship and business model innovation.’ Industry and Innovation, 24(5), pp.446-
467. 
 
Mongelli, L., Rullani, F., Ramus, T. and Rimac, T. (2019) The Bright Side of Hybridity: 
Exploring How Social Enterprises Manage and Leverage Their Hybrid Nature 
 
Mordaunt, J. and Cornforth, C. (2004) ‘The role of boards in the failure and turnaround of 
non-profit organizations.’ Public Money and Management, 24(4), pp.227-234. 
 
Morgan, G. (2006) Images of organisation. Thousand Oaks, California:Sage Publications. 
 
Moss, T., Short, G., Payne, and G. T. Lumpkin (2011) ‘Dual Identities in Social Ventures: An 
Exploratory Study,’ Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 35, pp. 805–830. 
 
Munoz, S. (2009) ‘Social enterprise and public sector voices on procurement.’ Social 
Enterprise Journal, 5(1), pp.69-82. 
 
Murray, V. and Wolpin, J. (1992) ‘Do Nonprofit Boards Make a Difference? An Exploration of 
the Relationships Among Board Structure, Process, and Effectiveness.’ Nonprofit and 
Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 21(3), pp.227-249. 
 
Muth, M. and Donaldson, L. (1998) ‘Stewardship theory and board structure; a contingency 
approach.’ Corporate Governance: An International Review. 6(1), pp.5-28. 
National Archives. (2013) The Community Interest Company Regulations, London. 
NCVO. (2006) Brief guide to Loan Finance for Trustees. The Sustainable Funding Project. 
National Council for Voluntary Organisations. 
 
NCVO (2012) UK Civil Society Almanac, http://data.ncvo.org.uk/a/almanac12/how-are-
public-sector-spending-cuts-affecting-the-voluntary-sector/#footnote-34d, accessed 5 June 
2018. 
 
Nicholls, A. (2010) ‘The Legitimacy of Social Entrepreneurship: Reflexive Isomorphism in a 
Pre-Paradigmatic Field.’ Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34(4), pp.611-633. 
 245 
Office of the Third Sector. (2010) Thriving Third Sector: A user guide for the National Survey 
of Third Sector Organisations. OTS, London.  
Olson, D. (2000) ‘Agency Theory in the Not-for-Profit Sector: Its Role at Independent 
Colleges.’ Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 29, pp.280–296. 
Osborne, S. and Brown, L. (2011) ‘Innovation, public policy and public services delivery in 
the UK. The word that would be king?’ Public Administration, 89(4), pp.1335-1350. 
 
Pache, A. and Santos, F. (2013) ‘Inside the hybrid organization: Selective coupling as a 
response to competing institutional logics.’ Academy of Management Journal, 56(4), pp.972-
1001. 
 
Pape, M., Fairbrother, P. and Snell, D. (2016) ‘Beyond the state: Shaping governance and 
development policy in an Australian region.’ Regional Studies, 50(5), pp.909-921. 
 
Parnell, D., Millward, P. and Spracklen, K. (2015) ‘Sport and austerity in the UK: An insight 
into Liverpool 2014.’ Journal of policy research in tourism, leisure and events, 7(2), pp.200-
203. 
 
Parnell, D., Cope, E., Bailey, R., and Widdop, P. (2017) ‘Sport policy and English primary 
physical education: the role of professional football clubs in outsourcing.’ Sport in 
society, 20(2), pp.292-302. 
 
Patton, M. Q. (1990) Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods. California: SAGE. 
 
Paton, R. (2003) Managing and Measuring Social Enterprises. Sage, London. 
 
Pearce, J. (2003) Social Enterprise in Anytown. Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, London. 
 
Pearce, J. A., and David, F. (1987) ‘Corporate mission statements: The bottom 
line.’ Academy of Management Perspectives, 1(2), pp. 109-115. 
 
Peattie, K and Morley, A. (2008) ‘Eight paradoxes of the social enterprise research agenda.’ 
Social Enterprise Journal, 4(2), pp.91-107. 
 
Pederson, E.R. (2006) ‘Making corporate social responsibility (CSR) operable: how 
companies translate stakeholder dialogue into practice.’ Business & Society Review, 111(2), 
pp.137-63. 
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